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Abstract
This Note argues that customary international law does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons
in self-defense. Part I describes the characteristics of nuclear weapons, including their destructive
capabilities and health effects. Part I also discusses the development of the laws of war and the
process by which a generally accepted principle or practice ascends to customary international law.
Further, Part I presents existing treaties concerning non-proliferation and other nuclear weapons-
related issues. Part II examines the application of the laws of war to nuclear weapons use and
the resulting conflict over the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. Part III argues that the
international community has neither expressly consented to nor evidenced their intent to accept
a ban on nuclear weapons use. Customary international law, therefore, does not contain a rule
forbidding the use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances. This Note concludes that prospective
measures designed to deter the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons are more effective than a
decision determining the legality of nuclear weapons.
NOTE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE LAWS OF WAR: DOES
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW PROHIBIT THE USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES?
fill M. Sheldon*
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear weapons1 have the capacity to cause vast destruc-
tion' and protracted illnesses,' yet no specific treaty declares
their use illegal.4 The laws of war5 establish limits on the means
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University.
1. See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14,
1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, 332, 6 I.L.M. 521, 523 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco] (defin-
ing nuclear weapons). Article V defines a nuclear weapon as "any device which is capa-
ble of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of
characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes." Id. at 332, 6 I.L.M. at
523; see Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Dec. 15, 1995, art.
1 (c), 35 I.L.M. 635, 640 [hereinafter Southeast Asia Treaty] (defining nuclear weapon
as "explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner but
does not include the means of transport or delivery of such device if separable from
and not an indivisible part thereof"). According to Article 1 of the treaty establishing a
nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa, a nuclear explosive device means, "any nuclear
weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of
the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in
unassembled and partly assembled forms." African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,
June 21-23, 1995, art. 1(c), 35 I.L.M. 698, 706 [hereinafter African Treaty].
2. See PAUL P. CRAIG & JOHN A. JUNGERMAN, NUCLEAR ARMS RACE: TECHNOLOGY
AND SOCIETY 141-44 (1990) (discussing immediate effects of nuclear weapons). The
destructive effects of nuclear explosions include burns from thermal radiation and
deaths from immediate radiation exposure and flying debris. Id. at 141-43.
3. See id. at 344-48 (describing radiation effects of nuclear explosions). Long-term
health effects of exposure to radiation include anemia, cataracts, leukemia, hypothy-
roidism, birth defects, increased infant mortality, and genetic damage. Id.
4. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 824, 57,
58 (July 8, 1996) [hereinafter Legality Opinion] (finding that ban on recourse to nu-
clear weapons does not appear in treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction, and
noting that international community has not produced treaty prohibiting nuclear weap-
ons use); Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reas-
sessment, 28 MCGILL L.J. 542, 546 (1983) (acknowledging that no treaty explicitly bans
manufacture, stockpiling, deployment, or actual use of nuclear weapons).
5. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 189, 196 (1992) (discussing application of laws of war to states' initial resort
to war and to belligerents' conduct during armed conflict). The laws of war consist of
treaties, custom, general principles of law recognized by the international community,
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and methods of warfare, however, by regulating the conduct of
belligerents and by limiting the weapons that may be used dur-
ing armed conflict.6 The laws of war potentially prohibit nuclear
weapons as a means of war.7 Further, the use of nuclear weap-
ons must comply with provisions of the U.N. Charter relating to
self-defense8 and the use or threat of force in armed conflict.'
Since the U.S. use of nuclear weapons during World War II,10
legal scholars have disagreed as to whether the use of nuclear
weapons is illegal under customary international law."1
and principles of law enunciated by jurists and judicial decisions. Nuremberg Trial, 6
F.R.D. 69, 109 (1946).
6. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 189.
7. See Malcolm N. Shaw, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, in NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 1, 2 (Istvan Pogany ed., 1987) (discussing application of
general principles of laws of war concerning methods of warfare to nuclear weapons
use); 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 347-48 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed.
1952) [hereinafter 2 OPPENHEIM] (proposing that legality of nuclear weapons use de-
pends on consideration of distinction between combatants and noncombatants, princi-
ples of humanity, and existing international documents that limit use of violence in
war).
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (providing that member states have right to self-defense
until Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security).
9. Id. art. 2(4) (prohibiting threat or use of force).
10. See JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 584 (1990) (discussing atomic
bombings of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945); see also
JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 344 (1954) (discussing in-
ternational community's reaction in 1945 to U.S. use of atomic weapons). But see Elbert
Thomas, Atomic Bombs in International Society, 39 A.J.I.L. 736, 736 (1945) (supporting
uses of atomic bomb during World War II). The hostilities of World War II com-
menced without formal declarations of war between Japan and China in 1937, Germany
and Poland in 1939, andJapan and the United States in 1941. 2 0PPENHEIM, supra note
7, at 292-93; see B.H. LIDDELL HART, HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 16 (1971)
(discussing events preceding outbreak of World War II). The British and French Gov-
ernments declared war against Germany on Sept. 3, 1939, and German forces invaded
Russia on June 22, 1941. Id. at 16, 141. The British Government formally declared war
againstJapan on December 8, 1941. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 296 n.1. The war in
Europe officially ended on May 8, 1945, and Japan officially surrendered on Sept. 2,
1945. HART, supra, at 680, 698.
11. See STONE, supra note 10, at 344 (stating that in immediate post-World War II
period, some nations did not question legality of U.S. use of nuclear weapons); Elbert
Thomas, Atomic Warfare and International Law, 40 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 84, 85 (1946)
(contending that atomic bomb rendered laws of war obsolete). Customary interna-
tional law refers to the laws governing relations between states. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 4-5 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter 1 0PPEN-
HEIM]. It includes treaties, custom, general principles of law recognized by nations,
judicial decisions of states acknowledging and enforcing this law, and writings ofjurists.
See Statute of the International Court ofJustice,June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055,
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On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice 2 ("ICJ"
or "Court") contributed to the international community's divi-
siveness over the legality of nuclear weapons use. i s In response
to a request by the U.N. General Assembly,' 4 the ICJ issued an
advisory opinion t3 ("Legality Opinion") on July 8, 1996 which
condemned only the first use of nuclear weapons.' 6 The IGJ,
1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (listing sources of international
law).
12. See U.N. CHARTER art. 7 (establishing ICJ as principle organ of United Na-
tions). Article 92 of the U.N. Charter provides that the ICJ shall function according to
the Statute of the International Court ofJustice. Id. art. 92.
13. See World Court Condemns Use of Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at A8
(noting split among states testifying before ICJ between countries such as France, Rus-
sia, and United States that urged ICJ to reject request and Australia and New Zealand
which argued for ban on nuclear weapons); N-Arms Not Illegal, But Court Limits Use,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 9, 1996, at A7 (stating that anti-nuclear groups disagreed on signifi-
cance of ICJ's ruling); Christopher Bellamy, D-day for Nuclear Arms Powers Threat, IN.
DEPENDENT, July 8, 1996, at 9 (noting that approximately 30 of 45 states offering evi-
dence before ICJ argued for illegality, and that France, Russia, United Kingdom, and
United States argued that ICJ should decline to rule on legality issue). The ICJ usually
consists of fifteen judges, but the death of one judge reduced the panel to an even
fourteen. Bellamy, supra, at 9. The Court's decision reflected the controversy over the
legality issue, as seven judges decided in favor, and seven against. Legality Opinion,
supra note 4, 105(2) (E), at 831. In the event of an even panel, the ICJ President casts
the deciding vote. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 12(4), at 1056, 3 Bevans at 1181. To
reach a majority on the issue of legality of nuclear weapons use, President Mohammed
Bedjaoui cast two votes. Jonathan C. Randal, World Court: Nuclear Arms Mostly Illegal,
WASH. POST, July 9, 1996, at A12.
14. See U.N. CHARTER art. 96(1) (allowing General Assembly to request advisory
opinions from ICJ on any legal question). The General Assembly is the parliamentary
organ of the United Nations which may pass non-binding resolutions. MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 58 (3d ed. 1991).
15. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65, at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190 (empowering ICJ
to render advisory opinions). By rendering advisory opinions, the ICJ assists other U.N.
organs in settling disputes and provides guidance on legal questions. IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 731 (4th ed. 1990). Legality opinions have
no binding effect on the international community. Interpretation of Peace Treaties
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.CJ. 65, 71 (Mar. 30).
16. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 105(2) (E), at 831. In 1993, the World Health
Assembly of the World Health Organization ("WHO") and the U.N. General Assembly
individually petitioned the ICJ for advisory opinions on the legality of nuclear weapons.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1995 I.CJ. 3, 3-4 (Order of Feb.
1) (discussing requests for advisory opinion). In Resolution 75K, the General Assembly
requested that the ICJ render an advisory opinion on the issue, "[i]s the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?" G.A. Res.
75K, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/49/699 (1994). The
World Health Assembly requested an opinion on the question whether, "[i]n view of
the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in
war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law in-
cluding the WHO Constitution?" 1995 I.C.J. at 4. For jurisdictional reasons, the ICJ
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however, refused to provide examples of when the use of nuclear
weapons in self-defense would comply with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter 7 and with customary international law relating to
armed conflict."8 In its Legality Opinion, the ICJ considered
principles traditionally reserved for conventional weapons, such
as provisions of the U.N. Charter relating to the use of force,19
the laws of war regulating conduct of hostilities during warfare,2 °
and relevant treaties specific to nuclear weapons. 21 The Court
refrained from declaring that the use of nuclear weapons would
contravene customary international law in all circumstances.22
Moreover, the Court declined to determine the legality of using
nuclear weapons in an extreme situation of self-defense which
threatens a state's survival.28
This Note argues that customary international law does not
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense. Part I de-
scribes the characteristics of nuclear weapons, including their
destructive capabilities and health effects. Part I also discusses
the development of the laws of war and the process by which a
generally accepted principle or practice ascends to customary in-
ternational law. Further, Part I presents existing treaties con-
determined that it could not respond to this request. See World Court Condemns Use of
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 13, at A8 (reporting that ICJ dismissed WHO request as
outside WHO's scope); N-Arms Not Illegal, But Court Limits Use, supra note 13, at A7
(discussing ICJ rejection of WHO request because WHO has authority only to address
health concerns, not international law).
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 provides, "[n]othing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Id.
18. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 95, at 829. The Court considered that it did
not have "sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law
applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance." Id.
19. See id. 37-50, at 822-23 (discussing U.N. Charter provisions relating to threat
or use of force); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) (prohibiting threat or use of force); id.
art. 51 (recognizing right of individual or collective self-defense); id. art. 42 (permitting
Security Council to take military enforcement actions).
20. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 53, at 823 (discussing prohibition against
poison); id. 74-97, at 827-30 (analyzing legality of nuclear weapons use in terms of
humanitarian law and law of neutrality).
21. Id. 57-63, at 824-26 (discussing treaties limiting acquisition, manufacture,
possession, deployment, testing, and proliferation of nuclear weapons).
22. Id. 95, at 829.
23. Id. 97, at 830. The Court stated that it could not "reach a definitive conclu-
sion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake." Id.
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cerning non-proliferaL. _a and other nuclear weapons-related is-
sues. Part II examines the application of the laws of war to nu-
clear weapons use and the resulting conflict over the legality of
the use of nuclear weapons. Part III argues that the interna-
tional community has neither expressly consented to nor evi-
denced their intent to accept a ban on nuclear weapons use.
Customary international law, therefore, does not contain a rule
forbidding the use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances. This
Note concludes that prospective measures designed to deter the
use and proliferation of nuclear weapons are more effective than
a decision determining the legality of nuclear weapons.
I. CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AN CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE LAWS
OF WAR
Despite the potentially disastrous effects of nuclear weap-
ons,2 4 the international community has not reached a consensus
on the legality of nuclear weapons use.2 5 In the absence of a
specific treaty banning nuclear weapons, the legality of nuclear
weapons use depends on principles of customary international
law.2 6 Legal scholars have compared the use of nuclear weapons
to other means and methods of warfare for which prohibitions
exist within the laws of war. 7 The international community has
made efforts to contain nuclear weapons through General As-
24. See NAGENDRA SINGH & EDWARD MGWHINNEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONTEM-
PORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-27 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing destructive and health ef-
fects caused by explosions of nuclear weapons during World War II). Some health
effects of nuclear explosions include radiation sickness, injuries from flying debris, and
burns from thermal radiation. CRAIG &JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 141-43.
25. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 1 57, 58, at 824 (finding that treaties relating
to weapons of mass destruction do not include ban on recourse to nuclear weapons,
and stating that international community has not produced treaty prohibiting nuclear
weapons use); Weston, supra note 4, at 546 (noting that no treaty specifically prohibits
manufacture, stockpiling, deployment, or actual use of nuclear weapons).
26. STONE, supra note 10, at 343; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 347-48.
27. See Nicholas Grief, The Legality of Nuclear Weapons, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (Istvan Pogany ed., 1987) (applying principles of international
humanitarian law to determine if any rule of international law prohibits nuclear weap-
ons use); ELLIOTT L. MEvROWTZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE RELEVANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-22 (1990) (analogizing to conventional and customary inter-
national law to evaluate legality of nuclear weapons); Shaw, supra note 7, at 1 (stating
that other rules of international law apply to nuclear weapons despite lack of treaty
condemning nuclear weapons).
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sembly resolutions and multilateral treaties. 2
A. Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons and Status of Nations
Possessing Nuclear Weapons
The nuclear explosions at Hiroshima2 9 and Nagasaki"0 and
the accidental explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor3 ' illus-
trate the potential destructive capabilities and medical effects of
nuclear energy.3 2 In the immediate post-World War II period,
the international community sought to control the further
spread of nuclear energy.33 Nations entered into international
treaties which characterized states according to the formal pos-
session of nuclear weapons in an attempt to monitor nuclear
weapons proliferation.3 4
1. Destructive Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons
The effects of nuclear explosions include blast effects, ther-
mal radiation, initial nuclear radiation, electromagnetic pulse,
and radioactive fallout.35 Upon detonation, a nuclear explosion
heats the air to approximately eighteen million degrees and pro-
duces a fireball which travels at the speed of light.36 A hurri-
cane-type wind follows this heat wave and can reach a speed of
28. See SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 216 (stating that law of nuclear
disarmament consists of General Assembly resolutions, treaties, and various national
court judgments).
29. See Charles E. Glover, Hiroshima Remembered; World War II: 50 Years Later, AT-
LANTAJ. & CONST., Aug. 6,1995, at 6C (providing detailed description of atomic bomb-
ing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945).
30. See id. (describing explosion of atomic bomb at Nagasaki on August 9, 1945).
31. See Richard Stone, The Explosions that Shook the World, SCIENCE, Apr. 19, 1996, at
352 (describing causes and effects of nuclear reactor explosion at Chernobyl, Ukraine).
32. See Nell McCafferty, Life After Chernobyl, AUDUBON, May 1996, at 66, 70-71
(comparing health effects caused by nuclear reactor explosion at Chernobyl to atomic
bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
33. See CRAIG & JUNoERMAN, supra note 2, at 22 (discussing creation in 1946 of
U.N. Atomic Energy Commission intended to eliminate all weapons of mass destruc-
tion, including nuclear weapons).
34. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsJuly 1, 1968, arts. I, II,
21 U.S.T. 483, 487, 729 U.N.T.S. 161,171 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter
NPT] (distinguishing between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states).
35. CRAIG & JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 255.
36. Tom Reinken, Attack on Hiroshima; Dropping the Bomb, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995,
at A4. The shock wave following a nuclear explosion results from the heating of large
quantities of energy released in a small volume of air which generates hot gases at high
pressures. CRaG & JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 256.
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over 150 miles per hour. 7 After the initial explosion, fission
products released from the core continue to emit beta particles
and gamma radiation, causing what is known as nuclear fallout."8
The international community first witnessed the destructive
capabilities of nuclear weapons during World War II.19 The U.S.
Air Force dropped a uranium-based atomic bomb on Hiroshima
on August 6, 1945,40 destroying four square miles of Hiroshima"
and causing in excess of 80,000 deaths. 42 On August 9, 1945,
three days after the bombing of Hiroshima, the U.S. Air Force
dropped a plutonium-based atomic bomb on Nagasaki.43 This
bomb destroyed one and one-half square miles of Nagasaki'
and caused in excess of 40,000 deaths.45 The nuclear bombs at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki detonated in the atmosphere causing
the fallout to spread away from the areas of explosion and, thus,
reducing the amount of radioactive fallout in the two cities.46 In
comparison, the 1986 accidental explosion and fire in a nuclear
reactor at the Chernobyl Atomic Energy Station in Chernobyl,
Ukraine 7 produced 200 times the amount of radioactive fallout
37. CRAIG &JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 257.
38. SINGH & McWHrrNNY, supra note 24, at 18.
39. See KEEGAN, supra note 10, at 584 (discussing U.S. use of atomic bombs during
World War II). On July 24, 1945, U.S. President Harry Truman authorized the use of
atomic weapons against Japan. Walter Pincus, Truman and the Bomb: What the Record
Shows, INT'L HERALD TRI.,July 17, 1995.
40. HART, supra note 10, at 696. An atomic bomb requires approximately 18
pounds of plutonium or about 55 pounds of enriched uranium. William Drozdiak,
Nuclear Watchdog Seeks More Bite, WASH. PosT, June 10, 1996, at A14.
41. SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 17.
42. HART, supra note 10, at 696. The bomb killed approximately one-quarter of
Hiroshima's population. Id. Other estimates suggest that between 80,000 and 140,000
people died immediately and that the bombing caused 100,000 serious injuries. CRAIG
&JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 17-18. Any casualty figures for the bombings of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki are approximate due to the loss of population records as a result of
the bombings. Id. at 18.
43. CRAIG &JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 18.
44. SINGH & MCWHINNEV, supra note 24, at 17.
45. CRAIG & JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 18. Estimates provide that the bomb
caused between 40,000 and 70,000 immediate deaths and injured about the same
number. Id. Reports suggest the bomb killed approximately one-sixth of Nagasaki's
population. SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 17.
46. Casey Bukro, Fallout From '60s A-Tests Worse Than Chernobyl, CHI. TRIB.,June 22,
1986, at C3. Generally, winds carry radiation away from an explosion's source and the
radiation becomes more diluted as it spreads. Boyce Rensberger, Partial Core Meltdown
Suspected, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1986, at Al.
47. The Accident at Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts, June 24, 1986, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The explosion
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than that of both atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki com-
bined.4"
2. Health Effects of Nuclear Explosions
The health effects of nuclear explosions4 9 consist of direct
effects, including injuries from the explosion itself and the re-
sulting radiation, and indirect effects, including blast damage.5"
The primary casualty effects of nuclear weapons include burns,
blasts, ionizing radiation, and thermal radiation.51 In the vicinity
of the nuclear explosion, the immediate health consequences of
the blast effects include lung damage and eardrum rupture.5"
The crushing or burning effects of a nuclear explosion 53 could
cause more deaths than radiation-related illnesses, such as can-
of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor occurred on April 26, 1986 at 1:23 a.m. Norman
Colin, Hazy Picture of Chernobyl Emerging, SCIENCE, June 13, 1986, at 1331; see CHILDREN
OF CHORNOBYL RELIEF FUND, HEALTH-RELATED IMPACT OF THE EXPLOSION AT THE
CHORNOBYL ATOMIC ENERGY STATION 1 (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter CHORNOBYL RELIEF
FUND] (on file with Fordham International Law Journal) (providing fact-sheet on health
effects of radiation caused by explosion of nuclear reactor at Chernobyl Atomic Energy
Station).
48. Andrew Melnykovych, Fallout Zone a Lab for Radiation Studies, Scientists Sift
Knowledge on Humans, Environment, COURIERJ., Apr. 22, 1996, at 6A; see Caroline Drees,
Impacts of Chernobyl to be a Mystery for 50 Years, REUTERS, Apr. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (stating that WHO reported statistics comparing effects of
nuclear explosions at Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Chernobyl).
49. See CRAIG &JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 335-52 (discussing biological and med-
ical effects of radioactivity). The health effects of nuclear explosions may not appear
for days, weeks, or years after the initial exposure, especially in cases where the radia-
tion exposure causes cancer. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, WEAPONS
THAT MAY CAUSE UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS 20 (1973)
[hereinafter ICRC REPORT]; Drees, supra note 48, at 1. Scientists have traditionally as-
sumed that cancers, other than leukemia, remain latent for at least ten years. Ann
MacLachlan, Rising Children's Thyroid Cancers Indicate Growing Chernobyl Link, NUCLEON-
ICS WEEK, Sept. 10, 1992, at 1, 8. Members of the WHO suggest, however, that the
carcinogenic effects of radioactive fallout damage the thyroid gland of children and
fetuses exposed to radiation more severely than they previously thought. Id. at 8.
50. See SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 17-27 (discussing direct and indirect
effects of nuclear weapons).
51. ICRC REPORT, supra note 49, at 20. Thermal radiation refers to the means by
which energy from a nuclear explosion is delivered to an object. CRAIG &JUNGERMAN,
supra note 2, at 270. Ionization is process of separating one or more electrons from an
atom or molecule. Id. at 336. Ionizing radiation damages cells in living organisms and
can cause the production of oxidants which act as poisons. Id. Unlike thermal radia-
tion, ionizing radiation may cause effects extending over a period of days, weeks, or
years until symptoms appear. ICRC REPORT, supra note 49, at 20.
52. CRAIG &JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 262.
53. SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 18.
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cer.5 4 At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, most fatal injuries resulted
from indirect effects of blast damage, such as lacerations from
flying glass fragments or injuries from being thrown against
buildings. 5 The physical damage to living organisms depends
on the types of contaminants to which they are exposed after an
explosion.56 Some long-term illnesses associated with the bomb-
ings at Nagasaki and Hiroshima include blood disorders, such as
anemia, cataracts, and leukemia.57
The 1986 Chernobyl accident provides recent data on the
health effects of nuclear weapons. 58 Researchers reported that
54. See Inherited Damage Is Found in Chernobyl Area Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
1996, at A8 [hereinafter Inherited Damage] (positing that many cancers caused by radia-
tion from Chernobyl accident resulted from exposure to radioactive isotope cesium-137
not released by bombs at Nagasaki and Hiroshima); Lidia Wasowicz, Genetic Legacy of
Chernobyl Disaster, UPI, Apr. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(describing cesium-137 as relatively long-lasting radioactive isotope which is main
source of radiation risk for people living in contaminated areas after nuclear explo-
sion).
55. SINGH & McWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 18. Indirect effects of the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki bombs included internal hemorrhaging and damage to the lungs, stom-
ach, and intestines. Id. The blast damage also caused the crushing or burying of peo-
ple by debris, injuries from flying objects, and burns from objects which had been di-
rectly or indirectly ignited by the blast. Id.
56. See McCafferty, supra note 32, at 70 (stating that radioactive iodine-131 dissi-
pates over several days, but other contaminants such as cesium-137 and strontium-90
have half-lives of 30 years). Cesium's longer half-life causes radiation poisoning to the
entire body over an extended period of time because it seeps into the topsoil, becomes
part of the food chain, and is ultimately ingested by humans. Nigel Williams, Leukemia
Studies Continue to Draw a Blank, SCIENCE, Apr. 19, 1996, at 358. Conversely, iodine's
short half-life causes a short, intense dose of radiation which the human body absorbs
in the thyroid gland, causing thyroid cancer. Id. Living organisms may suffer radiation
damage from gamma rays if they were close to the nuclear explosion. CR-a.G &
JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 336. Gamma rays also cause radiation damage as they are
released during radioactive fallout. Id.
57. CRAIG &JuNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 344-46. A significant correlation between
the nuclear bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki also existed for other cancers, such as
thyroid cancer, breast cancer, lung cancer, and cancer of the salivary gland. Id. at 347.
58. Ann MacLachlan, Defining the Chernobyl Damage Still Eludes Experts Everywhere,
NUCLEONICS WEEK, May 2, 1996, at 12. Some scientists dispute the number of fatal
casualties, including cancer rates, associated with the Chernobyl explosion. See Eliza-
beth Manning, Washington, UPI, Apr. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (discussing disputes among scientists and reports as to numbers of deaths
caused by radiation); Melnykovych, supra note 48, at 6A (listing other factors contribut-
ing to increase in Ukrainian health problems, including stress, alcoholism, smoking,
poor diet, and widespread pollution). Whereas the ministry of health in the Ukraine
reported approximately 125,000 deaths due to the accident, the Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists reported 6000 fatal casualties. Manning, supra. A victims' group, Chernobyl
Union, claimed more than 150,000 people died in the Ukraine alone, yet Greenpeace
Ukraine reported more than 32,000 related deaths. Scott Shane, Chernobyl's Persistent
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since this accident, levels of thyroid cancer among children in
the vicinity of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor had risen to eighty
times higher than the normal rate.59 A 1994 study reported that
exposure to radioactive fallout during pregnancy may cause
birth defects. 60 This study also indicated that, since the 1986 ac-
cident, birth defects in contaminated regions have increased by
1.8 times the normal rate of birth defects, from 3.87 per 1,000
live births to 6.97 per 1,000 live births.61 Other illnesses associ-
ated with radiation exposure include hair loss, 62 gastritis, leuke-
mia,63 and enlarged thyroid glands.64 Additionally, direct effects
Fallout, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 14,1996, at 2A. Data compiled by the WHO indicates that
the blast caused 3 immediate deaths, excessive radiation killed 28 fire-fighters attempt-
ing to extinguish the fire ignited by the blast, and radiation caused 11 additional
deaths. Michael Baker, Chernobyl Accident Not as Deadly as Portrayed, WISCONSIN STATE J.,
Apr. 24, 1996, at 1 1A; see Shane, supra, at 2A (stating that most scientists at gathering in
Vienna supported findings that Chernobyl accident directly caused less than 50
deaths).
59. Douglas A. Levy, Thyroid Cancer Cases Jump Near Chernobyl, UPI, Sept. 2, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; see Steve Connor, Big Rise in Child Cancer
Incidence Near Chernobyl, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 3, 1992, at 5 (stating that, due to Chernobyl
accident, children in Belarus were 80 times more likely to develop thyroid cancer than
children elsewhere in world); Cancers After Chernobyl, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at C5
(discussing WHO report that thyroid cancer among children has increased one-hun-
dred-fold); Gina Kolata, A Cancer Legacy From Chernobyl, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1992, at A6
(reporting data from Ukraine and Belarus indicated higher rate of thyroid cancer than
expected among children exposed to radiation from Chernobyl explosion). Thyroid
cancer is usually the first cancer to appear after exposure to radiation. Connor, supra.
Thyroid cancer results from the thyroid gland's absorption of large doses of iodine-131
and other iodine isotopes. See Michael Balter, Children Become the First Victims of Fallout,
SCIENCE, Apr. 19, 1996, at 357-60 (discussing correlation between increased incidents of
thyroid cancer and radiation released by Chernobyl nuclear reactor explosion).
60. See Rise in Birth Defects Near Chernobyl, UPI, July 13, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File (discussing evidence linking birth defects to radiation from
Chernobyl explosion). Yukio Sato, specializing in radioactivity-caused malformations at
the University of Hiroshima, conducted a study on birth defects in Belarus. Id.
61. Id.
62. See CRAIG &JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 336 (describing hair loss as caused by
intense exposure to beta radioactivity).
63. See Williams, supra note 56, at 358 (discussing leukemia as key early indicator
of radiation effects). After studying the Chernobyl nuclear accident, some scientists
questioned the link between leukemia and the accident. Medics Dispute ChernoylDisease
Link, UPI, July 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; see Manning,
supra note 58 (stating that increase in leukemia among children in Chernobyl area
probably resulted from increased detection and not from radiation exposure). But see
Chernobyl Study Raises Radiation Concerns, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 25, 1996, at 4C (re-
porting elevated leukemia rate among children in utero at time of Chernobyl explo-
sion). One researcher noted the difficulty of determining a correlation between in-
creased incidents of leukemia and the Chernobyl explosion because cancer data from
the affected regions was compiled using outdated techniques. Williams, supra note 56,
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of radiation poisoning include an increased infant mortality
rate,65 shorter life expectancy, 6 a higher infertility rate, 7 and
genetic mutations. 8
3. Categorization of Nations According to Nuclear Capabilities
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons6 9
("NPT") categorizes signatories to the treaty as either "haves" or
"have-nots," depending on whether these states formally possess
nuclear weapons. 71 The five declared nuclear weapons states are
at 358 (noting poor quality of data available because previous Soviet record keeping did
not conform to international guidelines).
64. Mireya Navarro, A Haven for the Ailing Children From Chernobyl, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 1995, at A4.
65. See PeterJ. Howe, Boston Sperm Bank to Help Fight Infertility in Ukraine, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1996, at 1 (stating that in Ukraine infant deaths have out-paced births
since 1990, and reporting that one of every five Ukrainian babies dies). Partially as a
result of infant mortality, Ukraine and Belarus reported negative population growth in
1994. CHORNOBYL RELIEF FUND, supra note 47, at 2. In the Ukraine, the infant mortality
rate is double the average infant mortality rate in Europe. Id.
66. See MacLachlan, supra note 58, at 13 (discussing high mortality rate among
initial accident recovery workers). Since the Chernobyl reactor explosion, Soviet offi-
cials reported a degenerated state of health for accident recovery workers. Id. Officials
also reported that these workers experienced an increased mortality rate by eight times
the rate before the explosion and a rate greater than the general working-age popula-
tion. Id.
67. See Howe, supra note 65, at 1 (discussing massive infertility crisis in Ukraine
and link between radiation and infertility). The increase in the infant mortality rate
since 1990 led Ukrainian health officials to conduct fertility testing. Id. Of those
tested, 50% of males between ages 13 and 29 have fertility problems, representing the
highest infertility rate in the world. Id.
68. See Inherited Damage, supra note 54, at A8 (discussing scientific reports of inher-
ited genetic damage in people exposed to nuclear fallout at Chernobyl); see also CRAIG
&JuNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 347-48 (describing genetic damage suffered by survivors
of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings). Scientists reported that families ex-
posed to the Chernobyl radioactive fallout are twice as likely to have children with ge-
netic mutations. Wasowicz, supra note 54.
69. See NPT, supra note 34, arts. I, II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (prohibiting
contracting parties from transferring or receiving nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive
devices). As of January 1, 1995, 171 countries had signed the NPT. See THE UNITED
NATIONS AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 185-86 (United Nations ed., 1995) [herein-
after NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION] (listing states party to NPT).
70. See NPT, supra note 34, arts. I, II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (classifying con-
tracting parties as either nuclear weapons states or non-nuclear weapons states). Article
IX defines a nuclear weapons state as one which had manufactured and exploded nu-
clear weapons or nuclear devices before January 1, 1967. Id. art. IX(3), at 492-93, 729
U.N.T.S. at 174. The NPT drew international criticism because it inherently discrimi-
nates against non-nuclear weapons states by allowing the haves to retain nuclear weap-
ons while prohibiting the have-nots from acquiring nuclear weapons. KATHLEEN C. BAI-
LEY, STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 7 (1993); see Nuclear Poker - India,
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China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.71 All states other than the five nuclear powers comprise
the "have-nots," or non-nuclear weapons states.
7 2
a. The "Haves"
Under the NPT, nuclear weapons states may not transfer
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states, 73 and must re-
frain from assisting, encouraging, or inducing non-nuclear weap-
ons states to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.74 A nu-
clear weapons state is any state that exploded a nuclear device
before January 1, 1967.7 China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States meet this requirement and,
thus, qualify as nuclear weapons states.
(1). China
The Chinese nuclear program began in the 1950's during a
period of cooperation with the former Soviet Union.77 On Octo-
ber 16, 1964, China conducted its first atomic bomb test 78 and
later exploded a hydrogen bomb in 1967.79 China has sharply
criticized the other four nuclear powers for continuing to de-
velop their nuclear programs while denying nuclear technology
ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1995, at 40 (describing India's criticism of NPT as establishing
system of nuclear apartheid which allows nuclear weapons states to retain nuclear arse-
nals while excluding non-nuclear weapons states).
71. Peter Grier, Much Arm-Twisting Ahead in Nuclear Test Talks, CHRISTIAN Sci. MON-
ITOR, July 1, 1996, at 4.
72. See NPT, supra note 34, art. II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (setting forth rights
and obligations of non-nuclear weapons states).
73. Id. art. I, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
74. Id. art. I, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
75. See id. art. IX(3), at 492-93, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174 (defining nuclear weapons
state). The United States tested the first atomic bomb in the Alamogordo Desert on
July 16, 1945. CRaG & JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 17. In August 1949, the Soviet
Union exploded its first atomic bomb. Id. at 24. The United Kingdom exploded its
first atomic weapon on October 3, 1952 off northwestern Australia. Key Events in Nuclear
Disarmament, 1945-96, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Sept. 12, 1996, at 655, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Key Events in Nuclear
Disarmament]. France detonated its first atomic bomb on February 13, 1960, and China
conducted its first nuclear weapons test explosion on October 16, 1964. Id.
76. See Grier, supra note 71, at 4 (stating that China, France, Russia, United King-
dom, and United States constitute nuclear weapons states).
77. CRAIG &JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 35.
78. Key Events in Nuclear Disarmament, supra note 75, at 655.
79. CRAIG &JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 37.
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used for peaceful purposes to developing countries.8 0 Neverthe-
less, China conducted a series of underground nuclear tests in
1995, before the 1996 negotiations on a comprehensive test ban
treaty."' The Chinese Government has pledged not to use nu-
clear weapons first against any state.82
(2). France
Since President Charles de Gaulle's leadership during the
1960's, the French Government viewed nuclear weapons as vital
to France's autonomy from its European allies.8 3 Under Presi-
dent Jacques Chirac, however, the French Government recently
expressed a willingness to coordinate a nuclear deterrence pol-
icy with its European neighbors.84 President Chirac has main-
tained that nuclear weapons form part of French deterrence pol-
icy and are not combat weapons.85 After the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, France retired certain non-strategic nuclear weap-
ons from its weapons arsenal.86 Recently, France reduced its nu-
clear arsenal to weapons aboard submarines and bombers when
it shut down eighteen land-based nuclear missiles.8 7 Despite
these reductions, France conducted a series of nuclear tests in
1995, provoking criticism from the international community. 88
80. Patrick E. Tyler, China Rebukes Four Other Nuclear Powers on Arms Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A14; see NPT, supra note 34, art. IV(2), at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S.
at 173 (providing that contracting parties shall cooperate with respect to exchanging
equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of
nuclear weapons).
81. Tyler, supra note 80, at Al4. Prior to the testing, U.S. reconnaissance satellites
detected preparations at the Lop Nor testing range in western China. Id. The Chinese
Government conducted another underground nuclear explosion in July 1996 to ensure
the safety and reliability of its weapons. John F. Harris, 5 World Powers Promise to Stop
Nuclear Testing; Comprehensive Ban on Blasts Is Signed at United Nations, WASH. PosT, Sept.
25, 1996, at Al.
82. Jeremy J. Stone, Customry Law Is Anti-Nuclear, INT'L HERALD TRIa., Nov. 13,
1995.
83. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 609-12 (1994) (examining French President
Charles de Gaulle's objective of establishing nuclear force independent of United King-
dom and United States).
84. David S. Yost, France's Nuclear Dilemmas, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 108,
111-12.
85. Id. at 116.
86. Tariq Rauf, Nuclear Disarmament: Review of Article VI, in THE FUTURE OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 69 (John Simpson & Darryl Howlett eds., 1995).
87. France Shuts Down Leg of its Nuclear Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1996, at A8.
88. Ian Geoghegan, New Zealand Urges World Nuclear Arms Ban, REUTERS, Nov. 9,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; see Don MacKay, Nuclear Testing:
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(3). Russia
The dissolution of the former Soviet Union 9 caused the in-
ternational community to question whether Russia or the non-
Russian republics controlled the former Soviet Union's nuclear
arsenals.9 ° Before the breakup, the Soviet Government stored
more than 7000 nuclear warheads in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine.9" In June 1996, Ukraine surrendered its inherited nu-
clear weapons, 92 and Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed to consoli-
date their nuclear weapons with Russia's weapons.93 Kazakhstan
has since become a nuclear weapons-free state, 94 and Belarus re-
cently turned over all Soviet nuclear weapons located in Belarus
to Russia.95
(4). The United Kingdom
The U.K. Government maintains a policy of deterrence to-
wards nuclear weapons.96 In 1958, the U.K. Government ac-
knowledged that no specific treaty banned nuclear weapons
New Zealand and France in the International Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L Lj. 1857,
1857-58 (1996) (examining opposition in South Pacific to resumed French nuclear
weapons testing). France conducted another nuclear test in January 1996. Harris,
supra note 81, at Al.
89. See George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the
Former Soviet Union, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 323, 325 (1993) (stating that Soviet Union dis-
solved into 14 independent republics).
90. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 14 n.1; see Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 89, at 334-
38 (discussing obligations of former Soviet Union under NPT undertaken by new re-
publics); Doug Bandow, Let 'Em Have Nukes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at 56 (stating
that after Soviet Union breakup, number of declared nuclear states increased from five
to eight due to possession of nuclear weapons by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine).
Since the Soviet Union's dissolution, the International Atomic Energy Agency
("IAEA"), the agency charged with developing peaceful applications of nuclear energy,
has noticed a rise in the trafficking of nuclear materials used to make nuclear bombs.
Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14.
91. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 37, 64. Before its dissolution, the Soviet Union had an
estimated 27,000 nuclear weapons. Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 89, at 323.
92. Anthony Goodman, Ukraine Worried About Potential Nuclear Neighbors, REUTERS,
Sept. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
93. Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14; see Steven Erlanger, U.S. Presses Shaky Belarus to
Honor A-Weapons Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1996, at 5 (stating that Russian military of-
ficers control Belarus' 18 nuclear warheads). The former Soviet republics of Armenia,
Estonia, and Lithuania either possess nuclear reactors or have nuclear research centers.
Bandow, supra note 90, at 56.
94. Erlanger, supra note 93, at 5.
95. Belarus Deal Dead; Crisis May Worsen, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1996, at 16.
96. Christopher Bellamy, World Takes First Steps to Ban the Bomb, INDEPENDENT, July
9, 1996, at 1. According to the U.K. Attorney General, nuclear weapons have contrib-
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use.97 Unlike U.S. policy, U.K policy does not declare that in
the absence of a specific treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons use,
the use of nuclear weapons would be legal.98 The U.K Govern-
ment instead declares that any determination of the legality of
nuclear weapons use must involve the application of recognized
principles of international law.99 Accordingly, the U.K. Govern-
ment contends that the legality of nuclear weapons use depends
on the circumstances of each case. 100
(5). The United States
In a 1955 naval manual, the U.S. Government stated that
the use of nuclear weapons against enemy combatants and mili-
tary objects is legally permissible until an express rule of interna-
tional law prohibits their use.' In its manual on land warfare,
the Department of the Army issued a similar statement which
provided that nuclear weapons use did not violate international
law in the absence of a specific agreement declaring their use
illegal.' 2 During the Persian Gulf War,' the U.S. Government
implied a threat to use nuclear weapons if Iraq attacked its forces
with weapons of mass destruction. 0 4 The U.S. Government con-
uted to ensuring international security over the last 50 years. Stephen Kinzer, World
Court Weighs Legality of Atomic War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at A6.
97. THE MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW: PART III THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND 113
(1958), quoted in Shaw, supra note 7, at 2 [hereinafter U.K. MILITARY MANUAL].
98. Grief, supra note 27, at 22. According to the U.K. Navy's legal advisor, no rule
of international law establishes a per se ban on nuclear weapons use. David Fairhall &
Richard Norton-Taylor, International Court Fudges Nuclear Arms Ruling; No Ban, But Brit-
ain Would Have Ignored Any Adverse Verdict, GUARDIAN, July 9, 1996, at 2.
99. U.K. MILITARY MANUAL, supra note 97, 113, at 2.
100. Bellamy, supra note 13, at 9.
101. U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE, NWIP 10-2, § 613, at 6-4
(1955) [hereinafter NAVAL MANUAL].
102. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAw OF LAND WARFARE 34(b), at 18 (1956)
[hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL]. According to a legal advisor for the U.S. State De-
partment, the U.S. Government currently contends that customary international law
does not per se prohibit nuclear weapons use. Jennifer Scott, U.S., Britain Argue for
Nuclear Arms as Deterrent, REUTERS, Nov. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
103. See DILIP HIRO, DESERT SHIELD TO DESERT STORM, THE SECOND GULF WAR 319-
79 (1992) (describing air campaign on January 16-17, 1991 as beginning of Persian Gulf
War). The Persian Gulf War began on January 16, 1991 and lasted six weeks. Id. at 319.
104. See William M. Arkin, Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War,
WASH. Q., Autumn 1996, at 3, 5 (discussing U.S. policy of "calculated ambiguity" which
theoretically gave Iraqi Government impression -that U.S. military would use nuclear
weapons in self-defense). U.S. Secretary of State James Baker stated that he conveyed
the impression that any Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons might provoke a
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tinues to hold nuclear weapons for deterrence and self-de-
fense. 105
b. The "Have-Nots," Nuclear Threshold States, and
Rogue Actors
Within the "have-nots" category, the international commu-
nity distinguishes between countries lacking a nuclear weapons
program, 116 countries with informal or clandestine ownership of
nuclear weapons,"0 7 and nuclear threshold states.10 8 A nuclear
threshold nation is a state that possesses both the technology
and knowledge to quickly assemble nuclear weapons, but whose
leaders have publicly denied nuclear ambitions."0 9 If a non-nu-
nuclear response. JAMES A. BAKER, III, THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY: REVOLUTION, WAR
AND PEACE, 1989-1992 359 (1995). The United States and its Western European allies
employed policies of deterrence which involved threatening to use nuclear weapons in
response to an attack by the Soviet Union or its allies. See KISSINGER, supra note 83, at
608-10 (discussing threatened use of nuclear weapons through deterrence policies dur-
ing Cold War). During the Korean War, the United States implied that it would use
nuclear weapons to end the conflict. McGEORGE BUNDY, DANCER AND SURVIVAL:
CHOICES ABOUT THE BOMB IN THE FIRST FIrY YEARS 240-44 (1988).
105. Scott, supra note 102. The U.S. opposition to the ICJ advisory opinion re-
flects its attitude towards the legality of nuclear weapons. See U.S. Defends Nuclear Arms,
GUARDIAN, Nov. 16, 1995, at 17 (discussing U.S. reaction to request for ICJ Legality
Opinion). The U.S. Government urged the ICJ to throw out the two requests for the
advisory opinion by claiming that nuclear weapons were "vital for global security." Id.
106. See Bronwen Maddox, Survey of World Nuclear Industry, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1995, at 40 (discussing technological connection between civil and military nuclear
power programs). A state's possession of a civil nuclear reactor may provide the tech-
nology, but not automatically the means, to construct a nuclear bomb. Id. A challenge
for countries with nuclear capabilities is to expand the growth of the industry without a
corresponding increase in nuclear weapons proliferation. Id. For example, before Bra-
zil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin
America, Brazil had parallel civil and military nuclear weapons programs with links be-
tween the two. See Wyn Bowen & Andrew Koch, Non-proliferation Is Embraced by Brazil,
JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REv.,June 1, 1996, at 283 (discussing past proliferation concerns of
Brazil's nuclear weapons program). The Brazilian military sought to divert technology
and research from the civil program to the military program. Id.
107. See Drozdiak, supra note 40, atA14 (stating that India, Israel, and Pakistan are
three undeclared nuclear powers); Bandow, supra note 90, at 56 (stating that India,
Israel, and Pakistan either have nuclear weapons or have ability to quickly assemble
them);John R. Redick et al., Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonprolifer-
ation Regime, WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 107, 107 (discussing possession of nuclear explo-
sive devices by India, Israel, and Pakistan).
108. See BAILEY, supra note 70, at 5 (stating that nations declining to join NPT
included nations building nuclear weapons).
109. Grier, supra note 71, at 4. The IAEA has raised concerns about the potential
for increased nuclear proliferation because some sophisticated developing nations may
possess the know-how, if not the materials, to produce nuclear weapons. Drozdiak,
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clear weapons state who has ratified the NPT receives or manu-
factures nuclear weapons, this state has violated the NPT."
Despite efforts to limit the possession of nuclear weapons to
declared nuclear weapons states," 1 nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion has spread to non-nuclear weapons states. 1 1 2 Countries that
have developed or attempted to develop nuclear weapons pro-
grams include Argentina, '1 3 Brazil,'1 4 India," 5 Israel," 6 Paki-
supra note 40, at A14. According to experts, about 40 nations possess the ability to
develop nuclear weapons, including Iran, Libya, and Taiwan. Id.
110. NPT, supra note 34, art. II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
111. See id. art. I, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (prohibiting nuclear weapons states
from transferring nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices to non-nuclear weapons
states, and forbidding nuclear weapons states from assisting, encouraging, or inducing
non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices).
112. See Tim Weiner, Mass Weapons Are Spreading, Pentagon Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 1996, at A5 (stating that, in recent report, U.S. Pentagon officials outlined threat of
spread of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons); Drozdiak, supra
note 40, at A14 (discussing alleged various stages of nuclear weapons development by
Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and Taiwan).
113. See Redick et al., supra note 107, at 108 (stating that until 1990's, surveys of
nuclear proliferation considered Argentina as nuclear threshold state). Until the
1990's, Argentina rejected the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created a nu-
clear weapons-free zone in Latin America. Id. Before this time, the Argentine Govern-
ment could have converted its civil nuclear program to a military program by establish-
ing facilities such as a gas diffusion enrichment facility, a reprocessing plant, a fuel
fabrication facility, and a pilot-scale heavy water facility. Id. The Argentine air force
once had a project to produce a nuclear capable missile with a range of 1200 kilome-
ters. Id. Argentina also supplied Iran with nuclear fuels pursuant to IAEA safeguards,
and helped modify one of Iran's research reactors. Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, JANE'S IN-
TELLIGENCE REV., June 1, 1995, at 10. Recently, however, the Argentine Government
ended its military nuclear weapons program and renounced nuclear weapons.
Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14.
114. See Bowen & Koch, supra note 106, at 283 (describing past evidence of Brazil's
military nuclear weapons program). The Brazilian Government began developing a
civil nuclear power facility in 1957, and the Brazilian military began pursuing a parallel
military nuclear weapons facility during the 1970's. Id. After President Fernando Col-
lor de Mello publicly made efforts to gain civilian control over the military in 1989, he
disclosed the existence of a deep shaft dug at a military base apparently intended for
nuclear testing. Id. In 1991, Brazil's Commission for Congressional Investigation re-
vealed that the military began designing and developing two nuclear weapons in 1977.
Id. The commission also reported that Brazil sold eight tons of natural uranium to
Baghdad in 1981 which U.N. inspectors later discovered in Iraq. Id. Since 1991, the
Brazilian Government has adopted measures to conform with nuclear non-prolifera-
tion, including its 1994 ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which established a nu-
clear weapons-free zone in South America. Redick et al., supra note 107, at 109.
115. Redick et al., supra note 107, at 107; see Alison Mitchell, Clinton, at U.N., Signs
Treaty Banning All Nuclear Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at Al (stating that India
has clandestine nuclear weapons program). The Indian Government stated that it has
chosen not to build an atomic bomb, but has the resources to construct one. Nelson
Graves, India Nuclear Test Report Sends Out Shock Waves, REUTERS, Dec. 16, 1995, available
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stan, 117 South Africa, 118 South Korea,1 9 and Taiwan. 120 Coun-
tries presently presumed to possess clandestine nuclear weapons
or countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons programs in-
clude Iran,12 1 Iraq, 122 and North Korea.1 2 3 Countries allegedly
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. India conducted a single nuclear test in 1974,
and U.S. newspapers reported that India might have been preparing for a test in late
1995. Id. India has criticized the five nuclear powers as seeking to retain a system of
nuclear apartheid by legitimizing nuclear weapons while monopolizing them. See
Grier, supra note 71, at 4 (quoting Prakash Shah, India's U.N. ambassador, in connec-
tion with comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations). Even though India led the cam-
paign to end nuclear testing during the 1950's, India refrained from criticizing the
1995 French nuclear test for 11 days. Disarmament: India Jittery on Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File. India has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which bans test
explosions of nuclear devices, because the treaty does not contain a provision for the
complete elimination of all nuclear arsenals. R. Jeffrey Smith, Pact's Effect Is Likely
Smaller Than Hoped, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1996, at A28.
116. Bandow, supra note 90, at 56; see Israel Signs Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, REUTERS,
Sept. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (describing Israel as hav-
ing nuclear weapons program). In 1979, U.S. satellites detected data indicating that a
probable nuclear test took place in the South Atlantic. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 51.
U.S. officials believed that Israel had conducted the test and possessed nuclear weap-
ons. Id. The Israeli Government, however, has never confirmed or denied foreign re-
ports that it possesses 200 nuclear warheads. No Change in Israel's Nuke Position, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter
Israel's Nuke Position].
117. Redick et al., supra note 107, at 107; see Grier, supra note 71, at 4 (describing
Pakistan as nuclear threshold state); Mitchell, supra note 115, at Al (describing Paki-
stan as having covert nuclear program); Bandow, supra note 90, at 56 (stating that Paki-
stan either has atomic arsenal or has ability to quickly assemble one);James Bone, Nu-
clear Powers Sign Pact to Outlaw Test Explosions, TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996 (discussing Paki-
stan's refusal to sign Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and stating that Pakistan is
nuclear threshold state).
118. See Lynne Duke, U.S. to Help S. Africa Boost Energy, Create Jobs, WASH. POST, Aug.
26, 1995, at A16 (discussing South Africa's international isolation partially resulting
from its secret development of nuclear weapons). Between 1979 and 1989, the South
African Government built six nuclear weapons and partially assembled a seventh.
Redick et al., supra note 107, at 107. During this time, the South African Government
also conducted research on developing nuclear weapons. Id. In 1993, S6uth Africa
announced that it had built nuclear weapons only after it had already destroyed its six
nuclear weapons. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 5.
119. See Bandow, supra note 90, at 56 (stating that South Korea abandoned nu-
clear ambitions during 1970's at U.S. urging).
120. See BAILEY, supra note 70, at 6 (describing Taiwan as developing clandestine
nuclear weapons program during 1970's, but abandoning its efforts after intense U.S.
pressure).
121. See David Albright, An Iranian Bomb? Development of Nuclear Weapons, BULL. OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, July, 1995, at 21 (discussing suspicions of Iranian nuclear weap-
ons facilities); Drozdiak, supra note 40, atA14 (describing Iran as state possessing ability
to develop nuclear weapons); Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, supra note 113, at 10 (discussing
evidence of Iran's fledgling nuclear weapons research program); Kenneth R. Timmer-
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maintaining stockpiles of nuclear weapons-related materials,
such as plutonium or enriched uranium,124 include India,125
man, Tehran's A-Bomb Program Shows Startling Progress, WASH. TIMES, May 8, 1995, at Al
(stating that Iran could develop nuclear weapons capabilities within three to five years).
The Iranian Government has officially denied any nuclear ambitions and has called for
regional disarmament. Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, supra note 113, at 10. Yet, Iran could
potentially divert technology from its civil nuclear power program to a military weapons
program. Chris Hedges, Iran May Be Able to Build an Atomic Bomb in 5 Years, U.N. and
Israeli Officials Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at A10. Western intelligence agencies have
compiled reports of suspicious procurement efforts and efforts to obtain nuclear mater-
ials, technology, and scientists as evidence of Iranian ambitions to develop nuclear
weapons, but they have not discovered any clandestine nuclear weapons facilities. Al-
bright, supra, at 21; see Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, supra note 113, at 10 (describing Iran's
goals since mid-1980's as obtaining nuclear fuels, training personnel, acquiring reac-
tors, and researching enrichment techniques); Hedges, supra, at A10 (discussing Ira-
nian efforts to collect nuclear material and equipment, including neutron source reac-
tor and isotope separator). In January 1995, Russia agreed to assist Iran with the com-
pletion of a nuclear power plant to be used presumably for civil purposes. Albright,
supra, at 22. Although the IAEA will strictly monitor the nuclear power plant, it would
be possible for Iran to divert plutonium, a by-product of nuclear reactors, for weapons
purposes. Id. at 22-23. Russia and Iran also signed a secret pact providing for future
contracts for research reactors and the development of a uranium mine. Id. at 22. In
1990, China and Iran signed a 10-year nuclear cooperation agreement allowing Iranian
engineers to train in China. Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, supra note 113, at 10. In 1992,
China also agreed to sell Iran two nuclear reactors, but it is uncertain when the reactors
will become operational. Id.
122. See Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14 (stating that Iraq's secret nuclear weapons
program became known after Persian Gulf War); Bandow, supra note 90, at 56 (stating
that Persian Gulf War interrupted Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons); R. Jeffrey
Smith, U.N. Says Iraqis Prepared Germ Weapons in Gulf War, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1995, at
Al (discussing Iraqi admissions to U.N. Ambassador Rolf Ekeus about crash efforts to
build nuclear weapons after invading Kuwait). Before the Persian Gulf War, IAEA in-
spectors failed to detect suspicious activity in Iraq. Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14.
Nuclear inspectors discovered evidence of Iraq's program after laboratory examinations
of hostages' clothing revealed trace amounts of isotopes related to enriched uranium.
Id. To monitor Iraq's program in the future, IAEA agents placed sensors in nearby
rivers which will detect isotopes as by-products of the nuclear program. Id.
123. See Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14 (describing samples taken by nuclear in-
spectors of nuclear facility in Yongbun and U.S. satellite photographs as establishing
evidence of North Korean nuclear program); Redick et al., supra note 107, at 108
(describing North Korea as nuclear threshold state). In a 1994 deal between North
Korea and the United States, North Korea agreed to dismantle its civil nuclear reactors
which produced waste necessary for nuclear weapons. North Korea Threatens to Pull Out
of A-Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at 5 [hereinafter North Korea]. In connection with
this agreement, the United States agreed to assist with the construction of two modern
reactors which produce less waste than the older reactors. Id.
124. See North Korea, supra note 123, at 5 (discussing materials required to con-
struct nuclear weapons).
125. See FRANK BARNABY, How NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPREAD, NUCLEAR-WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION IN THE 1990s 68-69 (1993) (describing fuel cycle of India's nuclear pro-
gram). India has reserves of 50,000 tons of uranium, uranium mines and mills, a ura-
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Israel,1 26 Pakistan, 127 and South Africa.12  Additionally, Alge-
ria, 129 Libya, 130 and Syria1 31 have indicated an interest in acquir-
ing nuclear weapons from other nations.1 32  Recently, Argen-
tina,1 33 Brazil,1 34 and South Africa1 33 have made efforts to dis-
nium conversion plant, a pilot uranium enrichment plant, and plutonium reprocessing
plants. Id.
126. See id. at 81 (describing Israel's nuclear program). Israel produces an esti-
mated 100 tons of uranium each year from uranium deposits in the Negev desert and
has capabilities to produce plutonium at a reactor located at the Dimona Nuclear Re-
search Center. Id.
127. See id. at 75-77 (discussing Pakistan's nuclear program). Pakistan has a secret
uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta and has an estimated, but uncertain, 20,000 tons
of uranium resources. Id. at 75, 77.
128. See id. at 111-12 (stating that South Africa has uranium reserves of about
40,000 tons, but that as of 1991, South Africa has decreased its operable uranium mines
from 14 to 5).
129. Bandow, supra note 90, at 56. In January 1986, Algeria purchased approxi-
mately 6600 pounds of uranium dioxide, used to produce plutonium or highly en-
riched uranium, from Argentina. LEONARD S. SPECTOR & JACQUELINE R. SMITH, Nu-
CLEAR AMBITIONS, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1989-1990 205 (1990). U.S. offi-
cials believe that Algeria transferred some of this material to Iran. Id. Algeria has two
nuclear reactors, but the Government denied that it ever intended to use them for
military purposes. Algeria Renounces Nuclear Arms, Joins NPT, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. By signing the NPT, however, Algeria
formally renounced nuclear weapons. Id.
130. See Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14 (describing Libya as potentially possessing
incentive and means to become undeclared nuclear power).
131. Bandow, supra note 90, at 56. But see SPECTOR & SMITH, supra note 129, at 144
(stating that Syria has never been seriously considered to have nuclear ambitions).
132. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 64; see Bandow, supra note 90, at 56 (describing Alge-
ria, Libya, and Syria as "potential threshold states" because they all have interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons). Countries may express an interest in developing their own
nuclear weapons program, but may lack the funds or technology to conduct nuclear
research. Maddox, supra note 106, at 40.
133. Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14; see Kathleen Hart, Clinton Submits New U.S.-
Argentina Nuclear Cooperation Pact to Congress, NUCLEAR FUEL, Mar. 25, 1996, at 15 (quot-
ing U.S. President Clinton as praising Argentina's efforts to demonstrate its commit-
ment to exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy); Robin Wright, Argentine Military's
Change of Mission a Sign of the Times, LA. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at A21 (discussing demili-
tarization and increased peacekeeping efforts of current Argentine Government). The
Argentine Government has conformed to the non-proliferation regime and has re-
nounced nuclear weapons testing. Redick et al., supra note 107, at 109. Additionally,
Argentina and the United States recently signed an agreement providing for nuclear
cooperation. Hart, supra, at 15. Although the two countries previously had a similar
agreement, the United States suspended that agreement because Argentina did not
adopt full IAEA safeguards. Id. Within Latin America, Brazil and Argentina signed a
bilateral agreement in 1991 establishing a joint nuclear materials accounting and in-
spection system. Redick et al., supra note 107, at 109. Argentina also signed an agree-
ment calling for the application of full IAEA safeguards to all nuclear materials and
equipment. Id.
134. See Redick et al., supra note 107, at 109 (discussing measures taken by Brazil-
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mantle their military nuclear weapons programs.1 3 6 Argentina
and Brazil also signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nu-
clear weapons-free zone in South America.137
B. Customary International Law
Customary international law refers to the body of law creat-
ing legal obligations binding on a state in its relationships with
other states. 138  No single international organization exists to
create, enforce, and interpret the body of international law.' 39
Instead, customary international law derives from treaties, 40 cus-
ian Government to comply with non-proliferation regime); Bowen & Koch, supra note
106, at 283 (describing Brazil's efforts to dismantle its military nuclear weapons capabil-
ities, and mentioning Brazil's new status as member of non-proliferation community);
Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Finds Relations With Brazil Have Come a Long Way Since Carter
Era, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 1996, at A30 (quoting U.S. State Department spokesperson on
Brazil's firm commitment to nuclear disarmament). Argentina and Brazil jointly
agreed to renounce testing nuclear weapons, create a mutual inspection and verifica-
tion agreement, comply with IAEA safeguards, and ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Redick et al., supra note 107, at 109.
135. See George Lobsenz, DOE Lifts Nuclear Restrictions on Four Emerging Markets,
ENERGY DAILY, Sept. 19, 1995 (discussing South Africa's public disclosure of abandoned
nuclear weapons activities); Bandow, supra note 90, at 56 (stating that South Africa
created six nuclear devices and later destroyed them); Redick et al., supra note 107, at
107 (describing South Africa as first state to unilaterally and voluntarily relinquish nu-
clear weapons). Recently, South Africa and the United States agreed to cooperate by
using nuclear power peacefully. Duke, supra note 118, at A16.
136. Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14.
137. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 11, art. 4, at 332, 6 I.L.M. at 523.
138. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 4-5; see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161
(1820) (discussing recognition of rule of customary international law as universal law of
society).
139. SHAW, supra note 14, at 58; see 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that
international community has no central law-making authority).
140. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1)(a), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187 (provid-
ing that conventions comprise part of international law); 1 OPPENHEiM, supra note 11, at
27-28 (discussing treaties as source of customary international law). A treaty is a written
agreement in which a contracting party accepts legal obligations to conduct itself in a
particular manner or to establish relations with another state. SHAW, supra note 14, at
79-80. Treaties are also known as conventions, declarations, and covenants. Id. at 79.
These terms all refer to the parties' willingness to create binding legal obligations for
themselves. Id. Typically, a treaty binds only those states that are parties to it. 1 OPPEN-
HEIM, supra note 11, at 28. A treaty creates law binding on all states when all or practi-
cally all members of the international community have acceded to the treaty. See id.
(dividing international law deriving from treaties into two categories, law-making trea-
ties binding only contracting parties and law-making treaties containing general princi-
ples of international law). Conversely, a treaty may be void and, thus, non-binding, if it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, art. 53, at 296, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, U.N. Sales No. E.70.V.5
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tom t general principles of law recognized by nations,14 2 judi-
cial decisions, 43 and scholarly writings.144 These sources of law
reflect the consensus of the international community as to par-
ticular rules or practices applicable in foreign relations.145
A provision of a convention or treaty may attain universal
acceptance as binding customary international law, even though
only a handful of states initially concluded the convention or
treaty. 46 Similarly, if a rule or principle ascends to customary
international law and subsequently becomes incorporated into a
(1969) [hereinafter Treaty on Treaties]. A peremptory norm, also known as jus cogens,
represents fundamental and compelling law, or overriding principles of international
law. See BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 512-15 (discussing principle of jus cogens). A new
peremptory norm will void existing treaties if the norm conflicts with the treaties.
Treaty on Treaties, supra, art. 64, at 297.
141. SeeICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1)(b), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187 (provid-
ing that custom is source of international law);JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
59-60 (6th ed. 1963) (discussing custom as source of international law).
142. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1)(c), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187 (provid-
ing that sources of international law include general principles of law); 1 GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 458 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter 1
SCHWARZENBERGER] (stating that general principles of law recognized by nations consti-
tute third type of law to which ICJ can resort when rendering decisions). No single rule
enunciates the extent to which states must recognize a general principle before it be-
comes binding universally. See id. at 45 (discussing uncertainty surrounding number of
nations required to make general principle universally binding). By assimilating a gen-
eral principle of law into their own legal systems, states signal that they have recognized
that principle as universally binding. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 18
(Apr. 9) (applying general principles of law to admit circumstantial evidence because
"all systems of law" had admitted such evidence, and international decisions had recog-
nized this practice); 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra, at 45 (stating that principal legal sys-
tems must share general principle of law before law can qualify as one recognized by all
nations). According to one Russian jurist, states must consent before a general princi-
ple of law becomes part of international law. Grigory I. Tunkin, General Theory of Sources
of International Law, 19 INDIANJ. INT'L L. 474, 482 (1979).
143. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1) (d), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187; see BROWN-
LIE, supra note 15, at 19-24 (discussing judicial decisions as informal source of interna-
tional law). Judicial decisions provide persuasive evidence as to the state of interna-
tional law. Id. at 19. Types ofjudicial decisions include decisions by arbitral tribunals,
the European Court ofJustice, national courts, ad hoc international tribunals, munici-
pal courts, and the ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice. See id. at 19-24 (canvassing sources of judicial decisions).
144. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1) (d), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187 (provid-
ing that teachings of most highly qualified publicists of various nations serve as subsidi-
ary means for determining rules of international law).
145. BROWNLIE, supa note 15, at 2.
146. SINCH & McWHINNE, supra note 24, at 41; see 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at
28 (stating that principles from treaties may become universal law when non-con-
tracting parties expressly consent or implicitly consent by recognizing principles
through custom). The Genocide Convention and the Antarctica Treaty are examples
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treaty or convention, that rule or principle will not lose its bind-
ing effect solely because a party withdraws from the convention
or treaty or because the parties abrogate the convention. 147
Once a principle or rule has become customary international
law, all states must abide by that law. 148
In addition to treaty law as a source of customary interna-
tional law, custom among nations may develop into rules of cus-
tomary international law. 49 State practice is evidence of
whether usage among states has developed into state practice ac-
cepted as law. 150 State practice does not need to be unanimous
in order to become a customary rule, but should be extensive
and virtually uniform.' 5 1 Only when states regard the norm as
embodying legal obligations requiring compliance does a gener-
ally accepted norm ascend to customary international law.152
This element of customary international law, known as opinio
juris, provides that states conform to a pattern of conduct due to
of treaties expressing principles of customary international law. SHAW, supra note 14, at
81.
147. SINGH & McWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 39.
148. See id. at 40 (stating that customary laws relating to laws of war bind nations
regardless of whether conventional law incorporated customary laws).
149. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1) (b), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187 (provid-
ing that ICJ should apply custom as source of international law when rendering deci-
sions).
150. See BRIERLY, supra note 141, at 59-60 (discussing elements of custom); Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-708 (1900) (canvassing international community's practice
of exempting fishing vessels from capture as war prize to determine if usage had rip-
ened into rule of international law). For a usage to develop into customary interna-
tional law through state practice, states must express their consent in their observance
of the usage. See S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7)
(stating "[t] he rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing princi-
ples of law"); SINGH- & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 38 (arguing that international
acceptance of practice requires consent for practice to constitute binding rule); Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54:
General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 68 (1953) (contending that
consent is latent in evolution of state practice into binding rule of law).
151. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3,
43 (Feb. 20) (providing that passage of short, as opposed to long, period of time does
not preclude formation of new rule so long as practice is extensive and virtually uni-
form).
152. See BRIERLY, supra note 141, at 59 (stating that usage becomes part of custom-
ary international law when those following that usage feel compelled to do so); see also
SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 35 (discussing difference between usage and
custom, where usage represents initial stage as habitual practice, and custom is source
of international law when feeling of legal obligation attaches to usage).
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a feeling of obligation.1"3 A rule of customary international law
may not bind states if they have expressly dissented to the rule's
formation. 15
4
At the International Peace Conference held at The Hague
in 1907,155 representatives adopted the Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land ("1907 Hague Conven-
tion IV"). 156 The preamble to this convention 5 7 ("Martens
Clause") acknowledged that no complete code existed on the
laws of war as of 1907.158 Accordingly, the Martens Clause sets
forth the default rule on sources of customary international law
153. See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.CJ. at 44 (holding "[t]he States con-
cerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obliga-
tion. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough."). It
is often difficult to determine when states acknowledge that they must comply with a
custom. See BRIERLY, supra note 141, at 60 (stating that evidence establishing custom
may be diverse because states may take positions on particular issues which do not rep-
resent their settled opinions).
154. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266, 277-78 (Nov. 20) (holding that
Peru was not bound to regional customary asylum rule because Peru repudiated asylum
rule and refrained from ratifying conventions adopting this rule, and, thus, concluding
that Colombian Government had not proven existence of custom on asylum rule); see
also Fisheries (U.K v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116, 138-39 (Dec. 18) (holding that Norwegian
Government not obligated to follow rule of customary international law relating to mar-
itime base-lines because it had consistently adopted contrary position). In the Asylum
case, the ICJ found that to establish custom as international law, the Colombian Gov-
ernment had to prove "that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and
uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression
of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the terri-
torial State." Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 276.
155. SeeJozEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS 1 (1982) (discussing two In-
ternational Peace Conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907). Czar Nicholas II
of Russia called for the first International Peace Conferences in 1899 to reduce arma-
ments and preserve peace. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 35 (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelff eds., 1989) [hereinafter ROBERTS & GUELFF]. He later prompted mem-
bers of the international community to convene a second conference in 1907. Id. at 43.
156. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Con-
vention IV]. Representatives of 44 states adopted this convention at the second Inter-
national Peace Conference held at The Hague in 1907. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note
155, at 43.
157. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
pmbl., 36 Stat. 2277, at 2279-80, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, at 278-79, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90, at
90-92 [hereinafter Martens Clause]. The Martens Clause appears in the preamble to
the second convention adopted at the first International Peace Conference held at The
Hague in 1899. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, pmbl., 32 Stat. 1803, at 1804-05, 187 Consol. T.S. 429, at 430-31, 1 AJ.I.L.
Supp. 129, at 130-32 (setting forth Martens Clause).
158. Martens Clause, supra note 157, at 2279-80, 205 Consol. T.S. at 279, 2 AJ.I.L.
Supp. at 91-92.
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relating to the laws of war on land.1 59 This default rule provides
that in the absence of a specific international convention limit-
ing a particular type of weapon or method of warfare, general
principles of customary international law continue to bind
states. 
16 0
C. International Organizations
Despite the lack of an international organization empow-
ered to create, enforce, and interpret international law,161 two
organs of the United Nations have addressed issues relating to
nuclear weapons.1 62 The General Assembly has passed numer-
ous resolutions on the use 163 and testing of nuclear weapons1 64
and nuclear disarmament. 16 5 Additionally, the ICJ recently ren-
dered an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons
use. 166
159. Id. at 2279-80, 205 Consol. T.S. at 279, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 91-92; see GEOFFREY
BEST, WAR AND LAw SINCE 1945 250 (1994) (discussing Martens Clause as early expres-
sion of international humanitarian law).
160. Martens Clause, supra note 157, at 2280, 205 Consol. T.S. at 279, 2 A.J.I.L.
Supp. at 92. The Martens Clause states:
in cases not included in the [Hague] Regulations adopted by them, the in-
habitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience.
Id. at 2280, 205 Consol. T.S. at 279, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 92.
161. SHAW, supra note 14, at 58.
162. See SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 289-91 (discussing efforts of Gen-
eral Assembly to address nuclear weapons issues through resolutions); Nicholas Rostow,
The World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons, 20
YALE J. INT'L L. 151, 151-52 & n.3 (1995) (discussing WHO and General Assembly re-
quests for advisory opinion by ICJ on legality of nuclear weapons).
163. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 4-5, U.N.
Doc. A/4942/Add.3 (1961) (providing that nuclear weapons use would violate U.N.
Charter and laws of humanity).
164. See, e.g., G.A- Res. 2163, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 11-12, U.N.
Doc. A/6530 (1966) (requesting that nuclear weapons states halt nuclear weapons test-
ing in all environments).
165. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 70C, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 90-91, U.N. Doc. A/50/590
(1995) (calling upon nuclear weapons states to seek nuclear disarmament); see also Le-
gality Opinion, supra note 4, 71, at 826 (examining totality of General Assembly reso-
lutions concerning nuclear weapons). The General Assembly may consider principles
relating to disarmament and arms control. U.N. CHARTER art. 11.
166. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 105(2) (E), at 831 (declining to decide if
nuclear weapons use in self-defense would violate customary international law where
state's very survival was at stake).
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1. The United Nations
After World War II, representatives from fifty states1 67 estab-
lished the United Nations to safeguard international peace and
security and to promote international cooperation.168  The
United Nations consists of six principal organs, including the Se-
curity Council, the General Assembly, and the ICJ.169 Both the
Security Council and the General Assembly may pass resolutions
to further the principles of maintaining peace and security.17
Whereas Security Council decisions bind member states, 171 Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions do not create legal obligations for
member states. 172 While General Assembly resolutions do not
bind member states, some legal scholars assert that General As-
sembly resolutions may express principles of customary interna-
tional law depending on how the General Assembly adopts a res-
olution, such as by an overwhelming majority or a unanimous
vote.1
73
2. The International Court of Justice
The U.N. Charter established the ICJ 174 after World War II
to replace the Permanent Court of International Justice
("PCIJ").1 75 The ICJ currently serves as the primary judicial or-
167. See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 402 (listing participating states).
168. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (setting forth purposes of United Nations). Delegates
from 50 nations adopted the U.N. Charter at a conference held in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia from April 25-June 26, 1945. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 402.
169. U.N. CHARTER art. 7. The additional organs are the Economic and Social
Council, the Secretariat, and the Trusteeship Council. Id.
170. See id. art. 11 (empowering General Assembly to make recommendations); id.
art. 24 (providing that Security Council acts as primary organ responsible for maintain-
ing peace and security).
171. Id. art. 25; see SHAW, supra note 14, at 751 (discussing functions of Security
Council). Article 25 provides, "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter." U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
172. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 14; see SHAW, supra note 14, at 754 (describing
General Assembly resolutions as "purely recommendatory" because resolutions in them-
selves "cannot establish binding legal obligations for member-states").
173. See BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining that majority vote on particular
resolution may constitute evidence of general principle of international law); SHAW,
supra note 14, at 754 (asserting that states' voting patterns of approving or opposing
General Assembly resolutions constitutes evidence of state practice); see also Legality
Opinion, supra note 4, 70, at 826 (describing normative value of General Assembly
resolutions).
174. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
175. See BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 716 (discussing similarities between PCIJ and
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gan of the United Nations. 176 The ICJ consists of fifteen mem-
bers of different nationalities serving nine year terms.1 77 Mem-
bers are elected by the Security Council and the General Assem-
bly.17  Each judge serves a term of nine years, and every three
years elections are held for one-third of the panel.1 79 If the ICJ
reaches a split decision because an even panel resulted from the
death or vacancy of one judge, the President of the ICJ has two
votes and casts the deciding vote needed to attain a majority.8 '
The functions of the ICJ include deciding disputes between
states1 81 and providing judicial guidance for other U.N. organs
in the form of advisory opinions.1 82 According to Article 38(1)
of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice 18 3 ("ICJ Stat-
ute"), the Court must apply all sources of international law when
it renders an advisory opinion. 184 The ICJ's decision in an advi-
sory opinion has no binding effect on parties to the ICJ Stat-
ute. 
85
ICJ, such as similar governing statutes, transferred jurisdiction between courts, and con-
tinuity of courts' jurisprudence). The United Nations replaced the League of Nations
as the international organization charged with maintaining international peace, secur-
ity, and cooperation. See SHaw, supra note 14, at 747-48 (discussing need for United
Nations to remedy defects of League of Nations, such as League of Nations' inability to
apply sanctions).
176. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. Article 92 provides, "[t]he International Court ofJus-
tice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in
accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter."
Id.
177. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, arts. 3, 13(1), at 1055-56, 3 Bevans at 1179, 1181-82;
see SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 53 (5th ed.
1995) (discussing ICJ's organization); BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 717 (describing ICJ's
election process).
178. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 4, at 1055, 3 Bevans at 1179-80.
179. Id. art. 13(1), at 1056, 3 Bevans at 1181-82.
180. See id. art. 12(4), at 1056, 3 Bevans at 1181 (providing that if equality of votes
occurs, eldest judge shall have tie-breaking vote).
181. See id. art. 35(1), at 1059, 3 Bevans at 1186 (providing that ICJ is available to
states, which are parties to ICJ Statute, for dispute resolution).
182. See id. art. 65(1), at 1063, 3 Bevans at 1191 (empowering ICJ to render advi-
sory opinions); ROSENNE, supra note 177, at 31-32 (discussing functions of ICJ).
183. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187.
184. Id. art. 38(1), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187. According to Article 38(1), the
sources of international law include international conventions, international custom,
general principles of law recognized by nations, judicial decisions, and scholarly publi-
cations. Id. art. 38(1), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187.
185. Id. art. 59, at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190; see SHAW, supra note 14, at 676-78 (dis-
cussing ICJ's advisoryjurisdiction). According to the ICJ, its advisory opinion "is only of
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D. The Laws of War
The laws of war establish restrictions on the conduct of hos-
tilities, t86 and attempt to balance the necessities of war with hu-
manitarian principles.187 In practice, the laws of war seek to
monitor the objectives of war,18 8 which generally are to over-
power the enemy and to impose the victor's will on its enemy. 189
By regulating when states may initiate war and states' subsequent
actions during war, 190 the laws of war seek to limit armed con-
flicts. 191
1. Sources of the Laws of War
As a continually evolving body of law, the laws of war consist
of many sources within the larger body of customary interna-
tional law.'9 2 Accordingly, states may declare weapons of mass
destruction illegal by specific agreements' 93 or through custom
as evidenced by state practice.1 94 States typically ban a particular
weapon or method of warfare by concluding a treaty or conven-
an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force." Interpretation of Peace Trea-
ties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71 (Mar. 30).
186. 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 10 (1968) [hereinafter 2
SCHWARZENBERGER].
187. See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, 138 Consol. T.S. 298, 299, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 95, 96 [herein-
after St. Petersburg Declaration] (establishing that contracting parties pledge to "recon-
cile the necessities of war with the laws of humanity"); 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note
186, at 10 (stating "[r]esort to force in any form is a step back in an ever continuing
civilising process.").
188. See 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 202 (contending that war and law are not
inconsistent because international law recognizes breakdowns in peaceful relations and
attempts to enforce remaining legal obligations).
189. 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 186, at 10.
190. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 189, 196 (describing difference be-
tween law in war and law against war).
191. Elliot L. Meyrowitz, The Laws of War and Nuclear Weapons, 9 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
227, 228 (1983).
192. See 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 226 (stating that laws of war derive from law
of nations relating to warfare). According to the International Military Tribunal at Nu-
remberg, the laws of war consist of treaties, universally recognized state custom and
practice, and general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military
courts. Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 109 (1946).
193. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 57, at 824; see W. MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRIS
T. ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR xix (1994) (stating that recently treaties have been
more frequently used as sources of laws of war).
194. See BRIERLY, supra note 141, at 59-60 (discussing custom as source of interna-
tional law when evidenced by state practice and opiniojuris).
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tion. 1 9 5 An agreement involving the laws of war generally applies
only during a war between two or more of the contracting par-
ties.196 Additionally, states often provide that if a non-con-
tracting party joins a war between two or more contracting par-
ties, the treaty ceases to apply. 197
195. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 1 57, at 824 (discussing state practice of
declaring weapons of mass destruction illegal by specific agreements).
196. See St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 299, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 96
(limiting contracting parties' obligations to war between contracting parties); Declara-
tion to Prohibit for the Term of Five Years the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives
From Balloons, and Other Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839,
1839, 187 Consol. T.S. 456, 456, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 153, 154 [hereinafter 1899 Hague
Declaration I] (providing that treaty's obligations apply only to war between two or
more contracting parties); Declaration Respecting Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899,
1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 (Cmnd. 3751) at 10, 10, 187 Consol. T.S. 453, 453, 1 A.J.I.L.
Supp. 157, 157-58 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Declaration II] (binding contracting parties
only in war between two or more contracting parties); Declaration Respecting Ex-
panding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 (Cmnd. 3751) at 5, 5, 187
Consol. T.S. 459, 459, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. 155, 156 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Declaration
III] (creating obligations for contracting parties only in war between two or more con-
tracting parties). Generally, a convention or treaty binds only the parties to the treaty,
and no longer binds them if they cease to be parties to the convention or treaty. SINGH
& MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 39. Conversely, the treaty or convention does not
create obligations for those states not parties to the treaty or convention. 1 OPPENHEIM,
supra note 11, at 28; see 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 142, at 458 (discussing state's
decision whether to create obligations for itself by entering into treaty).
197. See St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 299, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 96
(stating that St. Petersburg Declaration would cease to bind contracting parties if non-
contracting party joined armed conflict); 1899 Hague Declaration I, supra note 196, at
1839-40, 187 Consol. T.S. at 456, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 154 (terminating contracting par-
ties' obligations when non-contracting party enters war between them); 1899 Hague
Declaration II, supra note 196, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 at 11, 187 Consol. T.S. at 453,
1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 158 (providing that declaration will no longer bind contracting par-
ties if non-contracting party enters hostilities with one contracting party); 1899 Hague
Declaration III, supra note 196, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 at 5, 187 Consol. T.S. at 459, 1
AJ.I.L. Supp. at 156 (restricting scope of treaty's application if, in war between con-
tracting parties, non-contracting party joins belligerents). When France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States signed the Geneva Gas Protocol, they entered reserva-
tions outlining the scope of the protocol's coverage because the protocol did not in-
clude any restricting language. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of As-
phyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,June
17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 67, 69 (entered into force on Feb. 8, 1928)
(ratified by United States on Jan. 22, 1975) [hereinafter Geneva Gas Protocol] (setting
forth reservations of France, United Kingdom, and United States). An example of the
effect of this limiting language is the Iran-Iraq War. See REISMAN & ANTONIOU, supra
note 193, at xix-xx (discussing Iran-Iraq War in light of Iraq's reservation to Geneva Gas
Protocol). Iran never acceded to the Geneva Gas Protocol and Iraq entered a reserva-
tion providing that it would not be bound by the Geneva Gas Protocol in a conflict
involving a non-contracting party. Id. Thus, the Geneva Gas Protocol may not have
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2. The Period Preceding the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration
The laws of war distinguish between jus ad bellum' 98 and jus
in bello199 to monitor states' initial resort to war and their subse-
quent conduct during armed conflict.200 Jus ad bellum relates to
the lawfulness of a belligerent's resort to war. 1 Jus in bello refers
to the rights and duties of belligerents during the course of
war. 
202
As early as the fourth century B.C., states sought to regulate
the means and methods of warfare to limit the destructive effects
of war.20 3  During the Middle Ages, religious authorities at-
tempted to reduce the savagery of armed conflict.20 4 Prior to the
Thirty Years War in 1618,205 informal rules governed armed con-
applied to the Iran-Iraq War when Iraq used chemical weapons. Id.; see HIRO, supra
note 103, at 43 (describing Iraqi use of chemical weapons during Iran-Iraq War).
198. 2 SCHWARZENBERCER, supra note 186, at 37.
199. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 189.
200. See id. at 189, 196 (discussing differences between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello). The debate about the legality of nuclear weapons use focuses on jus in bello
rather than jus ad bellum because aggressors would theoretically employ nuclear weap-
ons after they are already engaged in war. See id. at 248-51 (discussing legality of nu-
clear weapons by applying principles of jus in bello). Provisions of the U.N. Charter
govern international disputes and supplement principles of jus in hello andjus ad belium.
See GEORC SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 47, 173 (1971) (stating
that U.N. Charter establishes limitations on jus ad bellum and discussing U.N. Charter's
regulation of use of force in self-defense). Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of
force, and Article 51 limits the use of force in self-defense. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 51.
201. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 1.
202. Id. at 189.
203. MEYROWITZ, supra note 27, at 2; see 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY 3 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter 1 FRIEDMAN] (quoting Book of Manu,
ancient Hindu civilization text which provided restrictions on types of weapons and
conduct towards sick, wounded, and those who surrender).
204. SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 14. During the twelfth century, Gen-
eral Councils of the Catholic Church issued decrees regulating conduct during hostili-
ties. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 9. In 1139, the Second Lateran Council con-
demned the use of the cross-bow which was the primary medieval hand-operated missile
weapon. A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 1I (Trevor N.
Dupuy & Gay M. Hammerman eds., 1973) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 18 (rev. ed. 1962) (dis-
cussing prohibition against use of cross-bow). The decree prohibited, "under penalty of
anathema that that deadly and God-detested art of slingers and archers be in the future
exercised against Christians and Catholics." 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 9. Despite
the ban on the cross-bow, the use of the cross-bow continued until the development of
explosives and firearms. MEYROWITZ, supra note 27, at 3.
205. See CICELY V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 11-12 (1939) (describing
events preceding outbreak of hostilities between Catholics and Protestants). The Thirty
Years War, commonly called the last religious war in Europe, began on May 23, 1618,
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flict without reference to international or concerted efforts.20 6
The formalization of the laws of war did not occur until
Dutch jurist Hugo de Groot, known as Grotius,2 0 7 memorialized
the rules on the means and methods of warfare in De jure Belli ac
Pacis,2 °s written during the Thirty Years War. 0 9 While Grotius
acknowledged the inevitability of war, he argued that reason-
able, state-imposed limits should govern a state's resort to war
and conduct during war.2 10 Grotius justified restrictions on the
conduct during war by citing humanitarian concepts including
limits on unnecessary suffering21' and the limited right to kill an
enemy.21
2
During the eighteenth century, the writings of philosopher
Jean-Jacques Rousseau21 advanced the laws of war.2 14 By defin-
and the warring countries declared peace in November, 1648 with the Peace of West-
phalia. Id. at 12, 501 n.2, 507.
206. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 29 (stating that in 1868, St. Petersburg
Declaration was first international agreement establishing limits on particular type of
weapon).
207. SHAW, supra note 14, at 22; see HAMILTON VREELAND, JR., HUGO GROTIUS 164-
77 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986) (1917) (discussing publication of De jure Belli ac
Paa/s). Born in 1583, Grotius studied at the University of Leiden at age eleven, and
published his first book at age fourteen. Id. at 2, 11, 27. To many, Grotius is the "father
of international law." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1609, 1609 (1995).
208. Huco GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI AC PAcIS [THE LAw OF WAR AND PEACE] (1646),
translated in 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (Francis W. Kelsey trans., James B.
Scott ed., 1964). When he completed De jure Belli ac Pacis in June 1625, Grotius had
divided his treatise into three books. VREELAND, supra note 207, at 164, 166. The first
part addresses jus ad bellum, or the right to war, the second part discusses the causes of
war, and the third part examines jus in bello, or conduct during war. Id. at 166-67.
209. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 14-15 (discussing effect of De jure Belli Ac Paris
on warring parties during Thirty Years War).
210. See GROTIUS, supra note 208, § 25, at 18 (discussing parameters of belliger-
ents' conduct during armed conflict). Grotius stated:
[I]east of all should that be admitted which some people imagine, that in war
all laws are in abeyance. On the contrary war ought not to be undertaken
except for the enforcement of rights; when once undertaken, it should be
carried on only within the bounds of law and good faith.
Id.
211. See id. at 651-53 (contending that laws of nations prohibited belligerents from
killing enemy by using poison or poisoning water or weapons).
212. See id. § 25, at 18 (stating that only goal of war is enforcing rights). According
to one legal scholar, Grotius asserted that limits exist for violence during warfare.
STONE, supra note 10, at 14. These limits arise from respect for human dignity, thus
requiring belligerents to spare civilians and combatants wherever possible. Id.
213. Peter Gay, Introduction to BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JEAN-JACQUES Rous-
sEAu ix (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 1987) (discussing Rousseau's background and
fundamental theories). Rousseau, a prominent political theorist, was born on June 28,
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ing war as a relationship between states,215 Rousseau argued that
citizens of belligerent states are incidental, rather than natural,
enemies.216 Rousseau acknowledged that a state's goal in war is
the destruction of the enemy state217 but asserted that states have
a limited right to kill defenders of an enemy state. 21 ' According
to Rousseau, states may consider the enemy's defenders as legiti-
mate objects of attack when they bear arms. 219 Once defenders
surrender, however, they are no longer the enemy's agents, and,
therefore, cease to be legitimate objects of attack.2 20
3. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration
Despite the writings of influential jurists such as Grotius and
Rousseau, states did not memorialize the laws of war in multilat-
eral agreements until the mid-nineteenth century.2 2 ' In 1863,
the Russian military developed a bullet that exploded upon con-
tact with hard surfaces.222 Later modifications to the bullet
caused it to explode upon contact with soft surfaces, such as
human flesh.223 Fearing that other nations would abuse the ex-
ploding bullet's power, the Russian Government proposed an in-
ternational conference to ban the projectile.224
The conference resulted in the St. Petersburg Declara-
1712. Id. at ix, xv. Rousseau wrote a political treatise entitled Social Contract in which he
analyzed the relationship between government, authority, and individuals. Id. at xv.
214. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 215.
215. JEAN JACQUES RoussF.Au, SOCIAL CONTRPACT (1762), reprinted in BASIC POLIT-
ICAL WRITINGS OF JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu 145 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 1987)
[hereinafter RoussEAu POLITICAL WRITINGS].
216. Id.
217. Id. at 146.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 149 (stating that before nineteenth cen-
tury, states relied on treaties to solve specific problems arising in war, but not to address
broad issues of rules of war).
222. DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIft ToMAN, THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICTS 101
(1988). The Imperial Russian Army developed the explosive projectile for use against
armored ammunition transports. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 219.
223. See MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 219 (discussing refined version of
bullet which would explode and fragment upon contact with human flesh).
224. SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 222, at 101. The Russian military forbade
the bullet's use against any military personnel because the bullet had the potential to
cause greater damage to troops. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 29.
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2251 istion, the first international agreement codifying a prohibition
on the use of a specific weapon in armed conflict. 226 The St.
Petersburg Declaration renounced the use of any projectile
weighing less than 400 grams which either exploded or con-
tained flammable material. 227  The contracting parties2 28 also
sought to establish a consensus on when the necessities of war
should yield to humanitarian interests.229
225. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298-99, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 95-96.
The St. Petersburg Declaration states:
Considering that the progress of civilization should have the effect of alle-
viating as much as possible the calamities of war:
That the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accom-
plish during war is to weaken the military force of the enemy;
That for this purpose, it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible
number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevi-
table;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the
laws of humanity;
The contracting parties engage, mutually, to renounce, in case of war
among themselves, the employment, by their military or naval forces, of any
projectile of less weight than four hundred grammes, which is explosive, or is
charged with fulminating or inflammable substances.
The contracting or acceding parties reserve to themselves the right to
come to an understanding, hereafter, whenever a precise proposition shall be
drawn up, in view of future improvements which may be effected in the arma-
ment of troops, in order to maintain the principles which they have estab-
lished, and to reconcile the necessities of war with the laws of humanity.
Id. at 298-99, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95-96.
226. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 29.
227. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 96.
Later declarations adopted at the first International Peace Conference held at The
Hague in 1899 banned the use of similar weapons, including projectiles and explosives
discharged from balloons, asphyxiating gases, and expanding bullets. See 1899 Hague
Declaration I, supra note 196, at 1839, 187 Consol. T.S. at 456, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 154
(prohibiting contracting states from launching explosive projectiles from balloons);
1899 Hague Declaration II, supra note 196, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 at 10, 187 Consol.
T.S. at 453, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 157 (banning use of projectiles designed to diffuse as-
phyxiating or other deleterious gases); 1899 Hague Declaration III, supra note 196,
1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 at 5, 187 Consol. T.S. at 459, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 155-56 (forbid-
ding use of expanding bullets).
228. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 297-98. Nineteen countries
either signed or acceded to the St. Petersburg Declaration, including France, Great
Britain, and Russia. Id. at 297-99; see SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 222, at 103 (list-
ing contracting parties).
229. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95; see
MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 219 (discussing Russia's perceived need to re-
strict appalling potential of newly developed military technology).
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While expressly banning a means of war, the St. Petersburg
Declaration also proclaimed that certain humanitarian princi-
ples apply to conduct during warfare. 230 For the contracting par-
ties, the only legitimate military objective of war was the weaken-
ing of enemy forces. 231 By agreeing that a belligerent state could
attack only the enemy's military forces, contracting parties ac-
knowledged a distinction between combatants and noncomba-
tants. 32 The contracting parties also recognized that states
could disable the greatest possible number of soldiers to attain
the objective of weakening the enemy's forces. 33 Nonetheless,
humanitarian concerns raised in the St. Petersburg Declaration
limited the wanton destruction of the enemy by providing that
aggressors could not employ weapons that would uselessly aggra-
vate the suffering of disabled men or render their deaths inevita-
ble. 2 4 Accordingly, the St. Petersburg Declaration enunciated a
humanitarian principle prohibiting states from using weapons
which cause unnecessary suffering.235
4. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences
At the invitation of the Imperial Russian Government, two
conferences were held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 (respec-
tively, the "1899 Hague Conference" and "1907 Hague Confer-
ence," jointly the "International Peace Conferences").236 As the
230. REISMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 193, at 35.
231. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95. The
St. Petersburg Declaration reflected the theories of Grotius and Rousseau by providing
that the only purpose of war was the weakening of the enemy's forces. Id. at 298, 1
A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95. Rousseau stated, "[flor war does not grant a right that is unneces-
sary to its purpose." RoussEAu POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 215, at 146. Rousseau
argued that this principle derived from reason and nature, and not from Grotian theo-
ries. Id.
232. See 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 186, at 157 (describing distinction be-
tween combatants and noncombatants as immunizing certain people and objects from
attack).
233. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95.
234. Id. at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95.
235. See Meyrowitz, supra note 191, at 234-35 (discussing prohibition against un-
necessary suffering).
236. See GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 1 (discussing two International Peace Con-
ferences as contributing to codification of laws of war). The International Peace Con-
ferences consisted of both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences. Id. The 1899 Hague
Conference provided for a subsequent conference, known as the 1907 Hague Confer-
ence. Final Act of the International Peace Conference, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 258, 264, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 103, 106 [hereinafter 1899 Hague
Final Act]. Similarly, the 1907 Hague Conference recommended yet another confer-
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first multilateral approaches to the general problems of modern
warfare, the International Peace Conferences represented the
next phase in the codification of the laws of war. 37 The goals of
the International Peace Conferences included pursuing collec-
tive arms control negotiations, ensuring a lasting peace, and
preventing armed combat.238 With these goals, the 1899 Hague
Conference marked the beginning of concerted efforts to limit
conduct during warfare, or jus in bello.2s9
Participants in the 1899 Hague Conference 240 formally ac-
cepted rules of war to govern armed conflict between con-
tracting parties.2 41 The members of the 1899 Hague Conference
adopted three conventions242 in which they sought to reconcile
ence to continue the efforts of the first two conferences. Final Act of the Second Inter-
national Peace Conference, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 216, 226, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 1,
28 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Final Act]. Due to the outbreak of World War I, however,
the third Hague Peace Conference never convened. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
204, at 66-67.
237. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 220.
238. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 204, at 50-52 (reprinting Russian Cir-
cular Note proposing 1899 Hague Conference's agenda). Twenty-six governments, in-
cluding China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, sent representatives
to the conferences. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 222, at 49.
239. MCCOUBREV & WHITE, supra note 5, at 221. By adopting principles relating to
the conduct of belligerents during warfare, parties to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Confer-
ences codified principles of jus in bello. Id.
240. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 35. On August 24, 1898, Czar Nicholas
II called for an international conference at which states could affirm their commitment
to maintaining universal peace and reducing armaments. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 204, at 48-50 (reprinting official Russian message delivered to ambassadors
to Imperial Russian Court). Czar Nicholas sent a second message on December 30,
1898 discussing the conference's specific agenda and stating the conference's aims of
reducing armaments and preserving peace. See id. at 50-52 (reprinting Russian Circular
Note proposing 1899 Hague Conference program). The Russian Imperial Government
convened the conference because it perceived that the international community sought
the preservation of peace, and it believed the arms race had progressed to an unprece-
dented degree. See id. at 49 (reprinting Czar Nicholas II's official call for international
conference).
241. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 222, at 49. The participants of the 1899
Hague Conference did not reach an agreement on the conference's primary object
which was to limit or reduce armaments. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 35; see
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 204, at 14 (stating that 1899 Hague Conference, as
disarmament conference, was "complete failure"); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 122
(discussing limitation of armaments as ostensible object of 1899 Hague Conference).
They did establish, however, institutions and procedures to settle international disputes,
such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, antecedent to the PCIJ and
the current ICJ. UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CON-
TROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 3 (1982) [hereinafter ARMS CONTROL].
242. 1899 Hague Final Act, supra note 236, at 263, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 104; Conven-
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humanitarian concerns with interests of military necessity. 243
The three conventions relate to the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes,2 " the laws and customs of land warfare,245 and maritime
warfare.246 At the 1899 Hague Conference, delegates also passed
declarations limiting the use of specific weapons, including dum-
dum bullets, 247 asphyxiating gases, 2 "48 and projectiles and explo-
sives launched from balloons.249
Two years after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, 5° the
Czar of Russia resumed the International Peace Conference at
tion for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779,
187 Consol. T.S. 410, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. 107 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention I]; Con-
vention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 429, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 129 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention
II]; Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, 187 Consol. T.S. 443, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. 159
[hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention III]. Conventions and declarations are also
known as treaties, and they refer to the parties' willingness to create binding legal obli-
gations for themselves. SHAW, supra note 14, at 79.
243. SYDNEY D. BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR 63 (1972)
244. 1899 Hague Convention I, supra note 242, art. 1, at 1785, 187 Consol. T.S. at
414, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 109.
245. See 1899 Hague Convention II, supra note 242, pmbl., at 1804, 187 Consol.
T.S. at 430, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 130-31 (discussing convention's purposes of revising and
defining rules of land warfare).
246. See 1899 Hague Convention III, supra note 242, pmbl., at 1828, 187 Consol.
T.S. at 444, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 160 (stating convention's objectives of adapting princi-
ples of 1864 Geneva Convention to maritime warfare).
247. 1899 Hague Declaration III, supra note 196, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 at 5,
187 Consol. T.S. at 459, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 155-56. The 1899 Hague Declaration III
provides, "[tihe Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets which ex-
pand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which
does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions." Id. 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
32 at 5, 187 Consol. T.S. at 459, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 155-56.
248. 1899 Hague Declaration II, supra note 196, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 at 10,
187 Consol. T.S. at 453, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 157. The 1899 Hague Declaration II pro-
vides, "[tihe Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the object
of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." Id. 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 32 at 10, 187 Consol. T.S. at 453, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 157.
249. 1899 Hague Declaration I, supra note 196, at 1839, 187 Consol. T.S. at 456, 1
A.J.I.L. Supp. at 154. The 1899 Hague Declaration I provides, "[tihe Contracting Pow-
ers agree to prohibit, for a term of five years, the launching of projectiles and explosives
from balloons, or by other new methods of a similar nature." Id. at 1839, 187 Consol.
T.S. at 456, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 154.
250. See SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 222, at 57 (discussing Russo-Japanese
War). The Russo-Japanese War, fought between 1904 and 1905, began without a formal
declaration of war. Id. At the 1907 Hague Conference, contracting parties adopted a
convention to ensure all hostilities would commence with prior warning, either by a
declaration providing reasons for commencing hostilities or by an ultimatum with a
conditional declaration of war. Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct.
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The Hague in 1907.251 Delegates at the 1907 Hague Conference
revised the three conventions 252 and one declaration 25 3 from the
1899 Hague Conference and adopted ten new conventions.254
In these documents, the delegates addressed the development of
humanitarian principles 255 but failed to make progress on dis-
armament negotiations.256
In addition to adopting conventions and declarations, the
contracting parties to both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Confer-
ences drafted regulations2 57 (respectively, "1899 Hague Regula-
18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2259, 2271, 205 Consol. T.S. 264, 270, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 85, 86
(hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention III].
251. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 43. Representatives from 44 countries,
including the five now-known nuclear powers, attended the 1907 Hague Conference.
See 1907 Hague Final Act, supra note 236, at 217-24, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 1-23 (listing
delegates to 1907 Hague Conference).
252. See 1899 Hague Convention I, supra note 242, art. 1, at 1785, 187 Consol. T.S.
at 414, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 109 (providing for peaceful settlements of international dis-
putes); 1899 Hague Convention II, supra note 242, pmbl., at 1804, 187 Consol. T.S. at
430, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 130-31 (relating to laws and customs of war on land); 1899
Hague Convention III, supra note 242, pmbl., at 1828, 187 Consol. T.S. at 444, 1 AJ.I.L.
Supp. at 160 (concerning adaptation to maritime warfare of principles of Geneva Con-
vention of August 22, 1864).
253. See Declaration Prohibiting Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives From Bal-
loons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, 205 Consol. T.S. 403 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Decla-
ration XIV] (prohibiting aerial bombardments).
254. 1907 Hague Final Act, supra note 236, at 225, 2 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 24-25 (listing
13 conventions and one declaration prepared by Conference for submission to plenipo-
tentiaries); see, e.g., 1907 Hague Convention III, supra note 250, art. 1, at 2271, 205
Consol. T.S. at 270, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 86 (setting forth principles of jus ad bellum by
providing that hostilities should commence with prior warning); Convention Respect-
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, arts. 2-5, 17-18, 36 Stat. 2310, 2322-23, 2325-26, 205 Consol. T.S. 299, 300-03, 2
AJ.I.L. Supp. 117, 118-19, 122-23 (establishing duties for belligerents, neutral states,
and citizens of neutral states to respect neutral territory during war); Convention Con-
cerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907, arts. 1-2, 36 Stat.
2351, 2363-64, 205 Consol. T.S. 345, 352, 2 AJ.I.L. Supp. 146, 147-48 (providing that
contracting parties agree not to bombard undefended ports and towns, but allowing
naval forces to bombard military targets in undefended towns); Convention for the
Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2371, 2383, 205 Consol. T.S. 359, 361, 2 AJ.I.L. Supp. 153, 154
(providing protections for military hospital ships carrying wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked).
255. See 1907 Hague Final Act, supra note 236, at 216, 2 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 1 (provid-
ing that sponsors of 1907 Hague Conference sought to "further develop the humanita-
rian principles which were the basis of the work of the first conference of 1899.").
256. See ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 43 (noting that delegates did not
reach general agreement on arms control).
257. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803 Annex at 1811-1825, 187 Consol. T.S. 429 Annex at 436-42, 1 AJ.I.L.
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tions" and "1907 Hague Regulations") establishing principles of
customary international law exclusively applicable to land war-
fare.2 "58 Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations259 sets forth
the basic principle that belligerents have a limited right to injure
the enemy.260 According to Article 23(e) ,261 aggressors may not
cause unnecessary suffering by employing arms, projectiles, or
materials calculated especially to cause such suffering.26 2 Article
23(a) forbids the use of poison or poisonous weapons,2 63 and
Supp. 129 Annex at 134-53 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Regulations]; Convention Respect-
ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 Annex at 2295-
309, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 289-97, 2 AJ.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 97-117 [herein-
after 1907 Hague Regulations]. The text of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations dif-
fers slightly with respect to certain articles. See ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 43-
44 (noting few instances where 1907 Hague Regulations contain substantive changes
from 1899 Hague Regulations); compare 1907 Hague Regulations, supra, art. 23, 2277
Annex at 2301-02, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106-
07 (containing additional subsection, Article 23(h), not included in the 1899 Hague
Regulations) with 1899 Hague Regulations, supra, art. 23, 1803 Annex at 1817-18, 187
Consol. T.S. 429 Annex at 438-39, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 129 Annex at 142-43 (differing from
1907 Hague Regulations by not containing similar provision on maintaining rights of
adversary's nationals).
258. See ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 43-44 (stating that 1899 Hague Con-
vention II comprehensively sets forth laws governing land warfare, and noting few
changes made by 1907 Hague Convention IV to revise 1899 Hague Convention II);
STONE, supra note 10, at 551 n.26 (stating that Hague Regulations have become part of
customary law and bind states independently of treaty obligations). The contracting
parties recognized that the Hague Regulations did not exhaustively express the laws of
war. Martens Clause, supra note 157, at 2279-80, 205 Consol. T.S. at 279, 2 AJ.I.L.
Supp. at 91-92. Rather, the Martens Clause states that customary international law shall
supplement the Hague Regulations relating to the laws of war. Id. at 2280, 205 Consol.
T.S. at 279, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 92.
259. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 257, art. 22, 36 Stat. 2277 Annex at 2301,
205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106.
260. Id. art. 22, 2277 Annex at 2301, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 AJ.I.L.
Supp. 90 Annex at 106. Article 22 provides, "[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." Id. art. 22, 2277 Annex at 2301, 205 Consol.
T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 AJ.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106.
261. Id. art. 23(e), 2277 Annex at 2301-02, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2
A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106.
262. Id. art. 23(e), 2277 Annex at 2301-02, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2
A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106. Article 23(e) provides that belligerents may not "em-
ploy arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Id. art.
23(e), 2277 Annex at 2301-02, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90
Annex at 106.
263. Id. art. 23(a), 2277 Annex at 2301, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2
AJ.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106. Article 23(a) provides that belligerents may not "em-
ploy poison or poisoned weapons." Id. art. 23(a), 2277 Annex at 2301, 205 Consol. T.S.
277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106. The 1907 Hague Regulations do
not define the meaning of "poison or poisoned weapons." Legality Opinion, supra note
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Article 23(c) provides that, upon surrender of an enemy, a bel-
ligerent no longer retains a right to kill or wound the enemy.
2 164
Article 25 prohibits attacks against neutrals or undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings. 65 Some legal scholars
contend that these regulations have become customary interna-
tional law, and, therefore, bind states not parties to the 1907
Hague Convention IV.26
6
5. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol
The International Conference on the Control of the Inter-
national Trade in Arms, Munitions, and Implements of War
26 7
convened in Geneva in 1925.268 Members of the international
community269 disapproved of the use of poison gas by German
4, 55, at 824. According to the ICJ, states have formulated their own interpretations,
and state practice does not indicate that contracting parties consider nuclear weapons
as poison or poisoned weapons. Id.
264. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 257, art. 23(c), 2277 Annex at 2301-02,
205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106. Article 23(c)
provides that belligerents may not "kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his
arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion." Id. art.
23(c), 2277 Annex at 2301-02, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 AJIL. Supp. 90
Annex at 106.
265. Id. art. 25, 2277 Annex at 2302, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L.
Supp. 90 Annex at 107. Article 25 provides, "[t]he attack or bombardment, by whatever
means, of town, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."
Id. art. 25, 2277 Annex at 2302, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90
Annex at 107. The version of Article 25 from the 1899 Hague Regulations does not
contain the language "by whatever means." 1899 Hague Regulations, supra note 257,
art. 25, 1803 Annex at 1818, 187 Consol. T.S. 429 Annex at 439, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 129
Annex at 143.
266. STONE, supra note 10, at 551 n.26; see BEST, supra note 159, at 8 (stating that
Hague Regulations represent customary law).
267. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 137. The conference convened to
adopt a convention, which has not entered into force, providing for the supervision of
the international trade in arms, munitions, and implements of war. SCHINDLER & To-
MAN, supra note 222, at 115. During the conference, the U.S. Government suggested
prohibiting the export of gases for use in war. ARMS CONTROL, supra note 241, at 9.
The French representative proposed drafting a protocol to prohibit the use of poison-
ous gas. Id. Finally, at Poland's recommendation, the drafters included bacteriological
weapons in the prohibition. Id.
268. See ARMS CONTROL, supra note 241, at 9 (discussing origins of Geneva Gas
Protocol); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 342-43 (discussing Geneva Gas Protocol as
attempt to abolish use of gas and chemical warfare and as continuation of prohibition
originally appearing in the 1899 Hague Declaration II).
269. See BEST, supra note 159, at 53-54 (stating that Geneva Gas Protocol banned
the "most objectionable" gas used during World War I). The Geneva Gas Protocol
arose from the concern of inter-war disarmers about inhumane weapons or weapons
which aggressors could develop furtively. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 204, at 76.
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and British forces during World War 1.27 At the conference,
thirty-eight nations signed a protoco 271 ("Geneva Gas Protocol")
condemning the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases,
and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices as a means of
war.2 72 Although most countries generally observed the protocol
during World War 11,273 contracting parties did not strictly ad-
here to it in other disputes.274
The Geneva Gas Protocol provoked controversy because the
drafters did not specify the chemical, biological, or other poison-
ous gases subject to the protocol's prohibitions.275 Based on the
language banning "other" gases, some states claimed that it was
270. See C.R.M.F. CRUTTWELL, A HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR: 1914-1918 153-54,
165-66 (2d ed. 1936) (discussing reaction to poison gas use during World War I);
STONE, supra note 10, at 554 (discussing use of poison gas during World War I). As the
first users of poison gas during World War I, German forces released chlorine gas from
stationary cylinders on April 22, 1915. Id. at 554 & n.44. The German forces did not
violate the 1899 Hague Declaration II because the forces did not discharge the poison
gas from the air. Id.; see 1899 Hague Declaration II, supra note 196, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 32 at 10, 187 Consol. T.S. at 453, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 157 (prohibiting use of projec-
tiles designed to diffuse asphyxiating gases).
271. See Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 197, at 576-82, 94 L.N.T.S. at 72-74 (list-
ing signatories).
272. Id. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67. The Geneva Gas Protocol declares that the con-
tracting parties accept the prohibition on the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or
other gases and "agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods
of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves .. " Id. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at
67, 69. The substance of the Geneva Gas Protocol derived from general principles of
customary international law prohibiting the use of poison and other similar materials
that cause unnecessary suffering. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 137.
273. See BEST, supra note 159, at 306 (stating that absence of poison gas use in
World War II resulted from fear of enemy's retaliation in like-kind). Despite the Ger-
man military's agreement to observe the Geneva Gas Protocol during World War II, the
German military violated the Geneva Gas Protocol by killing millions of noncombatants
with poisonous gas. STONE, supra note 10, at 555-56.
274. See ARMs CONTROL, supra note 241, at 9 (describing use of poison gas in other
armed conflicts). During the Ethiopian War of 1935-1941, Italy used mustard gas, a
type of poison gas, against Ethiopian forces. ANTHONY MOCKLER, HAILE SELASSIE'S WAR,
THE ITALIAN-ETHIOPIAN CAMPAIGN, 1935-1941 81 (1984). During the Iran-Iraq War of
1980-1988, Iraq used chemical weapons to regain control of the Fao Peninsula. HIRO,
supra note 103, at 43. After the Iran-Iraq cease-fire, Iraq used poison gas against the
Kurds. Id. at 194. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq threatened to use chemical
weapons, but never moved chemical munitions towards the front line. MICHAEL R.
GORDON & GENERAL BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERAL'S WAR 353 (1995).
275. Shaw, supra note 7, at 14; see ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 137 (stat-
ing that Geneva Gas Protocol's ambiguities stem from language prohibiting "other"
gases); ARMS CONTROL, supra note 241, at 10 (discussing international community's re-
action to Geneva Gas Protocol and stating, "[i] nterpretation of the protocol remained a
thorny problem.").
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unclear whether the Geneva Gas Protocol prohibited tear gas,
other non-lethal gases, or herbicides.276 Thirteen contracting
parties partially clarified the confusion of the protocol's cover-
age by declaring that the prohibitions extended to tear gas.277
The United States maintained, however, that the Geneva Gas
Protocol did not prohibit the use of nontoxic gases or chemical
herbicides.2 78 When the United States ratified the Geneva Gas
Protocol in 1975,79 the President included a statement af-
firming the U.S. understanding that the Geneva Gas Protocol
did not apply to control agents and chemical herbicides. 210 The
U.S. Government preferred to restrict the use of weapons of
mass destruction through disarmament agreements with effec-
tive safeguards. 28 ' Accordingly, the U.S. Government stood be-
hind its decision to use tear gas and chemical herbicides for de-
foliation purposes during the Vietnam War.28 2
276. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 137.
277. Id. On December 2, 1930, the British Government announced that it consid-
ered the Geneva Gas Protocol to ban the use of tear gas. Id. France and 11 other
signatories agreed with this interpretation. Id.
278. See id. at 137-38 (discussing U.S. reasons for dissenting from British view re-
garding application of Geneva Gas Protocol to tear gas). The U.S. Government argued
that tear gas and other non-lethal gases could be used during peace-time for police
purposes. Id. Accordingly, it claimed that the Geneva Gas Protocol could not con-
demn the use of these gases in war when they could be lawfully used in peace. Id.
279. Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 197, at 571. President Gerald R. Ford rati-
fied the Geneva Gas Protocol for the United States onJanuary 22, 1975. See Geneva Gas
Protocol, supra note 197, at 571 (reprinting Presidential proclamation on Geneva Gas
Protocol). When the U.S. Government ratified the Geneva Gas Protocol, it entered a
reservation claiming that it could use chemical or biological weapons in response to an
attack involving the first-use of such weapons by an enemy state or by the enemy's allies.
Id. The French and British Governments entered similar reservations upon their ratifi-
cations. Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 197, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67-69 n.1.
280. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 138.
281. ARMS CONTROL, supra note 241, at 10. The United States vetoed a Security
Council resolution proposed by the Soviet Union which urged universal ratification of
the Geneva Gas Protocol. Id. The United States subsequently voted against a General
Assembly resolution condemning the use of chemical and biological agents during
armed conflict. Id. at 11. The U.S. representative to the United Nations stated that the
United States objected to interpreting treaties through resolutions. Id.
282. See NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE, JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN
VIETNAM 618-19 (1988) (describing U.S. use of chemical herbicides for defoliation pur-
poses). The U.S. armed forces began using defoliants in the early 1960's but used them
more frequently between 1965 and 1967. Id. at 618. The U.S. armed forces primarily
used herbicides near waterways to remove places of concealment where the enemy
could ambush river boats. COMMANDER R.L. SCHREADLEY, FROM THE RrVER TO THE SEA"
THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN VIETNAM 195 (1992). Defoliation strategy was not as effec-
tive as U.S. armed forces anticipated. See id. at 280 (describing continual North
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6. The Kellogg-Briand Pact
To abolish the resort to violence in international rela-
tions, 283 sixty-three nations signed the Pact of Paris284 ("Kellogg-
Briand Pact") in 1928.285 In Article I, the contracting parties
condemned recourse to war and agreed to renounce war as an
instrument of national policy.286 The contracting parties also
agreed to seek only pacific means to settle disputes.287
Some legal scholars 288 described the Kellogg-Briand Pact as
overly ambitious and unrealistic because of its universal pledge
not to resort to war.289 This criticism focuses on the drafters'
failure to include measures which would ensure compliance with
Vietnamese attacks despite defoliation). As part of its defoliation strategy, U.S. armed
forces used herbicides to drastically defoliate broad strips on either side of the Long
Tau ship channel. Id. Despite these efforts, North Vietnamese forces continually sub-
jected ships in transit to rocket, recoilless rifle, and mining attack. Id. Agent Orange
was the most common defoliant, and it contained minimal amounts of dioxin, a highly
poisonous substance. SHEEHAN, supra, at 619. In response to U.S. defoliation tactics,
Cambodia lodged a formal complaint in which it alleged damage to crops and vegeta-
tion caused by chemical spraying. SCHREADLEY, supra, at 159.
283. GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 7; see 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 154
(describing Kellogg-Briand Pact as attempt to classify waging war as crime).
284. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 59 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; see BAI.
LEY, supra note 243, at 41 (discussing signatories to Kellogg-Briand Pact). Fifteen states
initially signed the agreement. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 154. In the preamble to
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the signatories invited all remaining states to adopt its princi-
ples. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra, pmbl., at 2344, 94 L.N.T.S. at 61.
285. See Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 284, pmbl., at 2344, 94 L.N.T.S. at 59 (stat-
ing that only pacific means should govern relations among states). Initially, French
Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg decided
to sign a bilateral pact renouncing war and agreeing to seek peaceful settlement of
disputes. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 204, at 155. Then, Secretary of State Kel-
logg urged that all nations should have the opportunity to sign the treaty. Id. The
Kellogg-Briand Pact led to the first world disarmament conference held in 1932 regard-
ing universal reduction and limitation on all types of armaments. GOLDBLAT, supra note
155, at 7.
286. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 284, art. I, at 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. at 63. Arti-
cle I provides, "[t] he High Contracting Parties solemnly declare.., that they condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." Id. art. I, at 2345-46,
94 L.N.T.S. at 63.
287. Id. art. II, at 2346, 94 L.N.T.S. at 63. According to Article II, "[t]he High
Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of
whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall
never be sought except by pacific means." Id. art. II, at 2346, 94 L.N.T.S. at 63.
288. BAILEY, supra note 243, at 41; see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 204, at
155 (referring to Kellogg-Briand Pact as "drunkard's oath").
289. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 284, art. I, at 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. at 63.
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the Kellogg-Briand Pact's obligations.290 As further evidence of
the Kellogg-Briand Pact's shortcomings, legal scholars noted
that it failed to prevent World War 1I.291
7. Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter
The U.N. Charter contributed to the development of the
laws of war through its prohibition in Article 2(4) on the threat
or use of force2 92 and its allowance in Article 51 for the use of
force in self-defense. 3  The right to self defense, however, is a
qualified right.294 According to Article 51, a state cannot invoke
the right to self-defense unless the Security Council fails to take
measures to maintain international peace and security.29 Rules
of customary international law further limit the right to self-de-
fense through requirements of necessity and proportionality. 9
These requirements provide that the use of force must be a pro-
portionate and necessary response to an armed attack. 97
290. ARMS CONTROL, supra note 241, at 4-5; see 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 190
(discussing lack of sanctions for violations of Kellogg-Briand Pact).
291. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 204, at 155; BAILEY, supra note 243, at 41.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact arguably failed to prevent World War II because it gave states
the power to determine whether a situation warranted resort to force in self-defense.
B.V.A. R61ing, International Law, Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control and Disarmament, in Nu-
CLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 180, 182 (Arthur S. Miller & Martin Feinrider eds., 1984); see
Meyrowitz, supra note 191, at 242 (stating that signatories continued to recognize resort
to war for purposes of self-defense); ARMS CONTROL, supra note 241, at 5 (discussing
hollowness of Kellogg-Briand Pact after signatories attached qualifications and interpre-
tations of treaty's obligations which reduced treaty's force).
292. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
293. Id. art. 51.
294. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94,
176 (June 27) (stating that customary international law principles of necessity and pro-
portionality limit responses by use of force in self-defense).
295. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
296. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 1 176, at 94; see SHAW, supra note
14, at 692 (describing principles of necessity and proportionality as part of customary
international law). The necessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense de-
rive from the Caroline incident in 1837 involving the British seizure and destruction of a
vessel in a U.S. port. Id. at 691-92. In an exchange of letters in which the British at-
tempted to justify its actions, the U.S. Secretary of State required the British to prove
the existence of the "necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means, and no moment of deliberation." See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 42-43 (1963) (quoting letter from U.S. Secretary of State
Daniel Webster to British Lord Ashburton). The United States also required a showing
that the British "did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it."
See id. at 43 (quoting letter from Webster to British ambassador in Washington).
297. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 176, at 94.
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8. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
During World War II, no agreement existed to provide ade-
quate humanitarian safeguards for war victims. 29 8  At a diplo-
matic conference held in Geneva in 1949 under the auspices of
the International Committee of the Red Cross, 299 representa-
tives3"' adopted four conventions for the protection of the
wounded, sick, and civilians.301 The first three conventions reaf-
firmed earlier humanitarian principles3 02 providing protections
for wounded, sick, or shipwrecked combatants,30 3 for those peo-
298. GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 84; see 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 155 (dis-
cussing World War II's role in revealing need for more comprehensive rules on prison-
ers of war and civilian population). When states learned the extent of the war crimes
committed during World War II, they decided to conclude the Genocide Convention in
1948. GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 84; see Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. 278, 280, 1970 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd. 4421) at 4 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (confirming that
genocide is punishable crime under international law).
299. REISMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 193, at xxix. Members of the diplomatic
conference decided to meet as a result of the hostilities of World War II. Rostow, supra
note 162, at 168. The International Committee of the Red Cross prepared draft pro-
posals on the application of humanitarian law to armed conflicts. ROBERTS & GUELFF,
supra note 155, at 169. After further revisions at the Seventeenth International Confer-
ence of the Red Cross, these proposals took the form of draft conventions for submis-
sion to a diplomatic conference. Id.
300. See ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 169-70 (discussing development of
conventional protections for war victims and civilians). Representatives from 64 states
attended the conference. Id. at 169.
301. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 12, 19, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 3122, 3128, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 38, 44 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention I] (pro-
viding protections for wounded and sick in field and for medical personnel in field);
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 12, 22, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
3226-28, 3234, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 92-94, 100 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention II] (dis-
cussing protections for wounded, sick, shipwrecked at sea, and military hospital ships);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts.
12, 13, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 146 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention
III] (discussing protections for prisoners of war from moment of capture through in-
ternment until release or death); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3526-28, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, 296, 297 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention IV] (establishing protections for
civilians on indiscriminate basis).
302. BEST, supra note 159, at 132. The 1949 Geneva Convention IV supplements
the provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 222, at
495.
303. 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 301, arts. 12, 19, at 3122, 3128, 75
U.N.T.S. at 38, 44.
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ple tending to wounded, sick, or shipwrecked combatants," °4
and for prisoners of war."05 The fourth convention10 6 ("1949 Ge-
neva Convention IV") established protections for civilians, as
well as combatants.30 7 All four Geneva conventions apply to
cases of declared war or other armed conflicts between con-
tracting parties.' °s
9. Protocols I and II Additional to the 1949
Geneva Convention
In the post-World War II period, the evolution of modern
warfare prompted the international community to revise the
laws of war.30 9 The international community had not advanced
the laws of war relating to the means and methods of warfare
since the 1907 Hague Conference and the 1925 Geneva Gas Pro-
tocol.3 10 New forms of armed conflict had developed, including
wars of national liberation, guerilla warfare, and other non-inter-
national disputes. 1 With these new forms of armed conflict,
civilians gradually lost protections because the means and meth-
ods of warfare had outgrown the protections provided in the
304. 1949 Geneva Convention II, supra note 301, arts. 12, 22, at 3226-28, 3234, 75
U.N.T.S. at 92-94, 100.
305. 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 301, arts. 12, 13, at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 146.
306. See 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 301, art. 3, at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 288-90 (providing floor of protections for persons not involved in hostilities when
dispute is not of international character). Article IV defines a protected person as one
"who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of
which they are not nationals." Id. art. IV, at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
307. See id. art. 3, at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90 (protecting people not involved
in armed conflict as well as combatants who have laid down their arms or who are
wounded or sick).
308. 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 301, art. 2, at 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32;
1949 Geneva Convention II, supra note 301, art. 2, at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; 1949
Geneva Convention III, supra note 301, art. 2, at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136; 1949 Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 301, art. 2, at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
309. GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 84.
310. Id. In agreements and conventions adopted before 1950, the international
community addressed the application of the laws of war to international, and not do-
mestic, disputes. Id.
311. See REISMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 193, at xxix (recognizing wars of na-
tional liberation as new feature of international politics); ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note
155, at 387 (stating that international community questioned application of laws of war
to guerilla warfare); see OMAR CABEZAS, FIRE FROM THE MOUNTAINS, THE MAKING OF A
SANDINISTA 162-76 (1986) (describing guerilla warfare in Nicaragua).
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pre-1950's agreements and conventions. 12  The rise in the
number of internal conflicts caused the international commu-
nity to clarify the application of the laws of war to these con-
flicts.313
To expand protections for civilians, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross convened a conference in Geneva 14 at
which participants supplemented the Geneva Conventions of
1949 with two protocols." 5 Protocol I ("1977 Geneva Protocol
I") augments protections for civilians by forbidding belligerents
to consider civilians as objects of attack and by prohibiting any
act or threat primarily intended to spread terror among a civil-
ian population. 316 It also banned belligerents from considering
civilian objects as objects of attack or reprisal.3 17 Finally, 1977
312. See GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 84 (discussing growth of guerrilla warfare
after World War I); see also BEST, supra note 159, at 343 (discussing reluctance of impe-
rial countries during Cold War to recognize that Third World countries should fight
wars of national liberation by same standards as international wars). In guerilla warfare,
the distinction between combatants and civilians is often unclear because the ruling
government's military has difficulty determining whether a citizen is part of a guerilla
group. GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 84. Rules relating to the distinction between com-
batants and noncombatants, therefore, did not protect civilians. See ROBERTS & GUELFF,
supra note 155, at 387 (stating that guerilla warfare challenged determination of com-
batant status).
313. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 387.
314. See BEST, supra note 159, at 345 (discussing events leading to conference and
process by which conference adopted protocols additional to 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions). The conference convened in 1974 and concluded in 1977. Id. at 344-45; see
ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 387 (describing participation of certain national
liberation movements in conference's deliberations). In the first session, conference
participants recognized that their most difficult task was identifying wars of national
liberation against colonialism, foreign occupation, and racist regimes as international
armed conflicts. BEST, supra note 159, at 345.
315. REISMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 193, at xxix; see Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, arts. 48-
79, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4, 25-40, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412-26 [hereinafter 1977 Geneva Protocol
I] (protecting victims and civilians involved in international armed conflicts); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611, 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1443 [hereinafter 1977
Geneva Protocol II] (providing protections for victims of non-international conflicts,
including those between armed forces of contracting parties and dissident armed
forces, but not including incidents of civil unrest).
316. 1977 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 315, art. 51(2), at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
Article 51(2) states, "[t]he civilian population ... shall not be the object of attack. Acts
or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civil-
ian population are prohibited." Id. art. 51(2), at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
317. Id. art. 52(1), at 27, 16 I.L.M. at 1414. According to Article 52, "[clivilian
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Geneva Protocol I codifies a humanitarian principle prohibiting
indiscriminate attacks, 18 including attacks which would strike
military targets, civilians, or civilian objects without distinc-
tion. 319 Protocol II ("1977 Geneva Protocol II") applies to inter-
nal or civil armed conflicts, but does not cover incidents of civil
unrest.32 0 It also mandates the humane treatment of all people
who are not involved in or who are no longer involved in hostili-
ties.32 1
E. Efforts to Contain Nuclear Weapons
After World War II, international organizations began to di-
rect their attention to the control of nuclear energy and nuclear
disarmament.322 The first effort to contain nuclear weapons in-
volved a plan for the regulation of nuclear energy and the elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons.32 3 In the United Nations, General
Assembly resolutions have consistently addressed issues related
to nuclear weapons. 324 Additionally, the international commu-
nity has concluded numerous treaties concerning nuclear weap-
objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals." Id. art. 52(1), at 27, 16 I.L.M. at
1414. Civilian objects include "all objects which are not military objectives." Id. art.
52(1), at 27, 16 I.L.M. at 1414.
318. Id. art. 51(4), at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
319. Id. art. 51(4), at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413. Indiscriminate attacks include:
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be di-
rected at a specific military objective; or
(c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such
case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction.
Id. art. 51(4), at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
320. 1977 Geneva Protocol II, supra note 315, art. 1, at 611, 16 I.L.M. at 1443.
321. Id. art. 4(1), at 612, 16 I.L.M. at 1444. Article 4(1) provides that all people
who are not involved in hostilities or who are no longer involved in hostilities "are
entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices.
They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction."
Id. art. 4(1), at 612, 16 I.L.M. at 1444.
322. See Rostow, supra note 162, at 179-83 (discussing international efforts since
1945 to address anxiety about use and proliferation of nuclear weapons).
323. See Bernard M. Baruch, Proposals for an International Atomic Development Author-
ity, 14 DEP'T ST. BULL.,June 1946, at 1057 [hereinafter Baruch Plan] (setting forth U.S.
plan for control of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament).
324. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 1 68-73, at 826-27 (discussing effect of
General Assembly resolutions addressing legality of nuclear weapons use).
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3 25
1. The Baruch Plan
In 1946, the U.S. representative to the U.N. Commission on
Atomic Energy,3 26 Bernard Baruch,3 27 presented a U.S. State De-
partment plan (the "Baruch Plan") to the United Nations on the
regulation of atomic energy and elimination of atomic weap-
ons.32 8 Under the Baruch Plan, the United States proposed plac-
ing the world's atomic resources under the control of an interna-
tional atomic development authority. 29  This authority would
monitor all phases of the development and use of nuclear en-
ergy,31° including maintaining information on raw materials331
and exercising complete control over production plants.33 2 The
325. Id. 58-59, at 824-25 (canvassing treaties relating to proliferation, use, and
testing of nuclear weapons).
326. See STONE, supra note 10, at 344-48 (discussing efforts and proposals on legal
regulation of atomic weapons). The General Assembly established a Commission on
Atomic Energy to investigate and make recommendations on the control of atomic
energy and on nuclear disarmament. G.A. Res. 1, 1st Sess., 17th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/1, at 9 (1946).
327. See CRAIG & JUNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 22 (discussing U.S. President Tru-
man's appointment of Bernard Baruch, a statesman, as chief negotiator with Soviet
Union concerning proposal for control of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons).
328. See Baruch Plan, supra note 323, at 1057 (outlining U.S. proposal for control
of nuclear energy); ARMS CONTROL, supra note 241, at 5 (describing goals of Baruch
Plan relating to regulation of nuclear weapons).
329. Baruch Plan, supra note 323, at 1059. The Baruch Plan states:
[t] he United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Develop-
ment Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development
and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including-
1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy activities poten-
tially dangerous to world security.
2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.
3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character
intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge
and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefor to detect, misuse of
atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must itself be the world's
leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus
supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in posses-
sion of leadership in knowledge.
Id.
330. See id. at 1060-62 (setting forth proposed measures of Baruch Plan). The Ba-
ruch Plan proposed that the International Atomic Development Authority would con-
trol atomic energy through "various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation,
inspection, research, and management by competent personnel." Id. at 1060.
331. Id. at 1060-61.
332. Id. at 1061.
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Baruch Plan required the removal of nuclear weapons from ex-
isting arsenals and the cessation of nuclear weapons production,
but only after the implementation of the international author-
ity.333 Provisions for compliance and punishments were of ut-
most importance to the success of the Baruch Plan.334
Despite the endorsement by a large majority of U.N. mem-
bers, the Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan.333 The Soviet
Union objected to a number of substantive provisions, including
inspection, ownership, and enforcement mechanisms. 36 Ac-
cordingly, the Soviet Union proposed its own plan prohibiting
the production and use of nuclear weapons. 33 17 It called for the
elimination of existing arsenals within three months of the
plan's entry into force and before the creation of an interna-
tional agency which would supervise the plan's implementa-
tion.338 Negotiations between the Soviet Union and United
States regarding these two proposals became deadlocked, and
each country rejected the other's plan. 3 9
2. General Assembly Resolutions
The General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions
directly relating to the use of nuclear weapons, 4 ° suspension of
333. Id. at 1060.
334. Id. at 1061.
335. ARMS CONTROL, supra note 241, at 6.
336. Id. at 6; see GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 13-14 (discussing Soviet Union's
response to Baruch Plan and formulation of Soviet Union's own plan for control of
nuclear weapons).
337. GOLDBLAT, supra note 155, at 13-14.
338. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
DISARMAMENT: 1945-1985 2 (1985).
339. SeeJohn Woodliffe, Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation: The Legal Aspects, in
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 85 (Istvan Pogany ed., 1987) (stating that
impasse in negotiations resulted in failure of first attempt to reach international nu-
clear disarmament).
340. See GA Res. 1653, supra note 163, at 4-5 (declaring that use of nuclear weap-
ons would violate U.N. Charter and laws of humanity); see, e.g., Non-Use of Nuclear
Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War, G.A. Res. 148D, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/39/749 (1984) (stating that nuclear weapons states
have primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for taking measures to pre-
vent outbreak of nuclear war); G.A. Res. 183B, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, at
73, U.N. Doc. A/38/628 (1983) (recalling that two nuclear weapons states solemnly
declared before General Assembly not to be first to use nuclear weapons, and inviting
other nuclear weapons states to make similar declarations); G.A. Res. 78J, U.N. GAOR,
37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 64, U.N. Doc. No. A/37/662 (1982) (stating that nuclear
disarmament is most effective deterrent against nuclear war and nuclear weapons use);
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nuclear weapons testing,341 and total nuclear disarmament. 342
In Resolution 1653,s~s the General Assembly declared that the
G.A. Res. 921, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 64-65, U.N. Doc. A/36/752
(1981) (declaring that nuclear weapons use would violate U.N. Charter and would con-
stitute crime against humanity); G.A. Res. 152D, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48,
at 69, U.N. Doc. A/35/665/Add.1 (1980) (categorizing nuclear weapons use as viola-
tion of U.N. Charter and as crime against humanity); G.A. Res. 83G, U.N. GAOR, 34th
Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/34/752 (1979) (recalling General Assembly
Resolution 71B which called for prohibition of nuclear weapons use); GA Res. 71B,
U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/33/461 (1978) (declaring that
nuclear weapons use would violate U.N. Charter and would be crime against humanity,
and stating that, due to these violations, nuclear weapons use should be prohibited
pending nuclear disarmament); G.A. Res. 191, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 16-17, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) (requesting that states employ atomic energy only for peaceful pur-
poses).
341. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2163, supra note 164, at 11-12 (calling upon all nuclear
weapons states to cease nuclear weapons testing in all environments); G.A. Res. 1648,
U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4942/Add.1 (1961) (urging
states to suspend nuclear weapons testing); G.A. Res. 1402A, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/4290 (1959) (requesting that states cease nuclear weap-
ons testing); G.A. Res. 1252, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/
4090 (1958) (urging states to suspend nuclear weapons testing).
342. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 70C, supra note 165, at 90-91 (calling upon nuclear weap-
ons states to seek nuclear disarmament); G.A. Res. 70P, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 99,
U.N. Doc. A/50/590 (1995) (urging nuclear weapons to stop improving, developing,
stockpiling, and producing nuclear warheads and their delivery systems); G.A. Res.
75H, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 70, U.N. Doc. A/49/699 (1994) (request-
ing nuclear weapons states to take measures towards disarmament with view to absolute
elimination of all nuclear weapons). The General Assembly has also passed resolutions
calling for a multilateral convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. G.A. Res.
71E, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 104, U.N. Doc. A/50/591 (1995); G.A. Res. 76E, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 77-78, U.N. Doc. A/49/700 (1994); G.A. Res. 76B,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 84-85, U.N. Doc. A/48/677 (1993); G.A. Res.
53C, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 70, U.N. Doc. A/47/692 (1992); G.A. Res.
37D, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/46/674 (1991); G.A.
Res. 59B, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 71-72, U.N. Doc. A/45/779 (1990);
G.A. Res. 117C, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 80, U.N. Doc. A/44/786
(1989); G.A. Res. 76E, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 90-91, U.N. Doc. A/43/
857 (1988); G.A. Res. 39C, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 81-82, U.N. Doc. A/
42/751 (1987); G.A. Res. 60F, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/
41/841 (1986); G.A. Res. 151F, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 90-91, U.N.
Doc. A/40/946 (1985); G.A. Res. 63H, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 70-71,
U.N. Doc. A/39/750 (1984); G.A. Res. 73G, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, at
67, U.N. Doc. A/38/641 (1983); G.A. Res. 100C, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
at 83-84, U.N. Doc. A/37/670 (1982).
343. G.A. Res. 1653, supra note 163, at 4-5. The General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 1653 by a vote of 55 to 20, with 26 abstentions. U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1063d plen.
mtg., at 808, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1063 (1961). Of the five declared nuclear powers, China,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted against the declaration. Id.
The Soviet Union voted for the resolution. Id.; see BAILEY, supra note 243, at 149-51
(discussing attitudes of China, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States with
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use of nuclear weapons would violate the U.N. Charter and laws
of humanity.344 Resolution 1653 refers to the 1868 St. Peters-
burg Declaration,345 the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences,346
and the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol 47 in order to illustrate that
weapons of mass destruction causing unnecessary suffering con-
travene the laws of humanity and principles of international
law.348  Resolution 1653 states that the use of nuclear weapons
would exceed the scope of war, cause indiscriminate suffering,
and affect people not involved in the hostilities.349
3. Treaties
While no single treaty explicitly bans the use of nuclear
weapons, 350 numerous treaties circumscribe aspects of the use or
possession of nuclear weapons.3 3 ' Some treaties limit the acqui-
respect to provisions of Resolution 1653); see also Legality Opinion, supra note 4, at 849
(Oda, J., dissenting) (discussing passage of Resolution 1653).
344. G.A. Res. 1653, supra note 163, at 5. Resolution 1653 declares, "[a]ny State
using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter
of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a
crime against mankind and civilization." Id.
345. Id. at 5; see St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298-99, 1 A.J.I.L.
Supp. at 95-96 (banning use of exploding bullets).
346. G.A. Res. 1653, supra note 163, at 5; see supra notes 236-66 and accompanying
text (discussing 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences and conventions and declarations
adopted at each conference).
347. G.A- Res. 1653, supra note 163, at 5; see Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 197,
at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67-69 (prohibiting use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases
as means of war).
348. G.A. Res. 1653, supra note 163, at 4-5.
349. Id. at 5. In reaching the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons would be
illegal, the General Assembly applied general rules of customary international law to
nuclear weapons. Id. at 4-5. In its Legality Opinion, the ICJ states:
That application by the General Assembly of general rules of customary law to
the particular case of nuclear weapons indicates that, in its view, there was no
specific rule of customary law which prohibited the use of nuclear weapons; if
such a rule had existed, the General Assembly could simply have referred to it
and would not have needed to undertake such an exercise of legal qualifica-
tion.
Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 72, at 826.
350. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 57-58, at 824 (finding that prohibition on
nuclear weapons use does.not appear in treaties relating to weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and noting that international community has not produced treaty banning nu-
clear weapons use); Weston, supra note 4, at 546 (stating that no treaty specifically pro-
hibits manufacture, stockpiling, deployment, or actual use of nuclear weapons).
351. See Southeast Asia Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2, at 640 (creating nuclear weap-
ons-free zone in Southeast Asia); African Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2, at 707 (establishing
nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa); South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6,
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sition, manufacture, and possession of nuclear weapons. 3 2 Ac-
cording to some treaties, states may not deploy nuclear weapons
in specific physical locations,353 such as outer space3 54 or the sea-
bed. 35 Similarly, some treaties forbid nuclear weapons testing
1985, art. 2, 24 I.L.M. 1442, 1444 [hereinafter Treaty of Rarotonga] (founding nuclear
weapons-free zone in South Pacific); Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, art. I, 23 U.S.T. 701, 704, 10
I.L.M. 146, 146-47 (entered into force May 18, 1972) [hereinafter Sea-bed Treaty] (cre-
ating nuclear weapons-free zone in sea-bed, ocean floor, and subsoil thereof); NPT,
supra note 34, arts. I, II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (preventing nuclear weapons
proliferation by nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states); Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 1, art. 4, at 332, 6 I.L.M. at 523 (establishing nuclear weapons-free
zone in Latin America); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, art. IV, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. 206, 208 (entered into force
Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (founding nuclear weapons-free zone
in outer space); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. 1, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 1316-17, 480 U.N.T.S. 45,
45-47 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1963) [hereinafter Partial Test Ban Treaty] (forbid-
ding nuclear weapons testing in atmosphere, outer space, or underwater); Antarctic
Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, arts. V, VI, 12 U.S.T. 794, 796-97, 402 U.N.T.S. 72, 76 (entered into
force June 23, 1961) (creating nuclear weapons-free zone in Antarctica).
352. See Southeast Asia Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(1) (a), at 640 (prohibiting con-
tracting parties from developing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, or controlling
nuclear weapons within zone); African Treaty, art. 3(a), supra note 1, at 707 (prohibit-
ing manufacture, stockpile, acquisition, or possession of nuclear explosive device);
Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 351, art. 3(a), at 1444-45 (prohibiting manufacture,
acquisition, possession, or control of nuclear explosive devices); NPT, supra note 34,
art. I, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons
by nuclear weapons states); Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 1, art. 1 (1), at 330, 6 I.L.M.
at 523 (requiring contracting parties to prohibit and prevent manufacture, production,
or acquisition of nuclear weapons within their territories).
353. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 58(b), at 824; see Southeast Asia Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 3(1) (b), (2) (b) at 640 (banning contracting parties from controlling
or stationing nuclear weapons inside or outside zone and from allowing another state
to control or station nuclear weapons within zone); African Treaty, supra note 1, art.
4(1), at 707 (preventing stationing of nuclear explosive device in territory of each con-
tracting party); Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 351, art. 5, at 1446 (prohibiting station-
ing of nuclear explosive devices within contracting parties' territories); Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 1, art. 1 (1) (b), at 330, 6 I.L.M. at 523 (forbidding Latin American
countries from receiving, storing, installing, deploying, or possessing nuclear weapons);
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 351, art. V, at 796, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76 (prohibiting nuclear
explosions and disposal of radioactive waste in Antarctica).
354. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 351, art. IV, at 2413-14, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208
(prohibiting contracting parties from placing space vehicles into orbit carrying nuclear
weapons, and forbidding establishment of military bases on celestial bodies).
355. See Sea-bed Treaty, supra note 351, art. I(1), at 704, 10 I.L.M. at 146-47 (for-
bidding contracting parties from implanting or placing nuclear weapons or weapons of
mass destruction on sea-bed or ocean floor).
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in specific physical locations.356 Some treaties also address re-
course to nuclear weapons during hostilities.3 57  Despite these
treaties, the international community remains divided over the
legality of nuclear weapons use.3 ~
356. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 58(c), at 824; see Southeast Asia Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 3(1)(c), (2)(c), at 640 (forbidding contracting parties from testing
nuclear weapons or from allowing another state to test nuclear weapons in their terri-
tory); African Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5(b), at 708 (prohibiting testing of nuclear ex-
plosive devices within contracting party's territory); Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note
351, art. 6, at 1446 (preventing testing of any nuclear exploding device within South
Pacific nuclear weapons-free zone and agreeing not to assist in or encourage such test-
ing by other states); Sea-bed Treaty, supra note 351, art. 1(1), at 704, 10 I.L.M. at 146-47
(preventing nuclear weapons testing in sea-bed zone by prohibiting placement of struc-
tures, launching installations, or any facility designed for testing); Treaty of Tlatelolco,
supra note 1, art. 1(a), at 330, 6 I.L.M. at 523 (prohibiting nuclear weapons testing by
Latin American countries); Outer Space Treaty, supra note 351, art. IV, at 2413, 610
U.N.T.S. at 208 (preventing nuclear weapons tests from originating in outer space by
banning placement into orbit of any object carrying nuclear weapons); Partial Test Ban
Treaty, supra note 351, art. I(1)(a), at 1316, 480 U.N.T.S. at 45 (requiring parties to
prohibit nuclear weapons testing within theirjurisdictions, including atmosphere, outer
space, or underwater); Antarctic Treaty, supra note 351, art. V, at 796, 402 U.N.T.S. at
76 (banning all forms of nuclear explosions on Antarctica). On September 24, 1996, 65
nations signed a comprehensive test ban treaty which bans all nuclear test explosions.
Farhan Haq, Disarmament: Clinton Leads CTBT Signing But Experts Doubt Results, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinaf-
ter Clinton Leads CTBT Signing]. Before the treaty can enter into force, 44 nations with
significant nuclear facilities, including Israel, India, and Pakistan, must sign the treaty.
Id.; see Terry Atlas, Nuclear Test Ban Pact OKD, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1996, at 1 (discussing
India's and Pakistan's opposition to treaty).
357. See Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 351, protocol 2, art. 2, at 1461 (providing
that contracting parties agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear devices against
parties to Treaty of Rarotonga or against certain territories within South Pacific nuclear
weapons-free zone); Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 1, protocol 2, art. 3, at 364, 6 I.L.M.
at 534 (providing that protocol's contracting parties undertake not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against parties to Treaty of Tlatelolco).
358. See Jennifer Scott, World Court to Rule on Legality of Nuclear Weapons, REUTERS,
Oct. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter World Court]
(discussing diverging views on whether ICJ advisory opinion would encourage or deter
disarmament negotiations); Kinzer, supra note 96, at A6 (discussing debate on legality
of nuclear weapons use). Before hearings began at the ICJ for the advisory opinion, a
nuclear arms specialist stated, "the view that nuclear weapons are illegal is definitely not
a widely shared norm [in international law] at present." Scott, supra. Based on written
submissions to the ICJ, six states, including France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, asserted the legality of nuclear weapons use. Brahma Chellaney, Next
on the World Court's Docket: Are NuclearArms Legal?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Opinion, Oct. 28,
1995. Twenty-eight states argued that nuclear weapons use is illegal, and nine states
declined to address the legality issue, instead focusing on jurisdictional issues. Id.
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a. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The contracting parties35 9 to the NPT 60 believed the spread
of nuclear weapons would increase the dangers of nuclear
war."6 1 To address these concerns, the contracting parties
agreed to prohibit the direct or indirect transfer of nuclear
weapons by the "haves, 31 6 2 and to forbid the receipt or manufac-
ture of nuclear weapons by the "have nots."136 Article III estab-
lishes safeguards in the form of inspections and monitoring by
359. NPT, supra note 34, at 561-66, 729 U.N.T.S. at 198-263 (listing signatories to
original treaty signed at Washington and Moscow).
360. See id. arts. I, II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (preventing spread of nuclear
weapons by nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states); see also ARMs CON-
TROL, supra note 241, at 82-87 (discussing negotiations leading to approval of final draft
of NPT). After private negotiations, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted
separate, but identical, proposals for a draft treaty on non-proliferation to the Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee ("ENDC"). Id. at 84-85. Members of the ENDC ac-
cepted proposed revisions addressing concerns of non-nuclear weapons states and sub-
sequently submitted a draft treaty to the General Assembly where it underwent further
revision. Id. at 85. Initially signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, the NPT was
extended indefinitely in late 1995. Final Document on Extension of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 11, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 961, Annex, Decision 3,
at 972-73 (1995) [hereinafter NPT Extension]. As ofJune, 1996, 181 nations signed the
NPT. Drozdiak, supra note 40, at A14. Of the countries declining to sign the NPT,
Israel pledged that it would consider signing the treaty only two years after a compre-
hensive peace in the Middle East. Israel's Nuke Position, supra note 116.
361. NPT, supra note 34, pmbl., at 484, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169.
362. See id. art. I, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (stating obligations of nuclear weap-
ons states). Article I provides:
Each nuclear-weapon State ... undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or con-
trol over such weapons or explosive devices.
Id. art. I, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. The NPT defines a nuclear weapons state as one
which had manufactured and exploded nuclear weapons or devices before January 1,
1967. Id. art. IX(3), at 492-93, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174. As of the NPT's signing, only
China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States fit this
definition. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, supra note 69, at 7.
363. See NPT, supra note 34, art. II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (discussing duties
of non-nuclear weapons states). Article II states:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State . . . undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indi-
rectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nu-
clear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manu-
facture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Id. art. II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
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the International Atomic Energy Agency 364 ("IAEA") in order to
assure the peaceful use of nuclear weapons-related material.3 65
While the NPT permits peaceful nuclear testing,3 66 it requires
that non-nuclear weapons states have access to the information
obtained from the testing.3 67 The NPT does not include punish-
ments or sanctions for violators of the treaty's obligations.6 8 Fi-
nally, the NPT exacts a commitment by all contracting parties to
pursue good faith negotiations towards nuclear disarmament.6 9
Recently, 175 states participated in a conference to review
and extend the NPT.370 In statements relating to the 1995 ex-
tension, the five nuclear powers gave security assurances by
agreeing not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weap-
ons states that are parties to the NPT.3 71  Also, the Security
364. See id. art. III, at 487-89, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172 (outlining role of IAEA in moni-
toring peaceful uses of nuclear energy). The IAEA is responsible for inspecting nuclear
installations held or operated by non-nuclear weapons states to ensure compliance with
the NPT. CRG &JuNGERMAN, supra note 2, at 436. Non-nuclear weapons states, how-
ever, allow these inspections only on a voluntary basis. Id.
365. NPT, supra note 34, art. III, at 487-89, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172; see BAILEY, supra
note 70, at 4 (stating that safeguards acted as mainstay of non-proliferation system). By
implementing safeguards, the drafters sought to prevent states from using commercial
and research programs for non-peaceful purposes. Id.
366. NPT, supra note 34, art. IV, at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
367. Id. art. V, at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173; see David Pitt, Nuclear-Free Zones: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, in NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES 1, 1 (David Pitt & Gordon Thompson
eds., 1987) (stating that term "peaceful uses" has not been defined). According to Arti-
cle V, "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be
made available to non-nuclear-weapon States ... on a nondiscriminatory basis." NPT,
supra note 34, art. V, at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
368. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 11. The NPT has suffered from problems of noncom-
pliance. See id. at 6 (discussing noncompliance of certain states, such as Iran, Iraq,
North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan, with treaty obligations by developing nuclear
programs). The NPT has failed to prevent vertical proliferation relating to the further
accumulation of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons states. Pitt, supra note 367, at 2.
It has also failed todeter horizontal proliferation as a number of non-nuclear weapons
states have acquired or can readily acquire nuclear weapons. Id.
369. NPT, supra note 34, art. VI, at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173. According to Article
VI, all contracting parties undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control." Id. art. VI, at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
370. See NPT Extension, supra note 360, Annex, Decision 3, at 974 (listing partici-
pants); Barbara Crossette, Treaty Aimed at Halting Spread of Nuclear Weapons Extended, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 1995, at Al (discussing NPT's extension).
371. See S.C. Res. 984, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 2, S/RES/984 (1995) (discussing
statements made by nuclear weapons states regarding security assurances).
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Council unanimously adopted Resolution 984,37 2 stating that the
nuclear weapons states, as permanent members of the Security
Council, should immediately refer incidents involving nuclear
weapons to the Security Council in order to ensure that victims
receive prompt assistance from the Security Council.373
b. Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones
Nuclear weapons-free zones arose to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons3 74 and to contain the number of existing nu-
clear weapons states.375 In treaties creating nuclear weapons-
free zones, contracting parties declare their territories free from
aspects of nuclear weapons, such as nuclear testing, stockpiling
nuclear weapons-related material, or dumping radioactive
waste.3 7 6 Presently, nuclear weapons-free zones exist in Africa,3
77
Antarctica, 37  Latin America,37 9 outer space, 380 the sea-bed,
38 1
372. See id. at 2 (inviting U.N. member states to assist non-nuclear weapons state if
that state is attacked with nuclear weapons).
373. Id.
374. Jozef Goldblat, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, in THE FUTURE OF THE NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY 86, 86 (John Simpson & Darryl Howlett eds., 1995).
375. Id.
376. See G.A. Res. 3472B, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 23-24, U.N. Doc.
A/10441 (1975) (defining nuclear weapons-free zone); Pitt, supra note 367, at 1 (defin-
ing nuclear weapons-free zone as area free of nuclear weapons while countries within
territory may still receive support of nuclear weapons states). According to General
Assembly Resolution 3472B, a nuclear weapons-free zone refers to:
[A]ny zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has
established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:
(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone
shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the
zone, is defined;
(b) An international system of verification and control is established to
guarantee compliance with the obligations derived from that statute.
G.A. Res. 3472B, supra, at 24.
377. See African Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2, at 707 (establishing nuclear weapons-
free zone in Africa); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A New Nuclear Treaty Is a Big Step for Africa,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 5, 1996, at Opinion (discussing importance of nuclear weap-
ons-free zone for Africa because treaty will arguably increase cooperation in use of nu-
clear science and will prompt diversion of resources formerly spent on nuclear arms
race to development efforts).
378. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 351, arts. V, VI, at 796-97, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76
(declaring Antarctica free of nuclear explosions and radioactive waste).
379. See Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 1, art. 4, at 332, 6 I.L.M. at 523 (founding
nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America).
380. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 351, art. IV, at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208
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Southeast Asia,3 82 and the South Pacific.
38 1
II. HAS A PROHIBITION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE
ASCENDED TO CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The application of the laws of war to nuclear weapons is
controversial because the overwhelming destructive force of nu-
clear weapons38 4 distinguishes them from the conventional
weapons which gave rise to the laws of war. 8 ' The laws of war
theoretically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons through limits
on methods of warfare 8 6 and restrictions on types of weapons.38 7
An absolute ban on the use of nuclear weapons, however, may
not have ascended to a rule of customary international law.388
(banning nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction from outer space and ce-
lestial bodies).
381. See Sea-bed Treaty, supra note 351, art. 1, at 704, 10 I.L.M. at 146-47 (prohibit-
ing contracting parties from placing launching installations or other facilities specifi-
cally designed for storing, testing, or using nuclear weapons in sea-bed zone).
382. See Southeast Asia Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2, at 640 (establishing nuclear
weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia).
383. See Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 351, art. 2, at 1444 (creating nuclear
weapons-free zone in South Pacific); South Pacific Now Nuclear-Free Zone, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Mar. 25, 1996 (describing negotiations surrounding formulation of treaty);
Mackay, supra note 88, at 1862-63 (assessing contracting parties' reasons behind signing
Treaty of Rarotonga).
384. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (discussing destructive capabili-
ties of nuclear weapons).
385. See Mmvlowrrz, supra note 27, at 2 (discussing doubt among legal scholars
over applicability of laws of war to nuclear weapons because laws of war arose before
advent of nuclear weapons); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 200, at 185 (discussing legal-
ity of nuclear weapons). Despite the development ofjus in bello after World War II, the
"nuclear question remains notoriously unresolved." MCGOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5,
at 222.
386. See Shaw, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing application of general principles of
laws of war concerning methods of warfare to nuclear weapons use); 2 OPPENHEIM,
supra note 7, at 347-48 (proposing that assessment of legality of nuclear weapons use
should incorporate reference to distinction between combatants and noncombatants,
principles of humanity, and existing international documents that limit use of violence
in war).
387. RICHARD FALK ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 22, 23
(1981) (discussing legality of nuclear weapons use in terms of prohibitions on weapons
and tactics having cruel effects and causing unnecessary suffering).
388. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 155, at 18 (noting that states, including nu-
clear powers, have not agreed upon single set of rules governing nuclear weapons use).
In its Legality Opinion, the ICJ unanimously held that no customary or conventional
international law exists to authorize the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.
Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 105(2)(A), at 831. Yet, the ICJ also concluded that it
could not find a per se conventional or customary rule that specifically prohibited the
threat or use of nuclear weapons. Id. 1 74, at 827.
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A. Customary International Law Prohibits the Use of
Nuclear Weapons
The laws of war consist of specific international conven-
tions, treaties, and scholarly writings which condemn aspects of
nuclear weapons use.3 89 Humanitarian rules regulating partici-
pants in armed conflicts provide that military necessities cannot
exceed the laws of war.390 States must act in concert with princi-
ples such as the prohibition against unnecessary suffering,3 91 the
prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, 92 and the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants. 93 Due to the health
and destructive effects of nuclear weapons, 94 scholars have ar-
gued that the present technology has rendered nuclear weapons
use inconsistent with these humanitarian principles of customary
international law.395
1. Nuclear Weapons Violate the Prohibition Against
Unnecessary Suffering
As a principle of humanity, 96 the prohibition against un-
389. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text (discussing sources of laws of
war).
390. See Meyrowitz, supra note 191, at 234 (stating that St. Petersburg Declaration
implies wartime sovereignty is not absolute because necessities of war cannot exceed
laws of war).
391. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (explaining origins in St. Peters-
burg Declaration of prohibition against unnecessary suffering).
392. See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text (describing prohibition against
indiscriminate attacks).
393. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (explaining distinction between
combatants and noncombatants); see also R6ing, supra note 291, at 187 (listing princi-
ples relevant to determining legality of nuclear weapons, including prohibition against
weapons causing unnecessary suffering and prohibition against indiscriminate attacks);
MEYROWITZ, supra note 27, at 21-22 (discussing principles of laws of war applicable to
nuclear weapons, including limited right to kill enemy, prohibition against unnecessary
suffering, prohibition against asphyxiating or poisonous gases, and prohibition against
indiscriminate attacks).
394. See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text (examining health effects of nu-
clear explosions); see also supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (describing destruc-
tive capabilities of nuclear weapons).
395. See R6ing, supra note 291, at 190 (stating that nuclear weapons are "odious"
and should a priori be considered illegal because states could employ less repulsive
weapons).
396. See Grief, supra note 27, at 22-39 (discussing principles of international hu-
manitarian law). International humanitarian law refers to the body of law consisting of
the laws of war arising from conventions held at The Hague and at Geneva. See Legality
Opinion, supra note 4, 75, at 827 (reviewing components of international humanita-
rian law). The Hague laws generally encompass restrictions on the means and methods
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necessary suffering provides that during war states may not em-
ploy weapons or tactics that have cruel effects or cause unneces-
sary suffering to combatants.3 97 The prohibition against unnec-
essary suffering first appeared in the preamble to the St.
Petersburg Declaration.39 8 The preamble states that contracting
parties should not use weapons which would uselessly aggravate
the sufferings of disabled men. 99 This principle was subse-
quently embodied in the Hague Regulations which sought to
codify the laws of war.4"'
Scholars argue that nuclear weapons violate the prohibition
against unnecessary suffering because the use of nuclear weap-
ons involves more force than necessary to weaken the military
forces of the enemy.40 ' A determination of the amount of force
necessary to overpower the enemy involves balancing military ne-
cessity against humanitarian concerns.40 ' This balancing test
considers whether there is an alternative method to weakening
the enemy by causing the least amount of suffering.40 3 In addi-
tion to casualties associated with the blast effects of nuclear
weapons, 40 4 radiation from nuclear explosions causes health ef-
of warfare used by belligerents against their enemy, and the Geneva laws generally ad-
dress protections for victims of war, disabled combatants, and persons not involved in
hostilities. See id. (examining aspects of international humanitarian law including laws
developed at Hague and Geneva); see also MCGOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 257
(discussing difference between Hague law and Geneva law).
397. Meyrowitz, supra note 191, at 234-35; see St. Petersburg Declaration, supra
note 187, at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95 (declaring that contracting parties should not
use weapons which would cause unnecessary suffering); 1907 Hague Regulations, supra
note 257, art. 23(e), 2277 Annex at 2301-02, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2
A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106 (prohibiting belligerents from employing arms, projec-
tiles, or materials designed to cause unnecessary suffering); 1977 Geneva Protocol I,
supra note 315, art. 35(2), at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1409 (forbidding use of weapons, projec-
tiles, and materials and methods of warfare intended to cause unnecessary suffering).
398. SINGH & McWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 116; see supra notes 221-35 and accom-
panying text (discussing St. Petersburg Declaration).
399. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, pmbl., at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at
95.
400. Shaw, supra note 7, at 3; see 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 257, art.
23(e), 2277 Annex at 2301-02, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90
Annex at 106 (forbidding use of arms, projectiles, or material intended to cause unnec-
essary suffering).
401. Grief, supra note 27, at 25; St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, pmbl.,
at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95.
402. Grief, supra note 27, at 25.
403. STONE, supra note 10, at 343; Grief, supra note 27, at 25.
404. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (explaining destructive capabili-
ties of nuclear weapons).
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fects including long-term illnesses such as leukemia and thyroid
cancer.4 °5 Accordingly, states using nuclear weapons would vio-
late the prohibition against unnecessary suffering because con-
ventional weapons would attain the goal of weakening the en-
emy without causing as much suffering as nuclear weapons.40 6
In the only case reviewing the atomic bombings of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki,40 7 the Tokyo District Court found that the
U.S. use of atomic weapons during World War II violated cus-
tomary international law by causing unnecessary suffering. 40 8
The Tokyo District Court relied on Articles 22 and 23(e) of the
1907 Hague Regulations to conclude that states cannot use
means of warfare causing unnecessary suffering.40 9 The court
found that because the United States used nuclear weapons
which caused unnecessary suffering, the United States violated
international law.410
2. Nuclear Weapons Violate the Prohibition Against
Indiscriminate Attacks
Article 48 of 1977 Geneva Protocol 1411 sets forth the basic
rule that states must ensure protection and respect for the civil-
405. See STONE, supra note 10, at 343 (contending that radioactive substances cause
suffering in excess of amount necessary to attain military objectives); SINGH & MCWHIN-
NEY, supra note 24, at 118 (stating that rationale of Article 23(e) of Hague Regulations
prevents belligerent from torturing enemy after belligerent has disabled enemy, and
arguing that radioactive fallout adds torture to disablement thereby causing unneces-
sary suffering); see also supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text (discussing health ef-
fects of nuclear explosions).
406. Grief, supra note 27, at 25.
407. See Harry H. Almond, Jr., Deterrence and a Policy-Oriented Perspective on the Legal-
ity of Nuclear Weapons, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAw 57, 59 (Arthur S. Miller & Martin
Feinrider eds., 1984) (stating that Shimoda case is onlyjudicial review of atomic bombs
used during World War II); Richard Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the
Atomic Attacks Upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 A.J.I.L. 759 (1965) (providing compre-
hensive discussion of Shimoda case and international reaction to decision).
408. Shimoda v. State (Japanese Gov't), 8 JAPAN. ANN. INT'L L. 212, 242 (Tokyo
Dist. Ct. 1964). Plaintiffs, Japanese citizens, sued the Japanese Government for injuries
associated with the atomic bombings. Id. at 222-24. Plaintiffs claimed that theJapanese
Government was responsible for its injuries because the Japanese Government waived
the claims of its citizens against the United States for the bombings. Id. at 220. The
Tokyo District Court dismissed plaintiffs' claims because it found that international law
does not recognize individuals' claims until provided for in a treaty. Id. at 249-50.
409. Id. at 242.
410. Id. at 241-42.
411. See supra notes 316-19 and accompanying text (discussing 1977 Geneva Proto-
col I).
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ian population by distinguishing between the civilian population
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objec-
tives.41 2 According to Article 51, indiscriminate attacks involve
targeting non-specific military objectives, using means or meth-
ods of warfare not directed at a specific military target, or using
means or methods of warfare effecting the area outside the zone
of warfare.4"' If a state knowingly engages in an indiscriminate
attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects, the
state has committed a grave breach of 1977 Geneva Protocol 1.414
Any grave breach of 1977 Geneva Protocol I is a war crime.41 5
Scholars also contend that the use of nuclear weapons vio-
lates the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks4'16 because
the radiation from a nuclear explosion is uncontrollable, may
damage non-military objects, and may also injure a large portion
of the civilian population.41 7 Although belligerents may inciden-
tally affect civilians or civilian objects without violating the prohi-
bition against indiscriminate attacks, they must not exceed hu-
manitarian concerns when attempting to secure military advan-
tage.4" 8 Following a nuclear attack, the wind carries radioactive
412. 1977 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 315, art. 48, at 25, 16 I.L.M. at 1412; see St.
Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95 (providing that
sole legitimate object during war is weakening of enemy forces). A civilian is one who
does not belong to the armed forces of the parties to the conflict, a militia or volunteer
corp forming part of the armed forces, or an organized resistance movement. See 1977
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 315, art. 50, at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413 (defining civilians
and civilian population). Civilian objects include all objects which are not military
objectives. Id. art. 52(1), at 27, 16 I.L.M. at 1414. Military objectives "are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contri-
bution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutraliza-
tion ... offers a definite military advantage." Id. art. 52(2), at 27, 16 I.L.M. at 1414.
413. 1977 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 315, art. 51(4), at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413; see
supra notes 318-19 (defining indiscriminate attacks).
414. Id. art. 85(3)(b), at 42, 16 I.L.M. at 1428. To qualify as a grave breach, the
state violating the 1977 Geneva Protocol I must act wilfully and its actions must cause
death or serious injury to body or health. Id. art. 85(3), at 42, 16 I.L.M. at 1428.
415. Id. art. 85(5), at 42, 16 I.L.M. at 1428.
416. See MEYROWITZ, supra note 27, at 24 (stating that atomic bombings of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki resulted in indiscriminate slaughter of Japanese citizens). But see
1977 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 315, at 432-34 (setting forth U.K. and U.S. reserva-
tions to Protocol I which expressly exempt nuclear weapons use from prohibition
against indiscriminate attacks).
417. BAILEY, supra note 243, at 148. Arguably, "the nature of nuclear weapons
makes it virtually inevitable that indiscriminate effects would accompany their use."
Grief, supra note 27, at 28.
418. See 1977 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 315, art. 57(2) (a) (iii), at 29, 16 I.L.M.
at 1416 (requiring that persons responsible for launching attack refrain from causing
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fallout beyond the area of the explosion.419 If the radioactive
fallout affects civilians, the use of nuclear weapons has resulted
in an indiscriminate attack.420 Some legal scholars contend that
nuclear weapons are per se indiscriminate and, therefore, mili-
tary advantage can never outweigh humanitarian concerns.421
3. Nuclear Weapons Fail to Distinguish Between Combatants
and Noncombatants
Nuclear weapons theoretically violate customary interna-
tional law because the use of nuclear weapons affects combatants
and noncombatants without distinction.4 2 The theory distin-
guishing between combatants and noncombatants provides that
a belligerent state may consider only another nation, and not
the inhabitants of that nation, as the enemy.42 3 Accordingly, this
theory prohibits states from intentionally attacking civilians
incidental civilian deaths or damage to civilian objects if military necessity would not
outweigh humanitarian concerns); see also Grief, supra note 27, at 29 (stating that mili-
tary actions are subject to rule of proportionality when determining limits of legitimate
conduct during armed conflict).
419. SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 106 n.4; see Rensberger, supra note 46,
at Al (describing diluted effect of radiation as winds carry radiation away from explo-
sion's source).
420. See Meyrowitz, supra note 191, at 234 (contending that states cannot contain
nuclear weapons to only military targets due to residual effects of radioactive fallout).
421. See id. at 234-35 (arguing that indiscriminate nature of effects of nuclear
weapons upon civilians and combatants justifies prohibiting nuclear weapons under
existing international law); Grief, supra note 27, at 28 (asserting that nuclear weapons
are per se illegal because states cannot control effects of nuclear weapons and cannot
direct nuclear weapons at particular military target); FALK ET AL., supra note 387, at 25-
26 (positing that nuclear weapons are incompatible with provisions of international law
limiting conduct of warfare because of indiscriminate destruction resulting from nu-
clear weapons use); BAILEY, supra note 243, at 148 (contending that states would have
difficulty using nuclear weapons discriminately due to destructive power of nuclear
weapons). Even if states can strategically use nuclear weapons, the risk of escalation
into a total nuclear war increases, thereby risking a violation of the prohibition against
indiscriminate attacks. Id.; see Grief, supra note 27, at 36 (discussing dangers of uncon-
trollable escalation of armed conflict with introduction of nuclear weapons).
422. See SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 151 (arguing that nuclear weapons
use would terrorize civilian population thereby violating fundamental principle of laws
of war); Grief, supra note 27, at 26-29 (asserting that international humanitarian law
prohibits nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons use cannot distinguish between
civilian objects and military objectives).
423. See 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 186, at 157 (stating that laws of war nega-
tively define distinction between combatants and noncombatants by immunizing cer-
tain people and objects from attack); RoussEAu POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 215, at
145 (stating that inhabitants of state engaged in armed conflict become only incidental
enemies of opposing state).
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within fighting zones.424 States developed a distinction between
combatants and noncombatants42 -5 to regulate excesses in war-
fare42 6 and to ensure protections for civilians within fighting
zones. 42 7 The St. Petersburg Declaration set forth the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants by declaring that weak-
ening the enemy is the only legitimate objective of war.428 Schol-
ars maintain that the use of nuclear weapons fails to distinguish
between combatants and noncombatants because civilians inside
and outside fighting zones will suffer injuries due to the unpre-
dictable and uncontrollable effects of nuclear weapons use.4 9
424. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 200, at 190-91 (stating that distinction be-
tween combatants and noncombatants originally intended to immunize civilian popula-
tion from intentional attack within fighting zones). The distinction between combat-
ants and noncombatants has never provided civilians with absolute immunity from at-
tack. SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 70. According to Article 28 of the 1949
Geneva Convention IV, "[t]he presence of a protected person may not be used to
render certain points or areas immune from military operations." 1949 Geneva Con-
vention IV, supra note 301, art. 28, at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308.
425. See 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 301, art. 15, at 3124-26, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 298 (providing that belligerent states may establish neutral zones for protection of
wounded and sick combatants or noncombatants, and for civilians not taking part in
hostilities and not conducting work of military nature); see Meyrowitz, supra note 191, at
238 (stating that combatant-noncombatant distinction is historical component of laws
of war). In 1923, an international conference met at The Hague to reconsider existing
rules of international law on warfare due to technological advances made since the
1907 Hague Conference. JOHN BAssET-r MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CUR.
RENT ILLUSIONS AND OTHER ESSAYS 182, 185 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1924). As
the U.S. delegate, John Bassett Moore introduced a U.S. proposal and stated:
Among the elementary principles which the development of modern rules of
warfare, running through several centuries, has been designed to establish
and to confirm, the principle most fundamental in character, the observance
of which the detailed regulations have largely been designed to assure, is the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and the protection of
non-combatants against injuries not incidental to military operations against
combatants.
Id. at 200.
426. See Lester Nurick, The Distinction Between Combatant and Noncombatant in the
Law of War, 39 AJ.I.L. 680, 681 (1945) (stating that due to influences of Grotius and
Rousseau "excesses in warfare became repugnant to the conscience of mankind"). Un-
til the Middle Ages, states that were engaged in armed conflicts treated all inhabitants
of the opposing state as the enemy, including women and children. Id. In 1868, the St.
Petersburg Declaration provided that belligerent states could consider only military
forces as the enemy. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp.
at 95.
427. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 200, at 189 (stating that distinction between
combatants and noncombatants applies within fighting zones).
428. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298, 1 AJ.I.L. Supp. at 95; see
supra notes 221-35 and accompanying text (discussing St. Petersburg Declaration).
429. See SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 75 (contending that any use of
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4. Nuclear Weapons Violate the Prohibitions Against the Use
of Poison or Asphyxiating Gases
The use of nuclear weapons potentially violates the 1899
Hague Declaration II,490 Article 23(a) of the Hague Regula-
tions,4 1' and the Geneva Gas Protocol,43 2 based on similarities
between nuclear weapons and asphyxiating or poisonous
gases.433 Due to the broad language and general acceptance of
these treaties, some legal scholars have argued that these treaties
apply to any weapon whose effects resemble the effects of poison
or poison gas.434 The radiation and radioactive fallout released
from nuclear explosions contaminate people and living orga-
nuclear weapons involves knowledge that such use will terrorize entire civilian popula-
tion); see also supra note 421 (reviewing argument that nuclear weapons use causes un-
controllable effects).
430. See 1899 Hague Declaration II, supra note 196, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 at
10, 187 Consol. T.S. at 453, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 157 (prohibiting contracting parties from
using projectiles that diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases). *
431. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 257, art. 23(a), 2277 Annex at 2301, 205
Consol. T.S. 277 Annex at 293, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 Annex at 106. Despite the prohibi-
tion against the use of poison in Article 23(a), the 1907 Hague Regulations do not
define the term poison. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 1 55, at 824. In one definition,
poison means:
A substance having an inherent deleterious property which renders it, when
taken into the system, capable of destroying life. A substance which, on being
applied to the human body, internally or externally, is capable of destroying
the action of the vital functions, or of placing the solids and fluids in such a
state as to prevent the continuance of life.
BLACK's LAw DIcroNA aY 1156 (6th ed. 1990). Additionally, the effects of poison in-
clude destruction of life or injury to health. See SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at
121-26 (discussing prohibition against use of poison and asphyxiating gases).
432. See Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 197, at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67 (noting that
international community has condemned use in war of asphyxiating and poisonous
gases).
433. Shaw, supra note 7, at 13; FALK ET AL., supra note 387, at 26-27; see Grief, supra
note 27, at 29 (discussing applicability of prohibitions of Geneva Gas Protocol to nu-
clear weapons use). Nuclear weapons resemble bacteriological weapons because both
can cause mutations in the chemical structure of living organisms. FALK ET AL., supra
note 387, at 29. Also, just as bacteriological weapons may affect wide geographical re-
gions, radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions may disperse over vast geographic
areas. SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 106 n.4. By failing to distinguish between
civilians and combatants, or between civilian objects and military objects, both bacterio-
logical and nuclear weapons theoretically violate the prohibition against indiscriminate
attacks. See FALK ET AL., supra note 887, at 47 (contending that bacteriological and
nuclear weapons are functionally equivalent because they both cause indiscriminate
effects).
434. FALK ET AL., supra note 387, at 28; see SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at
124-25 (arguing that nuclear weapons violate prohibition against poison due to similar
effects of poison or poisoned weapons and effects of radiation contamination).
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nisms.43 5 The health effects resulting from this contamination
resemble the health effects of poison or asphyxiating gases.4 3 6
By considering the effects of nuclear weapons and radioactive
fallout and the effects of poison or poisoned weapons as func-
tional equivalents, some legal scholars have concluded that the
prohibitions against the use of poison or poisoned weapons pre-
cludes the use of nuclear weapons.437
5. The Cumulative Effect of Treaties and General Assembly
Resolutions Limit Nuclear Weapons Use
Although no specific treaty bans the use of nuclear weap-
ons, 4 38 the cumulative effect of treaties addressing the nuclear
issue may establish a customary rule prohibiting the use of nu-
clear weapons.439 One set of treaties provides for restrictions on
nuclear weapons use or calls for the complete elimination of nu-
clear weapons.440 Other conventions attempt to control and
435. Meyrowitz, supra note 191, at 235-36.
436. Shaw, supra note 7, at 14; see FALK ET AL., supra note 387, at 26 (arguing that
exposure to radiation or radioactive fallout causes symptoms indistinguishable from
symptoms induced by poison); STONE, supra note 10, at 343 (contending that radioac-
tive substances are clearly poisonous). Specific elements of nuclear weapons, such as
uranium, are highly toxic chemicals. FALK ET AL., supra note 387, at 26.
437. See Weston, supra note 4, at 561 (arguing that nuclear weapons use would
violate Geneva Gas Protocol); Meyrowitz, supra note 191, at 235-36 (concluding that
Article 23(a) of Hague Regulations prohibits nuclear weapons use because effects of
nuclear weapons are analogous to effects of poison or poisoned weapons).
438. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 57-58, at 824 (finding that ban on recourse
to nuclear weapons does not appear in treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction,
and noting that international community has not produced treaty prohibiting nuclear
weapons~use); Weston, supra note 4, at 546 (noting that no treaty specifically prohibits
manufacturing, stockpiling, deploying, or actually using nuclear weapons).
439. See SINCH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 251-55 (discussing incremental
approach to nuclear disarmament).
440. See Southeast Asia Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(1) (a), at 640 (preventing con-
tracting parties from developing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, or controlling
nuclear weapons); African Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3 (a), at 707 (forbidding contracting
parties from developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, acquiring, possessing, or control-
ling any nuclear explosive device); Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 351, art. 2, at 1444
(creating nuclear weapons-free zone in South Pacific); Sea-bed Treaty, supra note 351,
art. I, at 704, 10 I.L.M. at 146-47 (banning nuclear weapons from sea-bed, ocean floor,
and subsoil thereof); Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 1, art. 4, at 332, 6 I.L.M. at 523
(establishing nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America); Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 351, art. IV, at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208 (banning placement into orbit of any
object carrying nuclear weapons); Antarctic Treaty, supra note 351, art. V, at 796, 402
U.N.T.S. at 76 (prohibiting deployment of nuclear weapons in Antarctic region).
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limit the existence of nuclear weapons. 441  Together, these trea-
ties which limit aspects of nuclear weapons arguably represent
the international community's dedication to achieving complete
nuclear disarmament, and, therefore, constitute evidence of
state practice opposing nuclear weapons use." 2
In its Legality Opinion,44 the ICJ stated that General As-
sembly resolutions have normative value as evidence of the crea-
tion of a new rule of customary international law or of the emer-
gence of an opinio juris.4 4 In its examination of the series of
General Assembly resolutions relating to nuclear weapons, 54 the
ICJ noted that certain states have argued that this series of Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions implies the existence of a rule of cus-
tomary international law forbidding nuclear weapons use." 6
441. See Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 351, art. I, at 1316-17, 480 U.N.T.S. at
45-47 (banning nuclear weapons testing in atmosphere, outer space, and underwater);
NPT, supra note 34, art. II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (restricting possession and not
use of nuclear weapons by states not already possessing these weapons in attempt to
curtail spread of nuclear weapons states). Sixty-five nations recently signed a compre-
hensive test ban treaty to prohibit all nuclear test explosions. Haq, supra note 356. The
treaty cannot enter into force until all 44 nations with significant nuclear facilities, in-
cluding Israel, India, and Pakistan, sign the treaty. Clinton Leads CTBT Signing, supra
note 356; see Atlas, supra note 356, at 1 (discussing India's and Pakistan's opposition to
treaty).
442. See SINGH & McWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 252 (asserting that disarmament
process has become self-perpetuating).
443. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 70, at 826 (discussing relative authorita-
tive weight attached to General Assembly resolutions).
444. Id. 70, at 826; see supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing
concept of opiniojuris); see also SINGH & MCWHINNEY, supra note 24, at 214-16 (arguing
that traditional positivist view that General Assembly resolutions could never express
rules of international law has evolved into acceptance of normative value of General
Assembly resolutions). The ICJ, however, concluded that General Assembly resolutions
do not establish a customary rule banning nuclear weapons use. Legality Opinion,
supra note 4, 72, at 826.
445. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 68, at 826. The ICJ specifically mentioned
General Assembly Resolution 1653 and noted that the General Assembly has adopted
resolutions which continually affirm the illegality of nuclear weapons. Id.; G.A. Res.
1653, supra note 163, at 5; G.A. Res. 148D, supra note 340, at 78; G.A. Res. 183B, supra
note 340, at 73; G.A. Res. 78J, supra note 340, at 64; GA. Res. 921, supra note 340, at 64-
65; GA. Res. 152D, supra note 340, at 69; G.A. Res. 83G, supra note 340, at 56; G.A. Res.
71B, supra note 340, at 48.
446. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 68, at 826. The ICJ further noted that states
advocating the illegality of nuclear weapons use contend that the passage of General
Assembly resolutions condemning the recourse to nuclear weapons involved the appli-
cation of the laws of war to the use of nuclear weapons. Id. 69, at 826. By applying
the laws of war to nuclear weapons, these states argue that the resolutions sought to
confirm existing customary international law, and did not attempt to create new rules.
Id.
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These states rely on the purported existence of a consensus
among U.N. members finding that nuclear weapons use contra-
dicts fundamental humanitarian principles." 7 Accordingly, they
argue that customary international law prohibits nuclear weap-
ons use.
448
B. Customary International Law Does Not Prohibit the Use of
Nuclear Weapons
The absence of a treaty specifically prohibiting nuclear
weapons use in all circumstances, including self-defense, sug-
gests that customary international law does not contain a per se
prohibition against nuclear weapons use. 449 To support this con-
clusion, legal scholars rely on positivist notions of state sover-
eignty45° and the practice of maintaining nuclear weapons for
deterrent purposes.45' Theoretically, states could use nuclear
weapons without violating the laws of war by preserving the dis-
tinction between combatants and noncombatants.452 Finally, the
laws of war may not adequately address technological advances
in warfare, and, thus, require revision in order to apply to nu-
clear weapons.455
1. The International Community Has Not Expressly Accepted
a Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Through Treaty Law or Custom
The theory of state sovereignty provides that the interna-
tional community may accept limits on new weapons only
447. MEYROWITZ, supra note 27, at 27.
448. Id.
449. SeeJohn Norton Moore, Nuclear Weapons and the Law: Enhancing Strategic Sta-
bility, 9 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 263, 264-65 (1983) (arguing that most nations, including five
nuclear powers, have not accepted per se ban on nuclear weapons use).
450. See BRIERLY, supra note 141, at 51-54 (assessing doctrine of positivism). Posi-
tivism refers to the theory that international law consists only of rules to which states
have expressly or implicitly consented. Id. at 51-52.
451. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 73, at 827 (recognizing nuclear weapons
states' continued reliance on practice of deterrence).
452. See Rostow, supra note 162, at 165-66 (stating that, in absence of specific treaty
banning nuclear weapons use, nuclear weapons use is arguably legal if consistent with
U.N. Charter provisions on use of force).
453. See 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 186, at 158-59 (describing distinction be-
tween combatants and noncombatants as outdated); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 207-
08 (discussing reasons for collapse of combatant-noncombatant distinction).
247
248 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:181
through express or implied consent.4 5 4 The rationale support-
ing the theory of state sovereignty includes maintaining the in-
tegrity of, and respect for, sovereign states.455 After the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648 which concluded the Thirty Years War,
45 6
states considered one another sovereign and equal and assumed
that no single state could judge another state's internal poli-
cies.45 7 Thus, the theory of state sovereignty provides that a state
may conduct itself in the international arena, subject to estab-
lished limits, until and unless that state consents not to engage
in otherwise permissible conduct.4 58
The international community has not expressed a ban on
the use of nuclear weapons through conventional law.459 The
numerous treaties relating to nuclear weapons regulate particu-
lar aspects of nuclear weapons, such as nuclear weapons testing
and the deployment of nuclear weapons in certain geographical
areas.46° The treaties do not, however, prohibit the use of nu-
clear weapons or declare that their use would violate interna-
tional law.4 6 1 According to the ICJ, these treaties do not estab-
454. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 57, at 824 (noting that states have typi-
cally declared weapons of mass destruction illegal by specific agreements). Arguably,
new weapons do not violate international law solely because they are unique. See
Nurick, supra note 426, at 683 (discussing limitations on new weapons used for artillery
bombardment). Rather, any use of new weapons must comply with general principles
of the laws of war. Id.
455. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(1) (stating that United Nations is based on princi-
ples of sovereign equality for member states).
456. See supra note 205 (describing Thirty Years War); see also KISSINGER, supra note
83, at 65. (stating that doctrine of raison d'etat dominated European diplomacy follow-
ing ThirtyYears War). The doctrine of raison d'itat provided that state interestsjustified
the use of any means necessary to protect these interests. Id. at 58.
457. SHAW, supra note 14, at 539-41.
458. See S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7)
(providing that states are subject to rules of international law which they have adopted
or which are usages generally accepted as expressing principles of binding law). Ac-
cording to two legal scholars, "consent must be regarded as patent in the ultimate ac-
ceptance of the practice as constituting a binding rule of law." SINGH & MCWHINNEY,
supra note 24, at 38.
459. See Rostow, supra note 162, at 165-66 (discussing argument that nuclear weap-
ons use is legal if consistent with provisions of U.N. Charter in absence of specific treaty
banning nuclear weapons use).
460. See supra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing treaties circumscribing
nuclear weapons testing); supra notes 353-55 and accompanying text (reviewing treaties
prohibiting nuclear weapons deployment).
461. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 57-58, at 824 (finding that treaties relating
to weapons of mass destruction do not include ban on recourse to nuclear weapons,
and noting that international community has not convened to explicitly prohibit nu-
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lish a new rule of customary international law prohibiting the
use of nuclear weapons. 462
Some legal scholars contend that the international commu-
nity has not consistently considered nuclear weapons illegal,
thus precluding custom from establishing a ban on nuclear
weapons use. 463 In addition to treaties, states may assert their
sovereignty through custom as evidenced by state practice.464
Accordingly, custom may establish a restriction on states' ability
to use nuclear weapons.465 The practices and policies of the five
nuclear weapons states466 comprise evidence of state practice re-
lating to the legality of nuclear weapons.467 By incorporating nu-
clear weapons into policies of deterrence since 1945,468 state
practice indicates that the international community has not yet
accepted a ban on nuclear weapons use.469 For example, since
clear weapons use); Weston, supra note 4, at 546 (noting that no treaty specifically for-
bids manufacturing, stockpiling, deploying, or actually using nuclear weapons).
462. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 61, at 825. According to one legal scholar,
"[e]xisting treaties for the control of nuclear weapons and the ongoing negotiation of
others constitute evidence that the international community does not believe that ex-
isting law, apart from customary and U.N. Charter rules regulating the right of self-
defense, prohibits the existence or use of nuclear weapons." Rostow, supra note 162, at
182.
463. See Moore, supra note 449, at 264-65 (contending that nuclear weapons states
have not accepted per se ban on nuclear weapons use); Rostow, supra note 162, at 179-
82 (asserting that many members of international community did not consider nuclear
weapons illegal at beginning of nuclear age).
464. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1)(b), at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187 (provid-
ing that custom constitutes source of international law); BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 5-9
(discussing elements of custom necessary to become international law); see also supra
notes 141, 149-54 and accompanying text (examining how custom as evidenced by state
practice develops into international law).
465. Rostow, supra note 162, at 182 (discussing lack of consensus on whether inter-
national law prohibits nuclear weapons use, apart from general limits on use of force in
self-defense).
466. See Shaw, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing actual possession of nuclear weapons
by China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States); see also supra notes 73-
105 and accompanying text (examining policies and practices of nuclear weapons states
with respect to nuclear weapons).
467. See BRIERLY, supra note 141, at 60 (discussing state practice as evidence of
custom). U.S. policy provides that nuclear weapons do not violate international law in
the absence of a specific agreement declaring nuclear weapons use illegal. Amyv FIELD
MANUAL, supra note 102, 34(b), at 18; see MMROWITZ, supra note 27, at 29 (stating that
U.S. Government contends use and possession of nuclear weapons are legal).
468. See Weston, supra note 4, at 575 (stating that United States and Soviet Union
adopted deterrence policies for nuclear weapons after beginning of arms race).
469. See Rostow, supra note 162, at 176-78 (discussing role of nuclear weapons in
international order during post-World War II period).
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World War II, the five nuclear powers have threatened to use
nuclear weapons on several occasions.47 0 Thus, although these
states have abstained from using nuclear weapons, nuclear weap-
ons remain part of their military strategy.
47
'
2. Policies of Deterrence Have Prevented an Armed Conflict
Involving Nuclear Weapons
The doctrine of deterrence provides that a state under at-
tack may retaliate with nuclear weapons if its attacker used non-
conventional weapons, such as chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons, and the attack threatened the victim state's vital inter-
ests.472 The reasoning of this doctrine is that the threat of nu-
clear retaliation will deter a potential aggressor.473 By adopting
policies of deterrence with respect to nuclear weapons,474 the
nuclear weapons states have indicated that they do not accept a
per se prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.475 The
470. See id. at 176-77 (discussing instances where nuclear weapons states
threatened to respond with nuclear attack); see supra note 104 and accompanying text
(describing threatened uses of nuclear weapons). One example of the threatened use
of nuclear weapons was the Persian Gulf War when the U.S. Government implied a
threat to use nuclear weapons in response to an Iraqi attack employing chemical or
biological weapons. See Arkin, supra note 104, at 5.
471. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 102 (discussing U.S. policy of deterrence); Bellamy,
supra note 13, at 1 (stating that United Kingdom maintains policy of deterrence towards
nuclear weapons).
472. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 52; see MSSINGER, supra note 83, at 608-10 (discussing
policy of deterrence during nuclear age); Alan Zimm, Deterrence: Then &I Now, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC., Aug. 1996, at 50, 50-53 (suggesting revisions in current definition of
deterrence to accomodate changes in forms of conflict from Cold War to regional ag-
gressions involving conventional weapons).
473. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 53.
474. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting Chinese policy of allowing
nuclear weapons use only for retaliatory nuclear strike); supra note 85 and accompany-
ing text (describing French deterrence policy); supra note 96 and accompanying text
(discussing U.K. deterrence policy); supra note 105 and accompanying text (reviewing
U.S. deterrence policy).
475. See Moore, supra note 449, at 264-65 (stating that five nuclear powers have not
accepted per se ban on nuclear weapons use). In its Legality Opinion, the IGJ noted
the argument of some states that circumstances, and not deterrence, prevented the use
of nuclear weapons after World War II. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 66, at 826.
The ICJ, however, declined to rule on the practice of deterrence as state policy. Id.
67, at 826. Nonetheless, the ICJ acknowledged the ongoing adherence to the practice
of deterrence as it stated, "[t] he emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically
prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered by the continuing tensions
between the nascent opiniojuris on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the
practice of deterrence on the other." Id. 73, at 827.
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United Kingdom and the United States have maintained that the
threat of nuclear weapons use has deterred another global
war.476 According to the doctrine of deterrence, the develop-
ment of increasingly destructive weapons has served the cause of
peace.477
3. Nuclear Weapons Do Not Violate the Distinction Between
Combatants and Noncombatants
By using nuclear weapons strategically, scholars argue that
states will preserve the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants. 4 78 The distinction between combatants and non-
combatants renders certain people immune from attack during
armed conflict. 479 Theoretically, the strategic use of nuclear
weapons will not result necessarily in the destruction of an entire
civilian population because states could target particular military
objects. 480 Further, military objects may be located in remote
476. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 73, at 827 (noting continued adherence
to practice of deterrence by nuclear weapons states); Scott, supra note 102 (discussing
U.K policies on nuclear weapons). The United Kingdom has stated that possession of
nuclear weapons as a deterrent is consistent with principles of self-defense. Id. The
United Kingdom and the United States voted against General Assembly Resolution
1653, which declared that nuclear weapons use would contravene international law and
the laws of humanity, because their policies of deterrence depended on their ability to
respond to aggression at any necessary level. BAILEY, supra note 243, at 149.
477. ME'ROWITZ, supra note 27, at xii. U.S. policies and practices during the Per-
sian Gulf War illustrated the concept of deterrence. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4,
at 842 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (contending that U.S. threat of nuclear weapons effec-
tively deterred Iraq from attacking with weapons of mass destruction). According to
U.N. Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Iraqi officials claimed they decided not to employ weap-
ons of mass destruction after receiving the U.S. threat ofJanuary 9, 1991 which implied
that "any [Iraqi] use of unconventional warfare would provoke a devastating [U.S.]
response." Smith, supra note 122, at Al.
478. See 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 350 (contending that nuclear weapons use
does not invariably destroy distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and
arguing that states can limit nuclear weapons to military objectives); R.F. Bacon, Seizing
the Strategic Baton, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1992, at 73, 73 (discussing strategic
nuclear weapons policy as incorporating use of nuclear missiles designed for accuracy);
see also supra note 232 and accompanying text (describing distinction between combat-
ants and noncombatants). States have designed miniaturized nuclear warheads, weigh-
ing approximately 440 to 750 pounds, which are relatively smaller than the 10,000
pound nuclear weapon dropped on Nagasaki. Eric H. Arnett, Nuclear Torpedoesfor New
Nuclear Powers, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., June 1989, at 98, 98. These miniaturized nu-
clear warheads theoretically permit a state to launch a nuclear torpedo from a subma-
rine in order to reach a target from a distance of several miles. Id.
479. 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 186, at 110.
480. Id.; see Everest E. Riccioni, Strategic Bombing: Always a Myth, U.S. NAVAL INST.
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areas, lacking significant civilian populations, thus reducing the
likelihood of affecting combatants.
481
4. The Distinction Between Combatants and Noncombatants
Has Eroded and the Laws of War Should Be Revised
Although states may not consider noncombatants legitimate
objects of attack,48 ' noncombatants within the zone of military
operations expose themselves and their property to the hazards
of warfare. 4 3 The doctrine of military necessity484 justifies the
incidental deaths of civilians within the zone of military opera-
tions while a state attempts to weaken the enemy's forces.48 5 If
the international community expands the definition of military
objectives to include larger tracts of territory, some scholars as-
sert that states may avoid violating the distinction between com-
batants and noncombatants. 486 Adopting a broad definition of
military objectives would, thus, strip noncombatants within the
zone of operations of protections provided by the laws of war.4" 7
PROC., Nov. 1996, at 49, 53 (proposing new visions for strategic bombing theory to
ensure successful military operations based on realistic military capabilities).
481. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 200, at 191 (discussing potential for states
to attack "enemy hinterland" due to development of long-range missiles).
482. See St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 187, at 298, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 95
(stating that only legitimate object of war is weakening enemy's forces).
483. 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 186, at 115.
484. See Nurick, supra note 426, at 683 (discussing doctrine of military necessity).
The doctrine of military necessity provides that states may rely on all indispensable
measures not prohibited by the laws and customs of war in order to weaken the enemy.
Id.; see MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 5, at 342 (discussing concept of military neces-
sity). Military necessity, however, will notjustify the wanton devastation of a district. See
Weston, supra note 4, at 555-56 (contending that humanitarian rules limit claims of
military necessity with respect to direct attacks upon civilian populations and terror-
bombing civilian regions to weaken morale).
485. See Weston, supra note 4, at 555 (stating that law condones incidental civilian
damage depending on vitality of military target).
486. Nurick, supra note 426, at 680. According to one legal scholar, the mass de-
struction of cities during World War II indicated that the distinction between combat-
ants and noncombatants "has been so whittled down by the demands of military neces-
sity that it has become more apparent than real." Id.; see BAILEY, supra note 243, at 38
(discussing terror-bombing against civilians during World War II).
487. See 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 207 (arguing that development of air war-
fare has resulted in belligerents considering targets outside theater of war, including
munitions factories and industry centers, as legitimate objects of attack). According to
one legal scholar, "[t]echnological developments of unparalleled destructive potential-
ity have brought about a situation in which almost any place in territories controlled by
belligerent states can be transformed into an operational area." 2 SCHWARZENBERGER,
supra note 186, at 158-59.
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Legal scholars argue that advancements in military technol-
ogy enlarged the zone of operations and contributed to a col-
lapse of the distinction between combatants and noncomba-
tants.48 8 The development of long-range missiles allowed states
to strike specific military targets beyond the initial zone of mili-
tary operations.8 9 If this strategic practice enables states to
claim that the region containing the particular military targets
falls within the zone of military operations, scholars argue that
states can theoretically justify any civilian death as incidental. 490
The two protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions potentially contributed to the blurring of the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants. 491 To address new
forms of warfare, such as guerilla warfare and wars of national
liberation, the two protocols expanded the scope of the 1949
Geneva Conventions' protections.492 Article 43 of 1977 Geneva
Protocol I defines combatants as including armed forces of a
government or authority not recognized by their adversary.493
Article 44 further classifies combatants as those operating in the
military arena without wearing military uniforms and without
openly carrying weapons, so long as they carry weapons immedi-
ately before an armed attack.494 While attempting to expand
protections for non-traditional combatants, scholars maintain
that this definition results in a dilution of the distinction be-
tween combatants and noncombatants. 495
488. See Nurick, supra note 426, at 680 (arguing that technological innovations
have hastened trend in war to treat combatants and noncombatants alike); 2
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 186, at 158-59 (contending that traditional distinction
between combatants and noncombatants is outdated); 2 0PPENHEIM, supra note 7, at
207-08 (discussing reasons for collapse of combatant-noncombatant distinction).
489. Nurick, supra note 426, at 689 (stating that aerial bombardment made it pos-
sible to "bring the war into the back yards of many millions of civilians").
490. 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 186, at 158-59.
491. See supra notes 309-21 and accompanying text (examining 1977 Geneva Proto-
cols I and II); REiSMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 193, at xxix (reviewing criticism of two
protocols); see also supra notes 298-308 and accompanying text (discussing 1949 Geneva
Conventions).
492. See 1977 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 315, art. 1(4), at 7, 16 I.L.M. at 1397
(including armed conflicts against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist
regimes in scope of protocol's application).
493. Id. art. 43(1), at 23, 16 I.L.M. at 1410.
494. Id. art. 44(3), at 23, 16 I.L.M. at 1410-11.
495. See REIsMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 193, at xxix (discussing criticism of pro-
tocols due to definition of combatants).
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III. THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL
CIRCUMSTANCES IS NOT ILLEGAL UNDER
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law does not presently contain a
rule prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in all circum-
stances.496 Accordingly, the use of nuclear weapons in self-de-
fense would not constitute a per se violation of humanitarian
principles within the laws of war.4 97 Moreover, a rule declaring
that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal would not adequately
prevent a future use of nuclear weapons because states often vio-
late the laws of war as a means of overcoming their enemies.498
Instead, to safeguard against the risk of nuclear weapons use, the
international community should adopt preventative measures to
deter the use of nuclear weapons and should strengthen the
non-proliferation regime.
A. A Rule Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons Use in All Circumstances
Has Not Ascended to Custommy International Law
Whereas the laws of war limit the means and methods of
warfare, they do not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in all
circumstances.49 The international community has not ex-
pressly or implicitly consented to a prohibition on nuclear weap-
ons use through a treaty or custom as evidenced by state prac-
tice.50 While General Assembly resolutions and treaties relating
to nuclear weapons may express principles of customary interna-
tional law, they have not established a rule forbidding nuclear
weapons use. 50 1 Finally, general principles of the laws of war,
such as the prohibition on the use of poison or asphyxiating
496. See supra notes 454-71 and accompanying text (reviewing arguments as to why
nuclear weapons use has not ascended to customary international law).
497. See supra notes 478-81 and accompanying text (describing contention that nu-
clear weapons use is not per se violation of distinction between combatants and non-
combatants).
498. See supra notes 482-95 and accompanying text (setting forth assertion that
distinction between combatants and noncombatants has eroded due tojustitification of
military necessity).
499. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text (explaining sources of laws of
war).
500. See supra notes 138-60 and accompanying text (reviewing meaning and
sources of customary international law); see also supra notes 459-62 and accompanying
text (discussing lack of express prohibtion of nuclear weapons use); supra notes 463-71
and accompanying text (describing lack of customary ban on nuclear weapons use).
501. See supra note 172 (explaining non-binding effect of General Assembly resolu-
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gases, do not ban nuclear weapons use."'
1. The Laws of War Lack an Express Prohibition on the Use
of Nuclear Weapons
The international community generally declares weapons of
mass destruction illegal by specific agreements. 503 No treaty ex-
ists to declare the use of nuclear weapons illegal. 04 The ICJ
held that no rule of conventional or customary international law
affirmatively permits the use of nuclear weapons.50 5 The laws of
war, however, do not generally set forth permitted conduct. The
international community instead drafts conventions on the laws
of war negatively in order to declare prohibited means and
methods of armed conflict.
2. State Practice Has Not Consistently Evidenced the
International Community's Intent to Outlaw Nuclear
Weapons Use
The international community has not indicated through
custom as evidenced by state practice 506 that a rule prohibiting
nuclear weapons use has become part of customary international
law. Within the international community, states have disagreed
as to whether the use of nuclear weapons is illegal under custom-
ary international law.50 7 Due to this division, no opinio juris08
has emerged whereby states feel obligated to accept the illegality
of nuclear weapons use. One example of the international com-
munity's inconsistent treatment of nuclear weapons use is the
incorporation by nuclear weapons states5 9 of the doctrine of de-
tions); see also supra note 173 and accompanying text (describing normative value of
General Assembly resolutions).
502. See supra notes 267-82 and accompanying text (examining Geneva Gas Proto-
col which condemned use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analo-
gous liquids, materials, or devices as means of war).
503. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 57, at 824.
504. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (addressing lack of treaty designed
explicitly to forbid nuclear weapons use).
505. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 105(2) (A), at 831.
506. See supra notes 141, 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing custom as
source of customary international law).
507. See supra note 358 (describing split among members of international commu-
nity regarding legality of nuclear weapons use).
508. See supra notes 152-53 (explaining doctrine of opiniojuris).
509. See supra notes 73-105 and accompanying text (examining nuclear policies
and practices of states considered nuclear "haves").
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terrence into their foreign policies since 1945.510 States assert-
ing the doctrine and practice of deterrence have consistently re-
served the right to threaten or use nuclear weapons in self-de-
fense against an attack directed at vital security interests."' With
respect to a protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 5 12 the United
States and the United Kingdom entered declarations providing
for nuclear weapons use in self-defense after a contracting state,
assisted by a non-nuclear weapons state, initiated an act of ag-
gression towards them.51 5 Other examples of state practice in-
clude state policies declining to accept a per se ban on nuclear
weapons use,514 the threatened use of nuclear weapons within
the last fifty years,515 the non-nuclear weapons states' support for
protections offered by nuclear weapons states, 16 and covert at-
tempts by non-nuclear weapons states to develop military nu-
clear weapons programs.5 17 These examples illustrate that the
international community has partially accepted nuclear weap-
ons, and indicate, at the very least, that the international com-
munity has not reached a consensus on the legality of nuclear
weapons use.
The international community, including non-nuclear weap-
ons states, has implicitly acknowledged the legality of nuclear
weapons through provisions for security assurances. In Security
Council Resolution 255, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and the United States agreed to provide security assurances to
510. See supra notes 472-77 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of deter-
rence).
511. See supra note 475 and accompanying text (addressing ongoing adherence by
nuclear weapons states to practice of deterrence).
512. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 1, protocol 2, art. 3, at 418-20; see also supra
notes 352-53, 356-57, 379 and accompanying text (discussing Treaty of Tlatelolco).
513. See Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 1, protocol 2, art. 3, at 418-20 (providing
that states signing Protocol II undertake not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against
contracting parties to Treaty of Tlatelolco).
514. See supra note 475 and accompanying text (examining five nuclear powers'
non-recognition of per se ban on nuclear weapons use).
515. See supra notes 104, 470 and accompanying text (noting instances of
threatened use of nuclear weapons since World War II).
516. See supra notes 371-72 and accompanying text (describing security assurances
given by nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states and reviewing nuclear
weapons states' assistance offered through Security Council to non-nuclear weapons
states in event of nuclear attack).
517. See supra notes 106-37 and accompanying text (examining past and present
efforts of states considered nuclear "have-nots" to acquire nuclear weapons or develop
military nuclear weapons programs).
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non-nuclear weapons states.518 These states pledged to act on
behalf of non-nuclear weapons states through the Security Coun-
cil if the non-nuclear weapons states faced an act of aggression
involving nuclear weapons. 519 Accordingly, the international
community recognizes the legality of the use and possession of
nuclear weapons because in order to provide these security as-
surances, nuclear weapons states must have the capability to use
nuclear weapons.
3. General Assembly Resolutions and Treaties Do Not
Constitute Evidence of State Practice Establishing A
Customary Rule of International Law
Banning Nuclear Weapons Use
General Assembly resolutions have no binding effect 52 0 and
cannot alone establish a rule of customary international law to
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. In the aggregate, General
Assembly resolutions may express trends in international law,52
but with respect to nuclear weapons they do not constitute evi-
dence that a custom has become part of international law
prohibiting nuclear weapons use. In its Legality Opinion, the
ICJ noted that General Assembly resolutions indicated an inter-
national objective to progress towards complete nuclear disarma-
ment.522 Yet, many of these resolutions passed with significant
opposition from both nuclear and non-nuclear states.523 The
consistent dissent, especially by nuclear weapons states, in the
vote on nuclear weapons-related resolutions undermines the
persuasive authority of such resolutions, especially when mem-
bers of the dissent comprise a majority of the world's economic
and military power.
Treaties addressing the acquisition, manufacture, posses-
518. S.C. Res. 255, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1
(1968).
519. Id.
520. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing non-binding effect of
General Assembly resolutions).
521. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting normative value of General
Assembly resolutions).
522. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 1 73, at 827.
523. See supra note 343 (noting passage of Resolution 1653 by 55 states in favor, 20
against, and 26 abstaining); see also Legality Opinion, supra note 4, at 849-50 (Oda, J.,
dissenting) (summarizing voting records on General Assembly resolutions relating to
use of nuclear weapons).
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sion, deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons52 4 do not con-
stitute a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.52 5 These
treaties merely indicate a growing international concern with nu-
clear weapons. The ICJ construed these various treaties as fore-
shadowing a future general prohibition. 52 1 Therefore, the inter-
national community must convene to establish such a ban be-
cause these treaties do not express general principles of law
forbidding nuclear weapons use.
4. The Prohibitions Against Poison, Poisonous Gases, and
Asphyxiating Gases Do Not Establish a Ban Against
Nuclear Weapons Use
Some legal scholars have argued that a prohibition on nu-
clear weapons use has emerged by analogy to treaties banning
the use of poison, poisonous gases, and asphyxiating gases.5 2 7
The treaties forbidding the use of poison, poisonous gases, and
asphyxiating gases,528 however, do not apply to nuclear weapons
use. As the ICJ noted in its Legality Opinion, the contracting
parties to these treaties have not indicated that nuclear weapons
fall within the treaties' prohibitions. 529  Treaties relating to
poison, poisonous gases, and asphyxiating gases forbid the use of
weapons primarily designed to diffuse these gases. 530 The pri-
mary object of nuclear weapons use is the destruction of a partic-
ular target or targets, rather than the diffusion of gases.
524. See supra notes 350-83 and accompanying text (canvassing treaties on nuclear
weapons).
525. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 62, at 825.
526. Id.
527. See supra notes 430-37 and accompanying text (setting forth argument that
nuclear weapons violate prohibitions against poison, poison gases, and asphyxiating
gases).
528. See supra notes 430-32 and accompanying text (discussing prohibitions on
poison, poisonous gas, and asphyxiating gases found in 1899 Hague Declaration II,
1907 Hague Regulations, and Geneva Gas Protocol).
529. Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 55, at 824. Based on the lack of the con-
tracting parties intent to treat the 1899 Hague Declaration I, Article 23(a) of the 1907
Hague Regulations, and the Geneva Gas Protocol as referring to nuclear weapons, the
ICJ found that these three provisions do not specifically prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons. Id. 56, at 824.
530. See, e.g., supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing scope of 1899
Hague Declaration II's prohibtion on use of poison or asphyxiating gases).
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B. The Use of Nuclear Weapons in Self-Defense Would Not Per Se
Violate Humanitarian Principles Within the Laws of War
The legality of nuclear weapons use in self-defense depends
on a state's ability to balance military necessity with humanita-
rian interests. 31 While humanitarian principles limit the right
to use force, no single rule dispositively declares a weapon's use
illegal. Accordingly, no single humanitarian principle would
outlaw nuclear weapons if a nation successfully presented rea-
sons for military necessity which justified such a use of force.
1. Customary International Law Does Not Include a Per Se
Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons in
Self-defense
The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force in Article 2(4),
including the aggressive use of nuclear weapons, 532 but con-
dones the use of force in self-defense or collective defense in
Article 51.1 33 Principles of necessity and proportionality limit
the use of force in self-defense.53 4 In the absence of an explicit
prohibition on a particular weapon, states may use nuclear weap-
ons in self-defense if the use satisfies the requirements of neces-
sity and proportionality. 5 Developments in nuclear weapons
technology, including strategic nuclear warheads deployed on
long-range missiles, have increased the likelihood that states
could comply with Article 51.36
531. See supra note 402-03 and accompanying text (examining balance between
military necessity and humanitarian principles).
532. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
533. Id. art. 51.
534. See SHAw, supra note 14, at 691-95 (discussing limits on right to use force in
self-defense).
535. See Legality Opinion, supra note 4, 39, at 822 (finding that if international
law per se bans specific weapons, states use of those weapons is not legal simply because
states comply with U.N. Charter provisions); Rostow, supra note 162, at 182 (stating that
in absence of specific treaty banning nuclear weapons use, states remain bound by U.N.
Charter rules regulating self-defense). Arguably, the use of nuclear weapons would be
permitted if military objects could be destroyed without serious loss of life or injury to
health. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 348-49.
536. See supra notes 478, 480 and accompanying text (describing strategic use of
nuclear weapons).
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2. Prohibitions on Traditional Methods of Warfare and
Conventional Weapons Do Not Necessarily Apply to
the Nuclear Age
The international community developed international hu-
manitarian law to address excesses of conventional weapons.
These humanitarian rules did not account for technological ad-
vances in warfare and weaponry, such as the harnessing of the
destructive capabilities of nuclear power.537 Humanitarian prin-
ciples within the laws of war consist of the prohibition against
unnecessary suffering,53 the prohibition against indiscriminate
attacks,539 and the distinction between combatants and noncom-
batants.54 The international community did not modernize the
laws of war until the adoption of the 1977 Geneva Protocols I
and II. 1" Yet the reservations attached to these protocols by
states,5 4 2 including nuclear weapons states, belies the applicabil-
ity of the protocols to nuclear weapons use.
One example of obsolete provisions in international hu-
manitarian law is the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants. 543 Although the international community appears
reluctant to discard the distinction between combatants and
noncombatants, the methods of warfare practiced during World
War II led to the dilution, if not the collapse, of the distinction.
During World War II, belligerent states illustrated the ease with
which they could manipulate the distinction between combat-
ants and noncombatants by broadening the zone of military op-
erations, thereby justifying incidental deaths of civilians within
537. See supra notes 488-89 and accompanying text (describing how new missile
technology has expanded zone of military operations).
538. See supra notes 396-400 and accompanying text (describing prohibition
against unnecessary suffering).
539. See supra notes 411-15 and accompanying text (explaining prohibition against
indiscriminate attacks).
540. See supra notes 424-25 and accompanying text (setting forth distinction be-
tween combatants and noncombatants).
541. See supra notes 309-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption and sub-
stance of 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II).
542. See supra note 416 (examining U.K and U.S. reservations to 1977 Geneva
Protocol I exempting nuclear weapons from prohibition against indiscriminate at-
tacks).
543. See supra notes 482-95 and accompanying text (reviewing argument that dis-
tinction between combatants and noncombatants collapsed after World War II).
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the zone. 5 "
C. The International Community Must Strengthen Measures to
Prevent Future Uses of Nuclear Weapons Instead of Relying
on Illegality Determinations
By concluding that customary international law does not de-
clare nuclear weapons use illegal, the issue of monitoring and
restricting nuclear weapons becomes political instead of legal. A
convention or treaty merely prohibiting nuclear weapons will
not effectively safeguard against their use and will not contribute
to international security. When Bernard Baruch presented his
plan for nuclear disarmament, he recognized the emptiness of a
simple renunciation of nuclear weapons.545 As evidenced by the
failure of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to renounce war as an instru-
ment of national policy,54 blanket prohibitions are futile unless
supported by an enforcement system. Accordingly, the interna-
tional community should adopt preventative measures to deter
nuclear weapons use and should strengthen the non-prolifera-
tion regime. A treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is
only one step towards ensuring that states will not resort to nu-
clear weapons in future armed conflicts. If the international
community follows its directive under Article VI of the NPT,547
to conclude a treaty on nuclear disarmament, the treaty must
establish mechanisms for inspection and oversight for civil as
well as military nuclear weapons programs. A system of sanc-
tions will also reinforce the treaty's substance. To achieve a
strictly regulated nuclear regime, leaders of the international
community must prioritize these issues on their agendas.
544. See supra notes 488-89 (describing expansion of zone of military operations
due to new weapons technology).
545. See supra notes 326-39 and accompanying text (describing Baruch Plan).
When presenting the Baruch Plan, Baruch stated:
I think the peoples we serve would not believe-and without faith nothing
counts-that a treaty, merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb,
constitutes effective fulfilment of the instructions to this Commission. Previ-
ous failures have been recorded in trying the method of simple renunciation,
unsupported by effective guaranties of security and armament limitation. No
one would have faith in that approach alone.
Baruch Plan, supra note 323, at 1059.
546. See supra notes 283-91 and accompanying text (examining Kellogg-Briand
Pact).
547. See supra note 369 and accompanying text (explaining Article VI of NPT).
262 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:181
CONCLUSION
Instead of relying on hindsight to judge a state's actions in-
volving nuclear weapons use, the international community
should adopt a system of strict regulation and oversight incorpo-
rating sanctions to prevent the future use of nuclear weapons.
In its Legality Opinion,54 8 the IGJ declined to adopt a bright-line
rule condemning the use of nuclear weapons in all circum-
stances. Rather, the ICJ decided that a state could use nuclear
weapons in self-defense if its very survival was at stake. To deter-
mine whether the use of nuclear weapons violates customary in-
ternational law, the ICJ requires the international community to
conduct a retrospective analysis on a case-by-case basis. Unless
the international community acts prospectively to implement a
transparent regulatory system, states will continue to circumvent
the existing proliferation regime and will justify nuclear weapons
use on grounds of deterrence and self-defense.
548. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text (discussing Legality Opinion).
